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2023

Order, Counter-Order, Disorder?

Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition

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SECOND ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR

The content of this proceedings comes from the Second Annual International Security Seminar (ISS) held from 9-10 February 2023 in Jefferson Hall at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, NY. The conference theme was "Order, Counterorder, Disorder? Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition."

The event was hosted by the West Point Department of Social Sciences, the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, the MESO Lab of the Ohio State University, and the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding.

The 2023 ISS involved more than 150 participants in 31 panels distributed over 15 working groups focused on regional and global security. Students and faculty from the West Point and the Modern War Institute were joined by top academics from around the world, as well as senior policy officials and leaders in the Army, and the Joint and Interagency communities in the United States.

Submissions spanned a number of topics focused on clarifying issues and offering advice on Sino-American competition. After a peer-review process, papers were selected for the event, updated by authors based on feedback and input during the event, edited, and then included in these proceedings. ☆

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THE 2023 SEMINAR ON THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

In Partnership with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance; the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth; and the Modeling Emergent Social Order Lab at the Ohio State University

We dedicate this report to our friend and colleague, Bear Braumoeller. May his memory be a blessing.

This seminar emerges – by design – from a collaboration between policy professionals, academics, and military leaders. It represents 15 topic-driven, transdisciplinary working groups, assembled from across professions, geographies, and nationalities. These working groups continue to function, and we hope they will be a resource for national and international leaders seeking to better understand critical economic, political, social, and technological questions at the heart of strategy.

This report captures the work of over 150 professionals seeking to support and inform the transition between the 20th and the 21st Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff at a time of significant uncertainty in the international system.

It is the second such report, of what we hope will be many more. The first report was prepared in support of the initial drafting of the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept by Secretary General Stoltenberg's Policy Planning Unit, led by Dr. Benedetta Berti, to whom we are immensely grateful for the impetus to create these working groups.

We hope the report challenges and informs its readers, and we remain at their disposal to continue challenging and informing.




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INTRODUCTION

ORDER, COUNTERORDER, DISORDER? SURVEYING THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE IN 2023

Jordan Becker,[1] Josh Woodaz,[2] and Douglas Lute[3]

The 21st Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff faces a challenging and rapidly shifting strategic landscape. The international order the United States and its allies constructed following the Second World War is in flux as economic and military power becomes more diffuse, generally shifting toward Asia. Russia and Ukraine are engaged in a destructive war of Russian aggression, amid worries about the future of Taiwan.

It is not unusual to make strategy in times of crisis – and occasionally, presentist bias drives us to misidentify our own times as being particularly challenging. However, it is hard to escape the significance of the long-term shifts in international order and ordering that face our nation's leaders in 2023.

When the authors of the essays in this symposium gathered at West Point in early February of 2023, several acute crises hung over the proceedings. Their charge, however, was to take both a long and a broad view and to consider strategic priorities for the United States and its Allies stretching over a decade or more. Doing so requires some context, which requires answering five central questions: first, what frameworks do we have for understanding international ordering, and how might we update them? Second, what alternatives to the current order are adversaries proposing, how do they formulate those alternatives, and how can we face them? Third, what emerging (and emerged) technologies are shaping current and future conflict? Fourth, how do societies and security orders interact? And finally, how do political economies contribute to order and, potentially, disorder?

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FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL (DIS)ORDERS

The concept of order is of critical interest to both scholars and practitioners. Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper (2018, 8) defined international order, as "the governing arrangements among states that establish fundamental rules, principles, and institutions… the basic framework that creates rules and settles expectations among states." Among wider audiences, order has been defined more simply. Guglielmo Ferrero (1948, 379), concluding his study on the origins of what Robert Jervis (1982, 362) called "the best example of a security regime – the Concert of Europe," described order as "the set of rules that man must respect in order not to live in the permanent terror of his fellow men, of the innate madness of men and its unpredictable explosions - a set of rules that man calls freedom."[4]

Major order-building efforts often follow strategic shocks: the post-WWII order that the United States and its allies have constructed and maintained may be seen as answering Ferrero's call at the time that he made it: it has enabled millions to enjoy freedom and security to an unprecedented degree. Current pressures require what Ferrero called the "reconstruction" of international order: the US seeks to do this while securing American interests, by "reclaim[ing] our place in international institutions" and "revitaliz[ing] America's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships (The White House 2021)." Reconstructing an order under stress while avoiding or mitigating destructive strategic shocks is the key challenge for today's strategists.

We draw four major lessons from the chapters in this Special Report: first, complacency is perhaps the most significant risk to international order and stability. By taking arguments (Cooley and Nexon 2020; Acharya 2018) about the end of US hegemony seriously, leaders seeking to reconstruct international order can mitigate this risk – fear of instability can encourage institutions to stay on top of risk and can therefore be stabilizing (Minsky 1986).

Second, we find that the addition of actual conflict with state actors (namely China and Russia, see Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume) to this general concern about the erosion of international order can have order-maintenance effects that are analogous to the effects Braumoeller (2019) observes war having on order-building. Careful attention to the domestic politics of adversaries may help avoid strategic surprise.

Third, we contend that arguments about war plan compatibility in alliance formation (Poast 2019) are also applicable to alliance maintenance – there are real tradeoffs between breadth and depth in international orders. These tradeoffs, once acknowledged, require the US to establish clear boundaries with adversaries, while still holding out the possibility of an open order in a less conflictual future. Establishing predictable patterns of engagement with adversaries is critical to avoiding misunderstandings and creating strategic stability.

And finally, we argue that this establishment of firm yet negotiable boundaries is critical to the ongoing process of reconstructing international order. In particular, the links between alliance management in Europe and Asia and the development of shared understandings of the challenges posed by both China and Russia to international order are already stimulating significant efforts at reconstruction. Still, those efforts' continuation is far from assured, as Berti, Kjellström Elgin, Gorana Grgić, and Vandewall make clear in chapter 4 of this volume.

[4] *Quote translated from Italian by the authors*

ALTERNATIVE ORDERS IN GREATER EURASIA

China and Russia threaten US hegemony and the international order it underwrites with what Cooley and Nexon (2020, 80) call "exit from above." Each of the two – sometimes in concert and sometimes not – appear to be working to undermine and provide alternatives to the US-led order indirectly, avoiding military confrontation, by shaping "the ecology of international order in line with their own preferences (Cooley and Nexon 2020, 104)." How do Chinese and Russian *domestic* politics shape the types of "wedging (Crawford 2011)" strategies they adopt? What risks and vulnerabilities emerge from the authoritarian politics of strategy-making? Part II of this volume addresses these questions.

In chapter 6, Jee, Tuttle, Xiong, and Khodorkovsky build on notions of "exit from above" and "wedging" to discuss China's responses to its disillusionment with the current international order and the strategies that it has pursued to provide realistic alternatives to it. Their analysis of emerging research identifies a record of mixed success for China. At the same time, China does appear to be providing alternatives to IMF loans, in particular, instances in Africa and Serbia, the PRC's transmission of economic into political influence has been incomplete. Observations about the expansion of the People's Liberation Navy Marine Corps suggests that China seeks to project power worldwide – challenges in doing so effectively while manipulating unit composition for party political reasons is a potential vulnerability.

Both China and Russia are likely to compete with the United States on as many rungs of a conceptual escalation ladder as possible, seeking tactics that achieve strategic ends while minimizing the risk of detection and retribution. Addressing this complex challenge from Russia, argue Stacey, Mayle, Person, and Skalamera in Chapter 7, requires the US and its allies to double down on our societal and military strengths while avoiding Russia's.

Just as alliance and domestic politics shape US and allies' strategies, China and Russia orchestrate strategy with an eye to the stability and security of their domestic regimes. Understanding the interactions between our adversaries' domestic political situations and their foreign policy choices can help identify strengths to be avoided and vulnerabilities to be exploited.

SHAPING ORDERS: TECHNOLOGY, CAPABILITIES, AND CONFLICT

Emerging and emerged technologies will doubtlessly affect and be affected by competition to shape the international order. While their effects on actors' calculations about threat, power, coercion, and deterrence are undeniable, the precise nature of those effects is multicausal and difficult to predict – political and societal factors are also important, as Part III of this volume highlights.

In chapter 10 of this volume, Kaufmann, Hedgecock, Hedgecock, and Raykhman identify three central considerations for the relationships between emerging technology and international ordering: actors' own perceptions of technology's effects, its integration into multilateral defense organizations like alliances, and its reconcilability with liberal ordering principles. They draw three recommendations for policymakers from their analysis: first, implementation of technologies into systems and societies is more important than the often over-hyped aspects of any particular technology itself; second, rapid implementation of technological advances requires the US, in particular, to address allies' concerns about abandonment and entrapment to ensure buy-in; and finally, technology shapes conflict below the level of armed violence, affecting the liberal international order in indirect but profound ways.

While the development, acquisition, and employment of specific technologies remains a critical aspect of various organs of government, strategic leaders must focus on the ecosystem in which these activities occur. Democratic capitalist systems have several enduring advantages, but those advantages require attentiveness to their sources if they are to continue to endure (Wolf 2023).

The juxtaposition between this system, which, at its best, harnesses the power of private sector research and design to a set of national interests identified through open and representative political deliberation, and authoritarian systems that seek to gain efficiencies through the state-led direction of resources to strategic priorities, is not new. But is the seemingly increasingly rapid pace of technological development, particularly in the field of Artificial Intelligence, changing this dynamic? Which systems will be best equipped to scale rapidly in response to crises, shift investments quickly, and establish and maintain norms that enable integration of technology into national security enterprises without becoming national security states?

Many questions about technology and ordering point us toward the politics, economics, and the political economies of how we order our domestic societies and the multilateral organizations in which they interact with one another. Parts IV and V of this volume explore these topics in depth.

SOCIETIES, SECURITY, AND ORDERING

Building on the insights above, Limbocker, Schwab, Simms, and Watson argue in Chapter 13 of this volume that US society is the locus of a number of "gray rhinos" (Wucker 2016): very probable, high impact, but neglected threats. They identify an underdeveloped noncommissioned officer corps education system, eroding civilian oversight of the armed forces, an antiquated model of civil-military relations, lack of trust in military medicine, and corrosive cultural elements as gray rhinos within the US national security enterprise. Each of these under-analyzed threats to national security requires focused attention from strategists.

Militaries reflect the states and societies in which they reside and execute the policies those states and societies formulate. Sullivan, Limbocker, and Kelly argue in chapter 15 that domestic politics are thus fundamental to military missions and force composition. Yet the dominant paradigm within the US military conflates nonpartisanship and subordination to civilian government with the avoidance of anything of a political nature, which, at its logical conclusion, includes war itself. Particularly in an environment of contentious domestic politics, such avoidance can be attractive, but is even more dangerous. Neglecting domestic politics in fashioning strategy and foreign policy is itself a gray rhino. Strategists can and must remain nonpartisan while thinking carefully about the political elements of the strategies they are crafting.

Just as the United States and its autocratic adversaries have domestic politics to attend to, so do allies and unaligned states. Chapter 16 addresses interactions between domestic politics in the US and its allies and the international strategic environment, finding that those interactions are critical. America's ability to preserve liberal international order depends on its ability to establish higher-order principles, agree on basic procedures for formulating and contesting those principles domestically, and understand analogous processes inside friendly and unfriendly societies. Defining, reconciling, and arguing conflicting notions of justice and law that undergird international order, chapter 21 highlights, will be a key component of such debates. A strategy that fails to address the domestic sources of power and purpose at home and abroad is not worthy of the name.

POLITICAL ECONOMIES AND INTERNATIONAL (DISORDER

Finally, societies also resource the human and material elements of military power and the national strategies and policies that it supports. Chapters 20-24 of this volume address these "sinews of war," shedding important light on alliance management, economic statecraft, and industrial policy.

As the US focuses its attention on adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region, allies in Eurasia will likely need to take on a greater share of the responsibility for securing Europe and its neighborhood. In chapter 20 of this volume, Thew, Fiott, Finelli, and Strasser contend that recent shocks point toward increased European defense spending, but also toward more precise modes of measuring commitments.

Such commitments manifest materially in defense capabilities, which emerge from Defense Industrial Bases. Chapters 23 and 24 address the US and global defense industrial landscapes, respectively. In chapter 23, Cappella Zielinski, Finelli, Gerstle, Kulalic, and Wilson contend that the US defense industry is currently optimized for the sorts of low-intensity and peacetime activities that the military faced in the post-Cold War period, elevating efficiency and cost-cutting over flexibility and capacity. Near-term returns take precedence over resilience and innovation. This model is no longer viable in the face of intense competition from China, requiring national leadership to "take a more intentional and direct role in shaping the capability, capacity, and resilience of the US defense industrial base." Chapter 24 addresses these considerations at an international level, focusing on transatlantic defense industrial relations and arguing for a new transatlantic bargain in this area.

Strategy is unavoidably political. Effective strategies require a clear understanding of the political and economic parameters shaping the exogenous environment, as well as the political, economic, and military levers available to planners to shape that environment and prevail in conflict. This five- part volume aims to provide strategists with a comprehensive look at those parameters from multiple perspectives – academic, military, policy, and industrial.

We contend that four categories of actions by the US and its allies can help stabilize international order in a way that favors continued peace and prosperity for their citizens. First, acknowledging the danger international order is in helps focus minds and avoid complacency. Second, acknowledging the very real conflicts we face with China and Russia helps clarify requirements and establish the case for careful order maintenance and establishment of boundaries – the fight for Ukraine's sovereignty is a concrete action in this area. Third, questions of compatibility are increasingly important in establishing such boundaries – it is important to retain the open nature of the US-led order while preventing

malign actors from corroding it from within. Finally, alliance maintenance continues to be a critical feature of the military elements underwriting an international order that is favorable to the US and its allies. Careful attention to allies, their national political economies, and the institutions and organizations that manage allies' relationships with one another is indispensable. ☆

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Part I.
Order & Ordering: Intellectual, Geostrategic, and Policy Frameworks

CHAPTER 1

ANARCHY, AUTHORITY, AND THE SPACE BETWEEN ORDER AND ORDERING – THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Patrick Kelly[1] Mike Rosol[2]

ABSTRACT

Recent research challenges the notion of international relations as purely anarchic and conflict prone. Anarchy's relationship to interstate conflict is complex, anarchy is often best viewed as a continuous variable for theoretical purposes, and anarchy is continuously variable, empirically. Whether we think of anarchy as the absence of central authority over international actors or as the absence of ordered international action, we can conceptualize and measure the variation between anarchy and its antithesis. In practice, international politics are of neither pure type – the reality of international politics fluctuates in the space between. Attending to the complexity of anarchy provides valuable insights. If states and their leaders treat anarchy as a variable, contested and shaped by state and non-state actors, they can better appreciate the nature and degree of change in international orders and its consequence for conflict and cooperation among states. Far from purely philosophical, the conception of anarchy is the key difference between strategic thinking about coping with China's growing power in a world devoid of authority and strategic thinking about shoring up the legitimacy of existing international orders in the face of China's rise.

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The authors are indebted to Beatrice Heuser and the late Bear Braumoeller for their thoughtful engagement in the panel.

INTRODUCTION

Anarchy is a central concept for scholars and students of international relations. For many scholars, anarchy is the thing that makes international politics different from domestic politics. It is the root cause of conflict among states and the fundamental problem to be overcome by states seeking to cooperate for mutual gain. Scholars define anarchy either as the absence of order or as the absence of a specific kind of ordering–common government. Thus, anarchy can be shorthand for "disorder" or for "the absence of a central authority" (Milner 1991, 69–70).

The high place of anarchy as a concept in international politics can be attributed to the enduring power of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz classified international politics as anarchic, an ordering principle fundamentally different from the organizing principle of domestic politics, which is hierarchic. For theoretical utility, Waltz insisted on a sharp disjunction between the two organizing principles. He explicitly rejected treating anarchy as one extreme observation on a continuous range, where the other extreme is "legitimate and competent government," which holds a "monopoly on the *legitimate* use of force" (Waltz 1979, 104, 114). Instead, according to Waltz, anarchy and hierarchy are best viewed as two distinct classifications, one typifying international relations, and the other domestic politics.

Recent scholarship challenges the traditional conception of international relations as purely anarchic and conflict-prone (Norris 2023; The MESO Lab, Ohio State University 2023; Vennet and Geeraerts 2023). Anarchy's relationship to interstate conflict is complex (Vennet and Geeraerts 2023). Anarchy *should* be viewed as a continuous variable for theoretical purposes (Norris 2023), and anarchy *is* continuously variable, empirically, whether viewed as the opposite of "order" or as the absence of participation in common hierarchical structures (The MESO Lab, Ohio State University 2023).

Attending to the complexities of anarchy is especially important in an era of potentially radical change associated with a rising regional hegemon in China. The international system is changing. Perhaps the fundamental ordering principle of the international system is changing, too. That is, international politics may be transitioning from a unipolar distribution of power under anarchy toward a bipolar distribution, but also from a system of less anarchy to more.

The prospect of more disorder or less centralized authority going forward should motivate reflection on the past and present. How much does the imperiled liberal international order approximate a legitimate monopoly on the use of force by the United States? If the order is changing, where is the locus of consensus and contestation—the *legitimacy* of the arrangement, or the *monopoly* over *force*?

These questions will draw attention to the fundamental sources of change in the international system and contestation over existing orders. In turn, they will reveal what the United States should do about it. Rather than only asking, "How should the United States deal with China's rise in an essentially anarchic world?" strategic leaders may also ask: "How can the United States ensure China's rise occurs in a maximally ordered and legitimate system?" Far from purely philosophical, the conception of anarchy is the key difference between strategic thinking about coping with China's growing power in a world devoid of authority and strategic thinking about shoring up the legitimacy of existing orders in the face of China's rise.

ANARCHY AND CONFLICT

Vennet and Geeraerts (2023) of Vrije Universiteit Brussel provide a new theoretical articulation of the relationship between anarchy and conflict. The key mediating variable is uncertainty, defined as states' inability to be sure about other states' intentions to use force and the time horizon over which this indeterminacy extends.

The authors identify two fundamental types of uncertainty: weak and strong. Weak uncertainty exists when great powers assess that the likelihood of threats to their vital interests is low, while strong uncertainty exists when great powers cannot make this assumption. The payoff of this distinction is in understanding the consequences of the severity of the security dilemma, wherein one state's attempts to increase its security causes the security of other states to decrease. According to Vennet and Geeraerts, weak uncertainty leads to less severe security dilemma dynamics because power gains are perceived as less consequential when states discount the likelihood of material gains being used against them in war. Meanwhile, strong uncertainty generates more severe security dilemma dynamics because states lack confidence in others' intentions not to use force and are incentivized to correct any imbalances in material power. When assessing others' intentions, states account not only for current but also for foreseeable future interests.

This relationship between uncertainty and interstate competition is complicated by the moderating influence of other factors, especially the international distribution of power. Under conditions of weak uncertainty, Vennet and Geeraerts argue that higher power imbalances will *decrease* security competition because weaker status quo states cannot expect to correct for the severe power asymmetry and because they do not expect to gain much from trying since expectations of others' aggression are already low. Meanwhile, higher power imbalances *increase* the severity of security dilemma dynamics under conditions of strong uncertainty. Uncertain states are more fearful of other states' aggression, and those fears become more severe when power gains are accruing to exceedingly powerful states.

While uncertainty directly shapes the extent and severity of interstate competition, uncertainty is itself a byproduct of conditions of the international system, namely anarchy and power polarity. Vennet and Geeraerts argue that unipolarity is most likely to generate weak uncertainty. Weak uncertainty is not an automatic byproduct of unipolar power distribution; instead, a global hegemon satisfied with the status quo might be able to signal and reinforce non-aggression. In contrast, weak uncertainty is less likely to arise under bipolar and multipolar systems, characterized by greater fear among potentially conflicting great powers.

ANARCHY AS VARIABLE (THEORETICALLY)

Norris (2023) argues that anarchy is best understood as a variable. This contradicts the traditional treatment of anarchy as a constant in international relations. According to Norris, anarchy varies in time and space. At different periods of history, states experience more or less order and, therefore, less or more anarchy. Moreover, in other regions of the world, or even across various state-to-state relationships, states encounter different levels of order. In short, anarchy is the antithesis of pure order, but the level of order varies from one extreme to the other.

The importance of this conception of anarchy, in Norris's view, is that it yields new insights into the role of power in international politics. Norris argues that states pursue power not as an end but as a means to achieve other ends. As a result, rational states wield power to achieve their

ends most efficiently. States can mobilize two different "currencies" of power in international politics: economic and military.

In Norris's argument, the level of international order determines the relative efficiencies of various modalities of power. Economic power is more efficient under conditions of greater order, where interests predictably align, and states can reliably cooperate around shared values and maximize collective welfare. Military power is more efficient under conditions of less order when unpredictability and enforcement problems complicate economic cooperation. Thus, states should rely more on economic instruments of power under conditions of greater order.

Norris identifies several potential extensions of the argument. One is that economic statecraft can be further broken down into specific mechanisms of financial investment, monetary policy, and trade, and these mechanisms vary in their tangibility. Trade is the hardest and most tangible economic instrument, while monetary policy is the most abstract. This suggests that the extent of anarchy determines not only the relative efficiency of military force compared to economic statecraft but also the relative efficiencies of specific economic instruments. A second potential extension is the consideration of expectations about the future. Norris identifies a puzzle in China's mistrust of international market mechanisms even under conditions of robust order in the 21st century. A possible solution is that China is weighing the relative efficiency of economic statecraft with respect to current levels of order and expectations of the future.

ANARCHY AS VARIABLE (EMPIRICALLY)

Members of the MESO Lab at the Ohio State University (2023) seek to measure the extent of order in international politics across time. The scholars adopt a "nominalist approach" to defining order, in that the best definition of order is most suitable for the researcher's question. They work with three distinct definitions of international order: order as predictability, order as ideological alignment, and order as institutional membership.

The first definition of order is the predictability of state actions. This is a "thin" conception of order, which can incorporate both positive and negative behaviors—so long as those behaviors are predictable responses to other states' behaviors. In this definition, one can characterize the degree of order without reference to states' underlying goals or interests and even without reference to the origins of predictability. Order is not the thing that yields predictability but rather predictability itself. In this view, order is the antithesis of chaos. The scholars operationalize this definition of order in terms of the size of the mean-squared error in predictions of a state's behaviors in response (within some defined timeframe) to another state's behavior within a dyad. Lack of order corresponds to high variability (high mean squared error in predicting responses), and order corresponds to low variability. According to this measure, derived from verbal and material dyadic interactions among major powers from 1945 to 2019, international order remained generally low during the Cold War, albeit with a sharp increase around 1980. Order then increased dramatically in the 1990s to a peak around 2000, followed by a more gradual decline to levels below the 2000 peak but above Cold War levels.

Another definition of order is in terms of ideological alignment. This conception of order emphasizes the importance of shared values among states. States have various ideological preferences, including organizing social interactions with other states. One logic of normative convergence among states is that ideologically similar states are more likely to align. Another logic of convergence is that certain (liberal) ideologically similar states are more *capable* of generating alignment because, for example, they can more credibly commit to institutional

obligations. To operationalize order as ideological alignment, the authors use Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) private property protection and electoral democracy scores to generate annual ideal points for each state. Next, the authors calculate the distance from these points to those of the United States and the Soviet Union in ideological space. A snapshot of alignment in 1962 illustrates some of the utility of this measurement strategy: most NATO states concentrate in a tight ideological cluster, but Turkey, Greece, and Portugal register as outliers, and this observed alignment tracks with NATO's tendency to admit certain states for geopolitical rather than ideological reasons.

The third and final definition of order is institutional membership. This conception treats order as observable in institutional participation because this membership is an *indicator* of interstate convergence (i.e., institutional participation is evidence of ordering) or because this membership is a *cause* of ordering (i.e., institutional participation is evidence of states attempting to achieve order). In either interpretation, more state participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) is consistent with greater international order. The operationalization of this definition works through a hierarchical latent trait model, which assigns every state an annual value for underlying political, economic, and social ideal points based on these states' observed membership in political, economic, and social IGOs.

These various conceptions and measurements of order have different implications for our understanding of anarchy. If we take order to mean the absence of chaos, and anarchy to mean chaos itself, then we can empirically observe variation in international anarchy over time by attending to the predictability of state actions. More anarchy means greater variability in the predictability of other states' actions, whether conflictual *or* cooperative. On the other hand, if we take anarchy as the opposite of hierarchy, or the absence of a legitimate central authority, observing variation in ideological alignment with hierarchs and international convergence in shared institutions means that we can detect variation in the extent of anarchy.

CONCLUSION

The traditional Waltzian conception of anarchy has endured in international relations scholarship despite many theoretical and empirical critiques (Bull 1977; Goh 2019; Kang 2019; Lake 1996, 2001, 2009; Mattern and Zarakol 2016; Wendt 1992). For example, Helen Milner challenged the tendency of scholars to treat anarchy as "*the* fundamental background condition" of international relations, which caused a "radical separation between domestic and international politics" in theory not matched by the overlap in reality (Milner 1991, 85).

More recently, R. Harrison Wagner provided an especially striking critique of foundational international relations arguments, including those made by Waltz, as incomplete and, therefore, invalid. In Wagner's view, the conclusions about conflict flowing from premises about anarchy do not follow, which means that these "structural" arguments have "virtually nothing to say about why war ever occurs anywhere" (Wagner 2007, 34). Wagner criticized the artificially radical disjunction between anarchy in international politics and hierarchy in domestic politics. He identified a severe contradiction between structural realism's conception of anarchy as the deep cause of international war and John Mearsheimer's argument for "partition" to resolve conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia in the 1990s. Wagner writes: "The consequence of partition is to substitute anarchy for a common government. If anarchy has the consequences Mearsheimer claimed for it, how could it lead to peace among warring ethnic groups?" (Wagner 2007, 35)

If such a fundamental critique—that various structural realist theories are *invalid*–has not dislodged the Waltzian conception of anarchy from its privileged place in international relations scholarship, it seems unlikely that recent scholarship will. However, even if anarchy remains fixed in its academic place, it is more open to variable interpretation by scholars and practitioners. Recent research should motivate observers of international relations and policymakers to question their assumptions and avoid overly simplistic notions of change or its absence in international relations.

How states and their leaders think of anarchy affects what they take as a given constraint for competing with international rivals and what they treat as an outcome of their own actions in international politics. Approaching the international system as fundamentally anarchic is often conceptually useful, but it can also cause observers to disregard significant changes in international politics. If the world is always anarchic, never more or less ordered or hierarchical, it is easier to dismiss meaningful international variation in unpredictability or sources of authority.

When, instead, states and their leaders treat anarchy as a variable, contested and shaped by state and non-state actors—much like states and their leaders view anarchy and authority in domestic society—then they may be able to better appreciate the nature and degree of change in international orders and its consequence for conflict and cooperation among states. ☆

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CHAPTER 2

ORDER & ORDERING-INTELLECTUAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS: MANAGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses three intellectual and policy-relevant questions: who manages international order? How does this management occur? What do the managers of international order seek to accomplish? We set aside more theoretical definitions in favor of historically-informed and applied analysis of international order with implications for a national strategy. We find that great powers but also other states and nonstate actors shape international order; that successful change in international order during the nuclear age will likely be "evolutionary, not revolutionary;" that actions to manage international order have unintended consequences; and that order management tools include not only traditional instruments of statecraft but also ideas and narrative information, among others. Finally, order management presents different challenges for revisionist and status quo powers. For the United States, the chief imperative in maintaining the advantages of the present international order may be to pursue or accept those changes that keep it broadly attractive to others also.

MANAGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Who manages international order? How does this management occur? What do those managing international order seek to accomplish? These questions largely set aside the more theoretical question of defining international order in favor of historically-informed and applied analysis with implications for national strategy.

We find that great powers but also other states and nonstate actors shape international order; that successful change in international order during the nuclear age will likely be "evolutionary, not revolutionary;" that actions to manage international order have unintended consequences; and that order management tools include not only traditional political and military instruments of statecraft but also ideas and narrative information, among others. Finally, order management presents different challenges for revisionist and status quo powers. For the United States, the

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chief imperative in maintaining the advantages of the present international order may be to pursue or accept those changes that keep it broadly attractive to others also.

Who manages international order?

The question of who manages international order invites a broader answer than the common focus on great powers. In a period in which many analysts perceive Sino-U.S. competition as a central organizing principle (Lebow and Zhang 2022; Simón, Desmaele, and Becker 2021), we argue instead for a broad definition of consequential actors in international order management. Middle powers and developing countries are a large and important arena for great power competition, and those countries are neither passive bystanders nor too small to matter. Moreover, although most discussion of international order focuses on states, we argue that nonstate actors – multi-national corporations, technology innovators, international and non-governmental organizations, among others – also play crucial roles. Thus, we also find that although focusing on great powers and other states is a good place to begin thinking about who does international order management, one should not stop there.

To be sure, great power competition is a useful framework for several reasons, not least because the United States is a great power. For U.S. audiences and policymakers in particular, focusing on great powers is the most obviously and directly relevant. For all audiences, the focus on great powers greatly simplifies international order management and its complexities. Such simplicity has long been upheld as a feature of the realist tradition in international relations thinking (Waltz 1979). Theories such as offensive neorealism explicitly emphasize the importance of great powers relative to others (Mearsheimer 2001). Indeed, great power competition and offensive neorealism are essentially interchangeable in their emphasis on this class of states (Nexon 2023; Newton 2023). For practitioners, such focus is appealing because it facilitates efficient allocation of time and other resources. If great powers are the most important actors, then great powers merit priority on questions of international order management. Such prioritization, choices, and trade-offs are at the root of strategy making. Current U.S. strategy, with its emphasis on great powers and rank ordering of competitors, clearly reflects this approach.

However, increasingly competitive great power relations may also increase the importance of middle powers in international order management. Eighty percent of the world's population live outside great powers, and both they and their countries matter as objects of great power competition and as consequential actors in their own right (Newton 2023). For example, the 52 countries condemning or sanctioning Russia over its war in Ukraine represent America's closest allies but only 15 percent of the global population. Though only 12 states openly side with Russia, some 127 countries – a majority – have not taken a clear stand (Economist 2023). Great powers have obvious incentives to keep score of such choices among other states. But unlike during the Cold War, the behavior and motivations of middle and smaller powers today may be more transactional than ideological (Newton 2023). Global trends in foreign direct investment, arms transfers, technology, energy, and food exemplify this self-interested calculus on the part of middle and small powers. And to be sure, great powers like China and Russia have encouraged such a transactional approach. The extent to which transactionalism challenges the "rules-based international order" (The White House 2022) is clearly relevant to international order management and argues for a broad definition of who does it.

How to manage international order?

International order is never static, always contested in some way, and subject to enduring historical forces of continuity and change. Moreover, some aspects of great power politics – such as power maximization, balancing, and deterrence – are as old as international relations itself and not unique to any particular order (Hooker 2023). What may be different about the

contemporary international order, however, is the futility of great power war as a driver of change. Panelists noted that a new international order is often a consequence of great power war, and the durability of the order can be related to the decisiveness of victory (Ikenberry 2019; Wyne 2023). Yet great power war in the nuclear age has long been understood as self-defeating (Brodie 1946; Wohlstetter 1959). Indeed, the prospect of mutually assured destruction is a powerful incentive for the stable management of international order (Waltz 1990).

Today's international order is, on the one hand, directly related to the post-World War II settlement. Yet the order is also under strain from the breathtaking pace of change over the last eight decades – in political, economic, technological, ecological, demographic, cultural, informational, and other terms. Events such as the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War exemplify this duality: great powers found consensus in upholding the post-World War II principle of sovereignty and institutions of the United Nations, while that very consensus confirmed the end of the Cold War and emerging primacy of the United States in a new post-Cold War order. This situation means that successful change in the management of the current international order will likely be "evolutionary, not revolutionary" (Filip 2023).

How states manage international order is a function of their interests, actions, and adjustments to events and other actors. (These are, of course, basic elements of national strategy). Van Beek (2023) builds on substantial scholarship acknowledging states' multiple and sometimes competing interests. Great powers may wish to maximize their power and influence over the international order. But states also have countervailing interests in limiting costs and uncertainty while avoiding great power war. Policymakers know that hard choices in the real world often reflect such dilemmas – or trilemmas, "multilemmas," etc. (Hayes and Moon 2016). For example, can liberal democracies continue to prosper from trade with China while also curbing its objectionable economic practices? With Russia, how can the United States and NATO allies curb armed aggression and defend Ukraine while also avoiding escalation to an even more destructive general war? Such questions once again suggest that while realist theories about states' basic interests in survival or power may be a useful place to start, policymakers must go further to weigh some interests against others and accept trade-offs in deciding which interests to prioritize and when.

Interests alone do not govern international order, however. Action can change or preserve order. Moreover, state action and international order affect one another: when states act to manage international order, the order itself may be changed (for good or ill, as intended or otherwise), and this order provokes further action by states and others. This dynamic nature of orders is especially apparent in hard power interventions, whether military or humanitarian (Filip 2023). Consider the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, which the United States and others undertook to restore stability to a war-torn region and protect a vulnerable population. What NATO allies described as action to uphold and preserve international order, Russia has routinely cited as an example of Western hypocrisy in flouting state sovereignty and the authority of the UN Security Council for nakedly self-interested reasons.

On the one hand, this feedback dynamic between action and international order may encourage states to seize and retain the initiative. Driving change seems more appealing than reacting or simply acquiescing to it. On the other hand, this dynamic also argues for caution and humility. Efforts to change the international order can have long-lasting and unpredictable consequences. At the very least, policymakers must endeavor to anticipate the consequences of action, knowing that such predictions will be imperfect. At worst, actors may conclude that any sense of driving events is illusory and intentional management of international order impossible (Betts

2000; Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller 2020; Edelstein 2021). At best, states and other actors concerned with international order management must conduct a realistic appraisal of whether the actions and resources available to them can achieve a desirable near-term effect while remaining resilient to unintended consequences and uncertainty.

The actions of middle powers illustrate the difficulties and potential dangers of how states attempt to manage international order. While Newton (2023) has pointed out the growing importance of middle powers, Simón and Figiaconi (2023) build on this insight by identifying specific trends in the actions of middle powers and evaluating great power responses to them. Although theories of state alignment have traditionally focused on "balancing" and "bandwagoning," a non-committal approach of "hedging" can be an attractive option for middle and smaller powers that feel caught between rival great powers. The still-shifting geopolitical landscape and trend toward transactionalism increase the attractiveness of such a wait-and-see approach. Moreover, hedging may also increase middle powers' bargaining power to extract concessions or otherwise influence the behavior of great powers. Middle powers in a competitive international order have specific concerns about abandonment by established great powers and encroachment by rising great powers. Accordingly, established and rising great powers are likely to respond to these concerns in different ways. Established great powers will attempt to mitigate abandonment fears through demonstrations of presence and building partner capacity. Rising great powers, by contrast, will attempt to reassure other powers through military restraint and political and economic engagement (Simón and Figiaconi 2023). These predictions underscore the importance of middle powers and the actions of states as both causes and consequences of international order (Shifrinson 2021; Wivel 2021).

Still, other kinds of action may be less well appreciated but also consequential in managing international order. Andrew Glencross explores the idea of international order as a "battle of narratives," a term also employed by European Union foreign affairs practitioners (Glencross 2023). This approach emphasizes the stories that policy actors tell in their efforts to create, sustain, or challenge international order. The underlying insight is that international order management is a human endeavor in which communication, identity, meaning, motivation, and morality all matter (Balzacq and Barnier-Khawam 2021; Kornprobst and Traistaru 2021; Ruggie 1998). In some ways, these observations represent continuity with the importance accorded to ideology during the Cold War and other twentieth-century contests. This approach has clear implications for the role of communications technology, traditional and social media, propaganda, and even education and historical understanding as relevant instruments of international order management.

There is also a considerable role for economics in international order management (Gilpin 1987; Ruggie 1982; Stein 1984; Cooley and Nexon 2020), not only as a matter for states but also for corporations and other non-state actors. That this aspect of the subject was not a principal focus of the panel may reflect the extent to which both scholarly and government institutions for international order management tend to begin with matters of politics, diplomacy, defense, and security. This disciplinary observation is another instance where traditional conceptions remain a good place to start but also leave room for further work.

Managing International Order – to what end?

Different kinds of actors seek different goals in managing international order. To status quo powers, management is about maintenance and preservation. To revisionist powers, management means modification, if not wholesale change. To middle or smaller powers, the main

task is dealing with the order's local impact (positive or negative), with little or no aim to affect the order itself. For non-state actors, order management may concern relatively narrow or technical preoccupations of the actor. The approaches, strategies, and tools best suited to manage international order necessarily depend on their likely use and desired ends.

The very notion of "ends" as they are often used by policy and strategy makers, may be somewhat misleading, however. Short of the apocalypse, neither history nor politics have any finality. Even in war, Clausewitz argued, "The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date" (Clausewitz 1976 [1816-1830], 80). Managing international order is, therefore, an ongoing challenge or an "infinite game" (Wagner 1983), and the associated tools of strategy and statecraft must work continuously (Cordova 2023; Johnston 2023; Stacey 2023). In considering goals or objectives for international order management, policymakers may benefit from clearly asking such questions as: Do we seek durable change to international order or more modest "muddling through" challenges to preserve or sustain the status quo?

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

For the United States, these arguments about managing international order have six implications for statecraft generally and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in particular:

First, Great power competition is a good starting concept for prioritizing efforts, but middle powers and other actors matter also. The NDS rightly emphasizes allies and partners. What about those adversarial, non-aligned, or "hedging" states?

Second, as a status quo power, the United States should seek evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change in the international order. Evolutionary change mitigates the risk of unacceptably costly conflict and preserves aspects of the international order that suit U.S. interests while accommodating changed circumstances.

Third, although states have basic common interests in survival or power, real-world problems usually invoke multiple and sometimes conflicting interests, e.g., security vs. prosperity, stability vs. opportunity, and values vs. resources. Policymakers accept trade-offs in deciding which interests to prioritize and when.

Fourth, international action has long-term and often unintended consequences. Action can both preserve and change order. When deciding whether to act, are the available options and resources capable of achieving a desirable near-term effect while also being resilient to other unintentional outcomes and uncertainty?

Fifth, managing international order is a human endeavor in which "narratives," communication, identity, meaning, motivation, and morality all matter. Traditional material elements of hard power also matter. The NDS is right to emphasize all instruments of national power. More attention could be invested in the intellectual and policy concepts, institutions, and initiatives to better integrate U.S. economic power.

Finally, the chief imperative in maintaining the advantages of the present international order maybe to pursue or accept changes that keep it broadly attractive to others. ☆

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CHAPTER 3

GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT: BRIDGING ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF SINO-AMERICAN COMPETITION

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ABSTRACT

The United States, its Allies, and its partners can adapt to the demands of the emerging strategic context by learning the right lessons from the tumultuous past five years, i.e., the COVID pandemic and related challenges across Western society, deterioration of relations between China and the West, and Russia's illegal annexation and (re)-invasion of Ukraine. On the one hand, the bridging of alliances should reinforce existing frameworks by widening areas of cooperation across sectors, deepen collaboration in areas like technology transfer and industrial engagement, and lengthening the time horizon to plan and execute activities together—with the intent to insulate Western power against the combined strength of Russian and Chinese subversion and aggression. But on the other, policymakers must ruthlessly prioritize the allocation of scarce resources and development of partnerships with like-minded stakeholders.

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The US National Military strategy calls the next ten years "a decisive decade." The competition between the United States and China is global, systemic, and comprehensive. Yet, it differs from the Cold War in several important ways. Where Russia and China once were rivals, today, they are partners—a Eurasian axis consisting of Russia and China and lesser partners like North Korea and Iran. (Brands 2022) Where the Cold War bifurcated the world into two ideological camps (and the 'Third World' of non-aligned states), a larger number of nations choose to remain close to both the West and China.

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Russia and China, and the Challenge of a Eurasian Axis

The challenges China and Russia pose to the United States and its allies, when or if they act in concert, are hard to overestimate. For the first time in its history, the West must contend with *two* existential nuclear adversaries concurrently—with those adversaries potentially acting in tandem.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the most obvious threat to peace and stability in Europe, but it is not the only one. Frozen conflicts from Georgia to Transnistria, and persistent meddling in politics throughout the EU and UK, have a corrosive effect across European societies. It remains a natural resource powerhouse, at least partially resistant to the effects of Western sanctions, and well-positioned to furnish China and other willing nations with commodities like gas and uranium. Even by continuing a disastrous war in Ukraine, Russia inadvertently helps to drain supply lines and war stocks from the United States and its allies, thereby limiting America's options elsewhere, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, for the next several years.

China presents a different threat pattern to the West than Russia; it defies the conventional explanation upon which traditional military intelligence and defense analyses are based. True, its military development indicates a blue water navy with global power projection capability and a large army. And it is developing critical capabilities like Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), stand-off missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, GPS-independent navigation, systems for information dominance, and long-range strike from multiple domains to push the United States beyond its so-called Second Island Chain and secure the Himalayas along its western border.

But China's impressive development of its military over the past 20 years is a subset of a broader effort to weaken the West. The United Front Work Department strategy enables China to press the West at points of perceived vulnerability. Western policymakers are only beginning to understand Beijing's creative use of economic power and "adversarial capital," but it amounts to investments by Chinese firms in Western businesses with the intent to weaken the industrial base and steal technology and processes. Confucius Institutes invest millions of dollars on Western campuses to "teach political lessons that unduly favor China (Edwards 2023)" amongst two generations of young students. China uses elite capture throughout the West to soften policy stances that may be unfavorable to Beijing. One example is the level of corruption at all levels of government in Canada, which is only now becoming public (Dorman 2023).

Building a Resilient Alliance Network to Insulate the West against a Eurasian Axis

America and its allies have the means to counter a Eurasian axis but together must exercise more complementary actions vis-à-vis Russia and China. The strongest is the network of relationships built upon decades of cooperation and relatively free transfer of goods, services, people, and ideas throughout the rules-based order. A Chinese diplomat once lamented to an American that the US "has all the good allies." The sentiment is correct; the challenge is to reinvigorate and adapt networks between Europe and Asia using practical tools that preserve the existing strengths of the security architectures of both regions while simultaneously viewing regional security through a broader, global lens. The US, its allies, and partners could make five advancements and adaptations listed below. While none are revolutionary, these ideas can, together, can facilitate a needed shift in Western thinking vis-à-vis China and Russia.

ALIGN TIME HORIZONS BETWEEN SHORT AND LONG-TERMS

American planners could be forgiven for not realizing that few countries can afford to consider multiple time horizons vis-à-vis China and Russia; smaller countries must be more ruthless than

the US in prioritizing scarce resources. With Moscow enmeshed in a quagmire in Ukraine, planners must contend with a volatile Russia that over-relies on its nuclear capability to backstop horrific military losses over the short term. Longer-term Russia is likely to threaten Europe with and a "replenished and re-stocked" conventional force within the next decade, capable of projecting limited force and supporting mercenary groups.

Two-time horizons also dominate discussions about China. The first is the Davidson Window, the short period from now until 2027 when China will reach the maximum of its strength vis-à-vis the West before weakening due to various factors. (Hendrix 2021).The second is the long term, often described as the "100-Year Marathon"—effectively now through 2050. (Pillsbury 2023) According to David Kilcullen, the two-time periods place different demands on planners, effectively focusing on longer-term capability acquisition, e.g., nuclear submarines for Australia in 2040 versus short-term fixes, Abrams tanks, and F-16 fighter jets for Ukraine today. While the United States and some larger allies have the capacity to accommodate short and long-term priorities regarding defense planning, most do not, and must therefore focus on a single timeframe.

STRENGTHEN EXISTING MECHANISMS BY IDENTIFYING (AND REMEDYING) INCOMPATIBILITIES

The fundamental challenge to bridging alliances between Europe and Asia is compatibility: where Europe's security infrastructures are *multilateral* and largely unified around NATO as the key structure for the North Atlantic community, Asia's alliance structure consists of *bilateral* security arrangements between the US and individual nations through centralized and siloed structures. The US was capable of adapting policy for both regions throughout the Cold War, but the emergence of a Eurasian axis as a mutual challenge for Asia and Europe forces policymakers in Washington to get creative about how to bridge the divide between like-minded security partners. This can be achieved by bolstering existing tools, like NATO-led initiatives extended to Asia and more seat allocation in NATO training programs for Asian partners. These are minor adjustments that require modest budget increases and a few additional staff officers in NATO billets. Progress is underway here; Japan and NATO announced a liaison office in Tokyo to open in 2024, which was first proposed over a decade earlier. (Reynolds, Pavel 2012)

A 'Super-NATO' organization as a hedge against a Eurasian axis is unlikely. The US and its network of allies and partners must be prudent, leveraging the unique features of the West, its geography and history, and a layered approach to deterrence and defense that spans the military, economy, and politics. Washington could consider a polycentric Indo-Pacific alliance and security architecture as a mesh of all instruments of national power employed to achieve a synchronized effect that insulates the West against Russia and China. Daunting as this may sound, several models in Europe and Asia demonstrate what is possible, e.g., the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden; and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) that boasts 15 nations.

Over the past decade, there has been a shift in how traditional US Allies view the security environment of the Indo-Pacific. It has been most pronounced in two separate yet mutually reinforcing security communities: select NATO allies increasingly establishing presence and power projection and declaring themselves as nations of consequence in the Indo-Pacific, and

non-NATO US treaty allies of the region, e.g., Australia and Japan.[1] This increase in attention, budgeting, and policy prioritization comes at a time in which both the EU and NATO acknowledge the systemic challenge posed by China and its closer relationship with Russia, as well as similar shifts in strategy Australia and New Zealand.

Other US allies, like Canada and South Korea, are natural elements of any coherent hedge against Russia and China. America could help allies and partners by opening planning billets to foreign liaison officers to both the Services and the Joint Staff, sending US officers to allied planning staffs wherever possible, outlining the risks and opportunities associated with both short and long-term horizons, and facilitating deeper cooperation by helping prioritize capability development across the DOTMLPFI spectrum.[8]

Doing so would also enable a continuous stream of Allied staff officers to be exposed to strategic considerations in ways otherwise unavailable to them, and equally valuable experience for US officers. Other areas of deeper coordination can help reinforce existing networks, in like intelligence sharing, early warning, and exercises. The allies and partners could expand air and missile defense cooperation, basing and warehousing arrangements, technology cooperation, and exercises and training in the long term.

DEFEND AGAINST WEDGING AND HEDGING

As far back as 2008, Wess Mitchell noted that "(t)he European Union is not a normal great power that simply needs to wrap up a few residual referenda, nor is it or an introverted but largely independent giant Switzerland. Rather, the European Union is likely in coming years to be a theoretically powerful but crisis-prone second-rate power caught in an unending geopolitical tug-of-war between other poles in the international system." (Mitchell 2008) His observation proved prescient (minus the notion of Europe being a "second-rate power"); the foreign policies of many European allies may be shaped by membership in both NATO and EU, but they also suffer from meddling by adversarial powers like Russia and China.

In a conference paper, Simon and Meijer (2023) note that both China and the United States (and Russia) use 'wedge strategies' to bring different countries and regions onto their 'side' or deny the other one from doing so. The United States continues to induce European allies and partners to adopt tougher stances on China across a range of issues: 5G digital infrastructures, technology transfer, global supply chains, investment decisions, and military deployments to the Indo-Pacific region. In turn, China pushes economic incentives and threats to prevent or weaken transatlantic alignment. Russia uses natural resources to exert influence over European nations with insatiable energy appetites.

Europe's autonomy amidst Sino-American competition hinges on European actors binding together to repel attempts to wedge. But the capacity to bind Europe together varies from issue to issue and is shaped heavily by institutional centralization within the EU and geographic location. Washington and Brussels need to engage across multiple formats and institutions, not just the EU and NATO. This includes developing new mechanisms, e.g., trade agreements and regional

[8] *France, and the United Kingdom, though Germany and the Netherlands have been increasing their maritime military presence.*
[9] *Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability.*

cooperation, to identify and minimize differences in threat perception and policy preference between the US and different European stakeholders, complement—or even align—transatlantic approaches to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

EMPOWER "SUPER-ATLANTICIST ALLIES"

While direct engagement between the US and EU is routine and substantive, the actions of Russia and China over the past several years facilitated the rise of a new phenomenon in European politics—the Super Atlanticist. While any smaller EU member state can become such a state, Banka (2023) argues that fears of abandonment incentivize Lithuania to show its 'good ally' *bona fides* through signs of support for American positions and policies throughout the world, even if that means that Vilnius at times adopts positions that conflict with the EU and some of its member states—France and Germany, in particular. Traditionally, small states are expected to 'sit quietly in the shadow of great powers' and a great deal of the scholarly literature has therefore treated them as "objects, not as subjects of international relations." (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006) Lithuania defied this expectation and serves as a template for other EU states to follow.

Lithuania is not the only state to pursue this strategy; Spain and Georgia contributed to the Iraq War, and Ukraine and Ireland sent troops to Afghanistan. But over the past few years, Vilnius has gone further than others by inserting itself into great power competition by becoming one of Europe's loudest voices opposing China. Why would the Lithuanian government challenge a power far greater in size? Multiple causative factors are at play, but its overall stance towards the Chinese Communist Party must be viewed through the lens of its alliance ties with the US. While confronting China may be a high-risk approach, it is equally, in the eyes of Lithuanian political elites, a high-reward strategy that makes the country a more attractive ally to America. By casting itself as a European frontrunner standing up to China, the Lithuanian government aims to cement its status as a trustworthy US ally over the long term.

Doing so is controversial domestically. A 2022 poll commissioned by Lithuania's Foreign Ministry found that a mere 13% of the Lithuanian public supported the government's hardline stance toward Beijing. (LTT 2022)Even Lithuania's President questioned whether the country had overplayed its hand and escalated the situation too far. (Milne 2022) Yet, despite domestic division and constant attacks by the Chinese Communist Party, the Lithuanian ruling coalition remains unfazed. When in August 2022, the US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi embarked on a controversial visit to Taiwan, the only EU country to endorse the trip was Lithuania. (Erlanger 2022)

While one should not overstate the impact Vilnius has on EU-China relations, Lithuania influenced the EU's policy agenda toward a US-friendly direction. Brands (2021) argues that while "great-power competitions have the feel of one-on-one duels, it is the choices of lesser states that can shape the fates of superpowers." (Brands 2021) Lithuania attempted to do its fair share of shaping great power competition. Of course, Vilnius hopes to get something in return for its tough line against China, i.e., a robust US military footprint in the Baltic region. After Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, the US has elevated its presence from "episodic deployments" to a "persistent rotational presence" across the Baltics. (LSM 2023) While a key strategic objective for Lithuanian lawmakers is a permanent US military base in the country, the latest US deployment constitutes an important measure of assurance for Lithuania.

ENCOURAGE ANCHOR STATES

The form and function of a Eurasian axis changes the strategic landscape in Europe and Asia; some states play outsized roles inconceivable a couple of years ago. Poland is a strong example of this phenomenon. Kulesa (2023) states that Poland views the US as the indispensable nation providing security and stability in Europe. But Washington's increasing interest in the Indo-Pacific is a key challenge for Polish policymakers; it risks the US turning its attention—and military—away from Europe, thus exposing the continent to Russian aggression.

In response, Warsaw adopted a combination of measures: efforts within NATO, bilateral contributions to US policies, and a push to deepen economic and industrial links with US companies. This approach includes measures to further cohere NATO, deter Russia, manage expectations regarding European strategic autonomy, and adjust the European Union's foreign policy to accommodate the increase in America's interest in the Indo-Pacific region. Poland sees China as a principal opponent but maintains a dialogue and economic ties with Beijing. At the same time, Warsaw views Russia as an immediate and ongoing threat.

While Warsaw recognizes the asymmetric nature of its relationship with Washington, it has adopted an "anchor state" philosophy in its strategic calculus with a four-pronged strategy. First, Warsaw engages in a persistent effort to have Washington establish a permanent US military presence in Poland. Second, it identifies the most salient American foreign policy objectives and provides substantive support to them, e.g., the 2003 Iraq invasion, counter ISIS-coalition, missile defense, and 5G network security. Third, Poland continues to deepen its economic and industrial links with the US industry, e.g., recent purchases of the F-35 combat fighter jet, Patriot missile battery, and Abrams Main Battle Tanks. Fourth, the Poles push for broader economic engagement with the US beyond defense and into areas like research and development, digital economy, liquefied natural gas terminals, and nuclear power plants.

CONCLUSION

The US and its allies contend with a Eurasian axis of China and Russia. Insulating the West from the combined might of Moscow and Beijing requires revitalizing existing institutions and internal reforms. It demands innovative diplomacy that places allies and partners at the forefront of policy planning across sectors, e.g., military, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Yet, the challenges and opportunities of this era behoove America's allies and partners to demonstrate value in new ways that resonate in Washington, Brussels, and beyond. This includes:

- Increasing opportunities for US allies and partners to participate in planning efforts, particularly in policy planning cells within the Departments of Defense and State (and placing US planners in similar positions within allied ministries where possible).
- Bolstering technical cooperation and transfer with trusted allies in Europe and Asia, using the recent experience with AUKUS and Poland as guides for multinational and bilateral cooperation, respectively.
- Rewarding "Super-Atlanticist" allies through industrial engagement and—if prudent—military basing considerations.

- Deepening industrial cooperation beyond traditional defense sectors to ensure mutually beneficial economic integration.

- Ensuring allies and partners remain resistant to wedging and hedging efforts by China and Russia globally. ☆

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CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES IN AN ERA OF COMPETITION

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ABSTRACT

Authoritarian, revisionist, and revanchist powers are exerting pressure on the liberal international order and challenging the United States' vital security interests across theaters. The United States will increasingly need to tackle challenges in two critical theaters simultaneously while also addressing global threats. To do so effectively, it will need to lean in and actively capitalize on its chief geostrategic advantage over its competitors and adversaries – its global network of alliances and strategic partnerships. However, alliance management faces both traditional and emerging challenges. These range from ensuring effective burden sharing, to providing alliance assurance, to balancing interests and values along with allies' contributions across theaters and domains. In addition, because the United States is operating in a world where all instruments of power, military and non-military, are increasingly utilized in an interconnected way, it will also need to look at defense and security alliance management through the lens of issues ranging from industrial policy to economic security. This essay sheds light on these "old" and "new" challenges, providing insights into critical issues of alliance management that the United States will face in the emerging security environment.

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The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion and escalation of its war of aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 made clear that the liberal international order is undergoing the most dramatic challenge since the end of the Cold War. Authoritarian, revisionist, and revanchist powers are aggressively challenging that order, both globally and in theaters that the United States has traditionally deemed most important for its national interest. Russia's brutal and ongoing military aggression against Ukraine and China's increasingly assertive behavior in the Indo-Pacific underscore that the United States must simultaneously address challenges in two critical theaters. It will need to do so while remaining able to tackle a number of significant global threats, from climate change to terrorism, that are not bound by geographical borders or confined

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to specific theaters. This disparate and manifold set of strategic considerations may strain U.S. and allied defense planning, extended deterrence, and deployable defense assets.

Peer and near-peer adversaries and competitors recognize that U.S. military forces enjoy an unprecedented global reach, in part made possible by a robust network of allies and partners. The U.S. National Security Strategy highlights this network as the United States' "most important strategic asset and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability" (NSS 2022). The U.S. National Defense Strategy sets forth a plan to "build enduring advantages" across U.S. and allied capabilities to counteract challenges and threats from competitors. The Strategy makes it clear that for the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order, and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective," while Russia constitutes a more acute threat due to its long-standing aggressive and destabilizing pattern of behavior, culminated in its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. The war, in turn, has undermined the European security order, furthered instability and insecurity globally, and put additional pressure on the rules-based international order (NDS 2022).

Understanding the dynamics of alliance relationships and how they may need to adapt will be vital to addressing these emerging challenges. As the largest and most powerful actor defending the rules-based international order and playing an essential role in coordinating across alliances, the United States is critical to this response. As the United States examines its policy options, calling on allies and partners plays on the United States' chief geostrategic advantage.

Alliance management, however, comes with a unique set of challenges that the United States will need to consider as it looks forward to the coming decades. These challenges have revolved around traditional issues such as burden sharing, assurances to alleviate the fears of abandonment and entrapment, and balancing between interest and values in the conduct of foreign policy. With the need to address multiple theaters at once and face more powerful challenges, alliance management in the near future must consider other factors like allies' global contributions, trauma care, and industrial policy. Furthermore, alliance management increasingly requires considering a range of non-military issues with a growing impact on alliances' cohesion and effectiveness. These include trade policies and active mitigation of economic vulnerabilities to the protection of critical infrastructure and democratic resilience. This essay sheds light on these "old" and "new" challenges and concludes by offering a set of policy recommendations that aim to improve U.S. foreign policy response in light of the looming systemic challenges.

THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES IN AN ERA OF COMPETITION

The Biden administration has lauded the United States' network of alliances as an extraordinary symbol of cooperation in the common pursuit of prosperity and peace. "Our alliances are what the military calls force multipliers," said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2021.[5] "They're our unique asset. We get so much more done with them than we could without them."

Alliances have played a core role in U.S. strategy since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, support to other states played a crucial function in containing the Soviet Union, and the United States, through NATO and bilateral agreements, made several commitments to defend its allies. Its extended deterrence commitments sought to reassure allies and deter military aggression from adversaries along the Eurasian heartland.

In an era of increasing great power competition, alliances can play a vital role in helping the United States manage conflict and competition in two major theaters. NATO countries and partners, as well as other treaty allies, have contributed to almost every major U.S. combat operation since the end of World War II. While there is room for improvement in allied capabilities, capacity, interoperability, and integration, the U.S. and its NATO allies together accounted for 55% of global military spending in 2022 and combined with U.S. treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific constituted 61% of the total world expenditure (SIPRI 2022). Standards across alliances create interoperability that eases the process of mobilizing and fighting alongside allies in a number of contingencies.

This force multiplication could apply to a single conflict, but it could also help the United States share responsibility for defense and deterrence across theaters worldwide. For example, to the extent that allies can mitigate local crises before a U.S. response would be necessary, the United States remains free to manage crises elsewhere. Allies also offer specialization and competitive advantages. Allies can bring different, specialized experience and expertise, including cold weather fighting, anti-submarine warfare, and intelligence assets and assessments. From setting discussions on values and norms to creating shared situational awareness and coordinating diplomatic and economic policies, alliances can also play a vital role in peacetime competition, which goes beyond the provision of military forces (Brands and Feaver 2017).

CHALLENGES OLD AND NEW IN ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

Much of the literature has located and debated the origins of alliances in their ability to aggregate military and economic capabilities to balance against concentrations of power, threats, and interests (Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; Schweller 1994; Barnett and Levy 1991; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2011; Johnson 2017; Henke 2017; Poast 2019). Institutional momentum can prolong and preserve the life of an alliance absent the threat it was created to counter: “alliances are not merely aggregation of national power and purpose: they can be security institutions as well” (Wallander 2000, 705).

Several challenges exist in alliance management. One danger is that allies could pose entrapment or “chain-ganging” risks, wherein a state is encouraged to behave more provocatively than it otherwise would because it feels secure that, in case of an escalation, other allies would step in to defend it due to concerns about the value of either the state, the relationship, or others’ perceptions. The United States has long been concerned with this potential risk and has thus written conditions into security agreements to manage it (Kim 2011; Beckley 2015; Cha 2016).

On the other hand, states could freeride or “buck pass,” doing little to counter a threat because they believe that others will do so for them (Christensen and Snyder 1990). This concern about freeriding is a regular discussion point in U.S. debates about alliances, with frequent conversations about burden sharing. Emerging research suggests that the relationship between military aid and donor defense spending may be driven by the nature of the partnership relationship itself. Bate (2023) finds that U.S. military aid is correlated with an increase in recipient military expenditures on average. However, this increase in military expenditures does not occur in U.S. treaty allies – and in fact, decreases in NATO allies after receipt of U.S. military aid. The author speculates that this phenomenon might occur because recipient countries are assured to the point where they are comfortable decreasing their overall military spending. However, the research focuses on the post-Cold War period when defense spending in NATO countries

generally decreased due to the lower threat perception. That trend began to reverse in 2014, following Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, suggesting threat perceptions and assessments of the broader security environment do also inform defense spending choices. While further research is necessary to understand the causal logic behind these findings and the impact the war in Ukraine has had on the said dynamics, it does suggest that U.S. military aid can be effective in shaping recipient defense programs under some conditions.

There is also concern about the balance between adhering to democratic values and seeking alliances and partnerships in a context of strategic competition. The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasizes promoting human rights, considering it a cornerstone of the existing competition between democracies and autocracies. Striking the right balance between interests defined strictly in terms of power and promoting values such as human rights has long been a challenge in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy. However, as the United States seeks to expand its base of alliances and partnerships to counter adversaries and competitors, it must also consider how these relationships might complement or conflict with U.S. values and human rights concerns.

This question is likely to become more complex as competition grows between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and China, Russia, and other revisionist autocracies on the other. From one perspective, enforcing democratic standards in the context of security cooperation could be perceived as a liability. Indeed, U.S. adversaries are not as constrained as the United States is by concerns about human rights and may seek to create relationships and make inroads in countries and groups with which the United States, for very well-intentioned reasons, does not cooperate. Yano and McKnight (2023) contend that the application of the Leahy Laws, which seek to "disassociate the United States from objectionable security forces while also incentivizing good behavior among governments wishing to access and benefit from U.S. security assistance," may actually hinder valuable U.S. cooperation that would not break the spirit of the laws. The relationship between human rights and geopolitical competition becomes increasingly complicated in states which do not have strong democracies, but which have not yet firmly aligned with adversary governments. Yet from another perspective, maintaining a rights-centered approach and promoting democratic good governance may also be seen as a unique asset of the United States and its allies and a way to effectively distinguish themselves from potential adversaries and competitors and their 'authoritarian cooperation model.' In the same context, there is also a need to further probe the link between promoting good governance, transparency, and human rights on the one hand and increasing the sustainability and effectiveness of security assistance and reforms, as elucidated in the case of Ukraine, in turn improving the combat effectiveness of partner forces. Looking to the future, the United States must maintain a balance between two strategic interests: broadening the network of security alliances and partnerships and upholding the democratic rules-based order.

There are also an additional set of emerging challenges and opportunities for academics and policymakers to consider when it comes to managing alliances in an era of strategic competition. As that competition plays out globally and simultaneously across theaters and domains, in order to successfully compete, the United States will need to retain a global footprint, both militarily and geopolitically. This seems to discount the notion of a 'single theater' approach to strategic competition. Moreover, the United States will need to retain a global approach and increasingly recognize the interlinkages between threats and challenges across theaters. In other words, while

different theaters may have different threat priorities, threats across the globe are interconnected and cannot be taken in isolation.

How the United States balances threats across theaters, and how allies might support and complement these efforts, is one of the most important questions facing defense planners. While the United States' military and defense budget is sizeable, its resources are finite. There are several ways in which allies might play a role in the management of strategic competition.
A first-order question is the role of the United States in Europe. One model suggests that the United States should significantly reduce its investments and presence in the European theater and that Europeans should take on a "first responder" role on the European continent, developing the capabilities and capacity to handle at least the initial phases of any conflict in the theater, including when it comes to collective defense. If European states could assume greater strategic responsibility in Europe, the United States could focus more of its attention and assets on the Indo-Pacific theater (Hamilton and Binnendijk 2022).

However, some tasks and roles the United States fulfills in Europe may not be able to be easily shifted (Meijer and Brooks 2021). In addition to extended nuclear deterrence, the United States serves as a cornerstone of strategic intelligence, logistics, training, cyber capabilities, and coordination (SILT2C) within the NATO alliance (Chinchilla et al. 2023). In the run-up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the power of these capabilities came on full display as the United States worked to alert European allies of Russia's true intentions. Since the start of the war, this leadership has continued with the United States serving as the principal coordinator of NATO Allies' responses.

Efforts to shift U.S. capabilities toward the Indo-Pacific require a two-pronged approach, reorganizing U.S. capabilities under a global umbrella and increasing European capabilities to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. While it may be tempting to consider U.S. asset deployments in a theater-to-theater context, taking a global assessment of force posture alongside the theater-specific assessments allows greater nuance and recognition of the opportunities and limitations of fungibility. Through this lens, the United States may be able to consider expanding its coordination, cyber, and intelligence capabilities to the Indo-Pacific without sacrificing its commitments to Europe. These facets are not necessarily contingent upon theater-specific constraints. However, assets for contributions like logistics and training may be less fungible. Thus, if maintaining the same resource pool but seeking to increase logistics and training in the Indo-Pacific, the United States may need to forgo some of its traditional responsibilities, suggesting increasing the role of European allies such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in maintaining European readiness (Chinchilla et al. 2023). In assessing the trade-offs, the United States should also consider the potential costs, in terms of geopolitical influence and power projection, of a substantially reduced European footprint. Likewise, a potential erosion of deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic theater could impact the Indo-Pacific one, again pointing to the complexity of alliances-management in the twenty-first century.

At the same time, the United States could further reflect upon how to leverage allies across theaters–militarily, economically, and politically. Notably, non-military cooperation and coordination in areas ranging from critical infrastructure protection to promoting resilience, to technological innovation represent other avenues through which European allies can contribute to tackling strategic competition, across theaters. Similarly, U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific could share lessons and expertise with European partners. Past efforts to include these states in NATO

meetings and summits provide one venue for coordination and discussion. Several European states have also deployed naval assets to the Indo-Pacific in shows of power projection. However, the reasons that allies participate in U.S.-led global efforts are nuanced. Recent research, for example, suggests that traditional explanations for why states conduct costly foreign policy signals are insufficient. Henley (2023) finds in a study of European naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific that neither deterrence of an adversary nor assurance to a patron fully explains European decision-making. Similarly, Walsh (2023) suggests that each state involved in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Partnership (AUKUS) had varying conceptualizations of the agreement, with motivations ranging from operationalizing alliances to the building of industrial capacity.

Indeed, one area of alliance management that still needs to be explored is the role of industrial policy. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the high rate at which ammunition and other stocks are expended in modern conflict and has brought attention to the capacity of the United States and allied defense industrial bases. Driven by strategic necessity or industrial interests, industrial partnerships could increase the capacity and efficiency of allied defense procurement. This also raises the broader question of how best to build partnerships: top-down or bottom-up? What starts as an industrial partnership could evolve into something more strategic and long-term, and what begins as a major leader-led statement of partnership could be hollow without these rich connections.

Alliances and partnerships could also play a role in addressing trauma and medical sustainment capabilities in the case of war. Great power conflict, if it were to occur, would result in both a high volume and high rate of casualties. Recent unclassified wargames about a possible U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, for example, note the likelihood of thousands of casualties within the first few weeks of a conflict (Cancian et al. 2023). Sustaining U.S. and allied forces in the case of a protracted conflict is key for the United States to strengthen its resiliency and adaptability in the Indo-Pacific. As a near-peer adversary, China has the potential to inflict substantial casualties on allied forces, and any number of potential complications could make treating wounded forces problematic. During recent conflicts in the 21st century, U.S. air supremacy and technological advantages supported U.S. efforts to recover and treat personnel in nearby facilities before moving them to Germany and other allied states. However, in a war with China, a failure to gain air superiority or an inability to overcome anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2/AD) could fundamentally disrupt U.S. trauma support systems. The current lack of medical capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater only exacerbates this threat. Building up the medical facilities, training, and experience of allies and partners in the region can serve as a further opportunity to strengthen relationships with partner forces and develop allied care systems for domestic and collective uses. At the same time, the United States should avoid a total reliance on these systems, and will need to consider the role of far-forward surgical teams and guerilla trauma system providers as U.S. forces are inserted beyond the reach of allied air and surgical support capabilities (Remondelli et al. 2023).

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The changes in the international system and the growing challenge of tackling threats that may endanger U.S. national security and that of its allies and partners demand a rethinking of the structure and purpose of the post-World War II security cooperation frameworks. We contend that the simultaneity of threats emanating from the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific demands that the United States and its allies effectively respond to these challenges and invest more in their

national defense. In this regard, the contributions speak to the need to revisit how alliances and partnerships are conceptualized – whether it is by focusing on the less prominent aspects of cooperation and coordination, such as those in the field of logistics and medical diplomacy, or by casting a new light on the long-standing debates such as those about the credibility of assurances and striking the right balance between interests and values.

Moving forward, one of the critical policy-relevant questions that the ongoing war in Ukraine has only highlighted is how the United States can best attract partners in the context of ongoing strategic competition with China and Russia. The debate on this issue also focuses on whether the United States would be better served by a more interest-based alliance system or whether it should prioritize working solely with democratic partners. In this sense, it will be important to continue balancing between building broad issue-based coalitions, standing up for the rules-based international order, and supporting democratic governance. The answer is bound to be context-dependent.

Another important question concerns the prioritization and strategic tradeoffs between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. A growing and vibrant research agenda on the prospect of coordination and cooperation between the U.S. allies from the two regions is bound to offer answers as to whether and how this can help the United States to overcome the strategic dilemma posed by a 'two-theaters' contingency. We recommend greater consolidation of efforts across theaters, as seen in the support for and participation in initiatives such as AUKUS and European naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, alliance-management in an era of strategic competition requires connecting the dots between theaters and increasingly between the military and non-military roles that defense alliances and security cooperation programs can play. In this context, discussions on better utilizing alliances like NATO to foster greater transatlantic convergence on issues such as resilience, energy and economic security, and active mitigating of economic vulnerabilities and dependencies on strategic competitors can be especially useful.

The United States and its allies face an increasingly contested international environment. Challenges from near-peer and increasingly-peer states amplify acute regional threats and global competition. The U.S. alliance network is one of the key pillars of the international rules-based order, and this network can play a core role in managing the challenges ahead. The devil, however, is in the detail, which makes effective alliance management an imperative in weathering the storm. ☆

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PART II. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES: GREATER EURASIA

CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA

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ABSTRACT

What is the nature of China's rise, and does this rise affect international politics? This essay uses both systems-level and individual-level approaches to theoretically and empirically examine China's rise from a social perspective. First, we examine the rise of China through a socialization framework and highlight key elements of great power and non-great power interaction at the system level. Second, we turn towards an individual-level approach and examine the role of elite discourse. Third, we examine the role of international public opinion and the individual perceptions of China's rise. Finally, we undertake a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of Western social perceptions of China's rise. Understanding these varied social aspects of China's rise is critical to the development of sound scholarship and effective foreign policy. Accordingly, this article is a key step forward in holistically understanding China's rise and its social implications.

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Scholars have long sought to understand the dynamics of great power competition and hegemonic transition. In the contemporary era, China's rise has brought both significant benefits and stark challenges to the liberal international order. As one of the world's superpowers, the United States must deliberately consider how it will respond to the resurgence of China and its Middle Kingdom-centric conceptualization of international order. In this pursuit, it is critical to precisely analyze how China is "rising;" alternatively stated, what is the nature of China's rise? Policymakers and scholars must understand these varying perspectives on China in order to effectively craft and shape policy.

This article synthesizes scholarly works that view China's rise from a social perspective. Struye de Swielande and Vandamme (2023) provide an overarching theoretical framework to understand the social nature of states within the international order and hierarchy. This framework leverages concepts of socialization, dominant socializers, peer competitors, and swing states to lay out the international order. Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023) examine elite discourse of the former Chinese Presidents Zemin, Hu, and Xi, and their conceptualization of the international order. This technical analysis focuses on identifying speech patterns and processes that indicate the Chinese leadership's understanding of China's contemporary rise. Givens, Okooboh, and Morrisey's (2023) nascent work examines the Western characterization of China's contemporary

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rise. This work loosely categorizes predictions about the rise of China as positive ("Panda Huggers") or negative ("Dragon Slayers"). Han, Han, and Zhang (2023) conduct an experimental online survey of American social attitudes toward China's rise. This study examines the social and psychological nature of public individual-level understanding of China's rise and its impact on the global order. The interplay of these new scholarly works focused on social discourse provides a key foundation to examine China's rise from a non-realist perspective.

Systems-Level: Resocialization and the Role of "Swing States"

Struye de Swielande and Vandamme (2023) characterize the rise of China using a social framework. From this perspective, the socialization process is a core component of understanding great power competition and international politics. In particular, the authors focus on the socialization process of swing states in the international order. Building on Fontaine and Kliman (2009), a swing state is defined as a country whose "choices [they] make – about whether to take on new responsibilities, free-ride on the efforts of established powers or complicate the solving of key challenges [i.e., obstruct] – may, together, decisively influence the trajectory of the current international order." In this process, "swing states" can emerge within an international order with a dominant socializer and a peer competitor. These swing states are either neutral or indecisive in their alignment with the two dominant powers of the international order. The dominant socializer recognizes other states, cementing these swing states as legitimate entities; in this process, various factors drive and shape the socialization process and the concurrent delegation of social status. In this process, a peer competitor can begin to emerge as an alternative socializer, greatly influencing the "role bargaining process

Although not explicitly discussed, this process of socialization is driven by the microprocesses espoused by Johnston (2008), Johnston (2018), and is echoed in works by Adler-Nissen and Zarakol (2021).[4] In the contemporary context, the United States is a dominant socializer, and China can be portrayed as a rising peer competitor. Given this conceptualization, swing state behavior is critical in understanding the future of great power competition. In contrast to the work by Ikenberry (2014) or Matsanduno (1997), the authors focus on the role of the smaller states as critical in shaping the international order. When compared to the existing scholarly literature, this is a non-traditional approach as it provides agency to smaller states, the swing states, that are typically labeled non-great powers (Walt 1991, Welch 1991); the implication is that non-great powers simply balance or bandwagon, rather than drive an inter constitutive process of social recognition and cementation. As China gains more influence and solidifies its position on the international stage, it rises within the international hierarchy and now wields the potential power to socialize other states. Both China and the United States' broad policy goals will likely incorporate aspects of socialization with a heightened focus on swing states.

In the framework, China's role as an alternative socializer, place it in competition with the United States (the dominant socializer). As the alternative socializer, China is in a status-seeking position and is looking to mimic the leader of the international system. Additionally, China

[4] *Tanguy Struye de Swielande and Dorothée Vandamme, "China as Alternative Socializer and the Role of Swing States" (Order, Counter-Order, Disorder? Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition, West Point, New York, 2023).*

also gains legitimacy by criticizing U.S.-led norms such as manifest destiny, while simultaneously advocating for Chinese-led norms, including "Asia for Asians." Thus, China's position as an alternative socializer gives it the ability to make new norms, norms that may challenge U.S.-led hegemony in the social arena. China is also a defender of the primary level of socialization: the Westphalian model of statehood. It challenges secondary levels of socialization and the development of alternatives through a range of spheres of influence, including political, economic, and military realms. Under the current model, swing states are also agenda setters. These agenda-setters are aware of their status and leverage their status to pursue state interests. Ultimately, the great powers may set the international order, but middle states and smaller powers do the socialization work.

Notably, the socialization process is observable in China's attempts to project its unique social identity to reinforce a group identity in line with its international goals. These attempts include developing parallel alternative systems, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). BRICS and SCO represent China's aims to facilitate international group identity separate from those originally socialized by the United States. In response, the United States has the ability, as the dominant socializer, to counter these alternative systems and identities. To fully make use of this ability, a closer analysis of what constitutes a "swing state" and how the United States should bring a swing state to its side. This process of resocialization is critical to U.S. national interests and should occupy a central role in the United States' foreign policy. Emphasizing the liberal international order set forth by the United States is critical to the process of resocialization. Furthermore, reinvesting in diplomatic relations with both strong allies as well as weaker partnerships is another facet of resocialization.

The United States must consider how to bring these new partners into its sphere of influence and maintain relations with states that have been in the sphere for decades. However, determining what countries fall into the category of swing state or agenda setter will be a difficult policy question to answer. Identifying countries that fall into the "middle power" category is critical to policy considerations. Still, it will also be challenging due to the ever-changing nature of defining a country as a middle power.

Social Audiences: Chinese Elite and American Opinion

China's underlying goal to become the dominant socializer has proliferated in varying ways amongst its leadership. Building from the socialization focus of Struye de Swielande and Vandamme (2023), this article turns toward Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023) and Han, Han, and Zhang (2023). Both works seek to explore the impact of messaging on Chinese and American audiences; these works both examine the role of social priming at the individual level. However, these works indicate different perceptions of China's current stage of socialization.

First, Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023) explore varying conceptions of the international order through the language of three Chinese leaders: Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. These works speak neatly together and jointly examine the system-level and leader-level conceptualizations of China's rise as a social state; this approach pairs neatly with Johnston's (2008) seminal work focused on China's institutional learning process. Similarly, Buzan (2010) examines the questions of the nature of China's contemporary rise; the work from Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023) explicitly answers this question through discourse analysis of the highest levels of Chinese political leadership.

The authors provide a compelling elite-based study of China's conceptualization and presentation of its own rise. In this study, the data analysis indicates that the three Chinese leaders converge

on five key ideas in framing and understanding international order: international order is maintained through international perspectives; the perspective is one of a realist nature, power dynamics of various countries shape the international order; an ideal international order is fair, just, multilateral, and multipolar; China does not strive to overturn the international order; they have only assumed responsibility for revamping it to increase representation. The final point is of particular interest as a "revamp" may cement China as the dominant socializer to increase alternative viewpoints and ideologies within the international order. The varying viewpoints, however, differ between China's prominent leaders. President Zemin's rhetoric was primarily concerned with security, President Jintao with domestic development, and President Xi Jinping with bolstering China's position as a global power. The transition between key leaders primary concerns not only represent the dynamism of the country, but the transformation of the international order and the United States as its leader. President Xi Jinping's use of soft power rhetoric, key terms referring to "revising the current international order," and prideful oratory when referring to Chinese culture reaffirms the new goal to make China the dominant socializer. Analysis of Chinese leadership rhetoric signals shifts in China's strategy and approach towards its foreign policy. However, China's call to revamp the current international system only takes an explicit, emboldened value when working with domestic audiences.

Turning towards new survey work from Han, Han, and Zhang (2023), international audiences take an oppositional view. In particular, Han, Han, and Zhang (2023) highlight a negative priming effect and rising threat perception amongst international audiences. All of the Chinese Presidents presented a liberal view of the international order; highlighting economic interdependence and cooperation with all the global powers—deeply contrasting the internal realist view all leaders converge on. This messaging demonstrates a fundamental contradiction in internal and external messaging. The social reception of this difference is manifest when examining domestic and international audiences. Indeed, from the international audience perspective, social surveys reveal that China's attempt to become the dominant socializer is starkly against the international status quo. In fact, even direct mention of such a goal to international audiences will increase the threat perception of the country.

Furthermore, the predictions of China's rise as the dominant socializer and international leader are murky. Literature suggests that the perception of China as an authoritarian out-group member in the minds of democratic citizens can influence the way they interpret China's other international actions. China's global engagement may have negative consequences when imaged as an authoritarian out-group, shaping perceptions of its multilateral efforts. China's perception is also revealed through its inter-governmental organizations (IGO) participation. IGO's are an "institutional structure created by agreement among two or more sovereign states for the conduct of regular political interactions."[5] When information on China's authoritarian nature or behaviors is given, its engagement in IGOs leads people to perceive China as more threatening. However, without any priming information, people view China as less threatening. The priming information that signifies China's authoritarian nature dampens the threat mitigating effect of its engagement in IGOs.

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[5] *Jungmin Han, Xin Han, and Shuli Zhang, "Multilateral Engagement, Authoritarianism, and the Peaceful Rise of China: (Order, Counter-Order, Disorder? Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition, West Point, New York, 2023).*

The ability of priming information to influence perception should be considered in U.S. policy strategy towards China. Through priming information, the United States can engage with the international community to ensure congruence between threat perceptions of China and reality. This provides for accountability, which is critical due to China's increased expansion in IGO's. This work stands in contrast to Johnston's (2008) ideas of social states, wherein China sought to integrate into the international order through norm adaptation; in fact, Han, Han, and Zhang (2023) indicate that China's international socialization process has failed in the eyes of American audiences while Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023) suggest that the Chinese leadership has consistently messaged about its liberalization and socialization.

Panda Huggers and Dragon Slayers

Turning from a systems-level and elite-level social approach, Givens, Okooboh, and Morrisey (2023) examine contrasting Western perspectives of China's rise. The authors begin this nascent study by examining historical Foreign Affairs articles and manually coding their sentiment as pro-China or anti-China. This approach highlights significant concerns with selection bias and endogeneity; the authors clearly claim that Foreign Affairs is broadly demonstrative of U.S. thinking on China. Nonetheless, this early-stage work provides important historical context for understanding Western perspectives on China's contemporary rise.

Givens, Okooboh, and Morrisey (2023) state that the predominant Western perspectives on China can be categorized into two camps: Panda Huggers and Dragon Slayers.[6] Panda Huggers are categorized as those that take a more positive view of China and believe that China is to be incorporated primarily in the form of an economic partner. They also believe that theories surrounding modernization will run its course, and China will eventually develop democratic features over time. On the other hand, Dragon Slayers are those who take a more aggressive, confrontational stance on China. Dragon Slayers and Panda Huggers tend to have very different interpretations of China's rise. Notably, neither camp has been entirely correct in its interpretations and predictions of China, which highlights the drawback of perceiving China as an unchanging entity. Rather, imagining China fluctuating between either end of the Panda-Dragon spectrum may provide for a better approach toward Sino-policy development.

CONCLUSION

This article examined the role of social frameworks and individual perception in shaping China's recent rise. Building on new works from Struye de Swielande and Vandamme (2023), Zhang, Xiong, and Braumoeller (2023), Givens, Okooboh, and Morrisey (2023), and Han, Han, and Zhang (2023), this article highlighted key developments in the literature on social states and China's role as a contemporary swing state. The synthesis then compared public messaging from past Chinese Presidents and an assessment of Western audience perception. Finally, the paper turned towards an analysis of Western sentiment on China.

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[6] *John Wagner Givens, Osebhahiemen Okooboh, and William Morrisey, "How Accurate Were Predictions of China's Rise?" (Order, Counter-Order, Disorder? Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition, West Point, New York, 2023).*

Drawing on these ideas, the United States should place more emphasis on resocialization strategies to preserve relationships with the "middle powers." Maintaining a sphere of influence with these agenda-setters should be a policy priority. As the United States navigates uncertainties and changing dynamics with middle states, socialization can allow for stronger diplomatic relations between the U.S. and some of these "swing states" looking to better position themselves in the international order. In light of more aggressive, "warrior wolf diplomacy" from China, the United States should consider international, swing-state perspectives when conducting diplomacy. Here, the discourse should focus on the role of intermediary states and cementing their status in the international social hierarchy. Through solidification and recognition of the role of middle states, the United States can begin to empower its allies and focus on the system's response to China's rise. Although much work remains to be done, these new works provide a strong foundation for future work in the field of socialization in the international order. ☆

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CHAPTER 6

CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

What has China done – or not done – to undermine the "international order," and how should states respond? We begin with an overview of China's disillusionment and discontent with the current international order and assess the extent to which China can offer a realistic alternative. We then consider China's relationship with international institutions, examining the extent to which Chinese lending competes with the institutional power of the IMF. We find that countries receiving Chinese economic aid are less likely to start an IMF program, and, if they do start one, they are more likely to bargain for less demanding terms. We also examine Chinese influence on Africa and Southeastern Europe, and U.S. strategic responses. A detailed account of Trump and Biden administration policies suggests that African states seek to retain agency in the face of Sino-American competition, and are unlikely to respond to coercion or demands to choose sides. Likewise, in Serbia, Chinese aid's effects appear mixed and context dependent. Alongside its efforts to wield financial power strategically, China also wields military power: new research on them expanding role of the People's Liberation Navy Marine Corps argues it could be used to expand Chinese military power worldwide, not just in the Taiwan Strait. In short, China's broadly defined interaction with the international order – its institutions, norms, and status quo– defies scholarly consensus and remains a significant policy challenge.

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As we contemplate the institutions, norms, and security deterrence that constitute the so-called "international order" and the disruptions to that order on the European continent, our attention is drawn to another regional power – China. How has China engaged with the international order? What internal and external actions has it taken in opposition to the US-led international order? And how should other states respond? These are the questions that motivate discussions of China and the international order from a security perspective. Though the security studies field is diverse and heterogeneous, drawing upon evidence from a wide range of settings and contexts, we identify a clear need to address the central question of how China relates to and, at times, challenges the existing international order.

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Szczdulik (2023) broadly describes China's opposition to the U.S.-led international order and its actions to challenge it, starting from the observation that China defines the current global order as a U.S.-centered order. Though China does not directly challenge the rules-based international order per se, it is critical of the U.S.' central role, focusing on three major themes. First, China claims there will be a shift in international power from the "West" to the "East." Second, China tends to argue that the current international order does not reflect the contemporary balance of power because developing countries are given less power and authority than their importance. In addition, China sees itself as the leader of developing countries. Third, China contends there is no one way to govern the world and no universal values or norms. This implies that developing countries, like China, need not copy Western solutions to governance problems. Modernization does not necessarily equal Westernization, especially democratization, and political solutions must be emphasized that fit national characteristics.

Though China's criticisms of the U.S.-created global order are ubiquitous, Szczdulik observes that it is more difficult to find a "positive" agenda; China does not offer any plausible alternatives. What exactly would China like to see in place of the current system? China does not offer clear answers. Though China criticizes the U.S.-led order, there is no precise conceptualization of what a *China*-led international order would look like. There are some hints—such as a more substantial role for developing countries—but no coherent picture.

What China has done, Szczduliks notes, is begin to pursue its own interests within the confines of the current order. China has sought to lead the reform of international governance, launched a "charm" offensive toward the global South, advertised "no strings attached" economic assistance, and fostered certain countries' strategic dependence on China, especially in the economic realm. It wants to be a major player in writing the regulation of emerging areas, like the Internet, technology, and artificial intelligence. China has also reinforced its narrative in international discourse by introducing Chinese "buzzwords" such as Chinese-style democracy, the China Dream, and the importance of sovereignty.

Szczdulik's (2023) discussion of China's relationship with the international order is reminiscent of other scholarly work that explores the implications of China's rise. Will it undermine and overcome US hegemony (Layne 2018; Chin and Thakur 2010)? Even if China wanted to, could it succeed in toppling the US-led international order (Allan, Vucetic, Hopf 2018; Kahler 2013; Weiss and Wallace 2021)? Szczdulik echoes the idea that China is resentful of the current order, which it sees as reflecting American interests and power (Layne 2018). However, Szczdulik's view that China lacks a *positive* alternative to the current international order highlights China's real challenges in initiating a true paradigm and ideological shift in the international order (Beeson and Li 2015; Kahler 2013; Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018).

Broad views of how China views and critiques the international order are ubiquitous (Layne 2018; Goh and Sahashi 2020; Simón, Desmaele, and Becker 2021). However, what are the specific Chinese actions done to undermine or challenge this order? Sundquist (2023) delves into China's relationship with a specific institution within the current international order: the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The central question in this work is whether China can challenge the authority and power of the IMF, which has represented a core component of the U.S.-led, post-Bretton Woods system of international organizations. Though existing scholarly work concerns Chinese actions within institutional spaces (Ferdinand and Wang 2013; Beeson and Li 2015;

Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018; Weiss and Wallace 2021), Sundquist argues that China can alter the current international landscape by issuing *bilateral* loans to countries, diminishing the need to apply for an IMF program. Sundquist believes this represents an "institutional eclipse," which reduces or weakens the influence of the IMF by providing an alternative source of economic support. By supporting struggling countries, China attempts to dilute the influence of the IMF as an international institution while also gaining foreign policy concessions from the countries it aids.

Using data on China's loans and IMF programs, Sundquist uses changes in Chinese global lending to instrument for China's loans to a specific country and finds that the presence of China's loans does allow some countries to avoid IMF programs for assistance. For other countries, Chinese loans improve their bargaining position with the IMF and reduce the number of conditions attached to an IMF program. Sundquist's paper presents a rigorous analysis of the relationship between Chinese lending and the power and influence of an important international institution. Though commentary about China's growing influence and its supposed revisionist motivations abound, there is a surprising lack of careful empirical analyses of these claims. Sundquist offers a refreshingly empirically grounded look at the relationship between China's aid and the current international order. Some questions remain: is China actively attempting to undermine the IMF, or is this merely an unintended consequence of China pursuing its own strategic goals? In other words, another interpretation of Sundquist's results could be that China offers aid to countries for foreign policy concessions, and one result of that is the decline of IMF influence. IMF decline in and of itself may not be China's core motivation for distributing aid. Sudnquist also does not explicitly discuss the agency of receiving countries, though it is hinted at by the idea that these countries can leverage China's aid for better deals from the IMF. What are the strategic calculations of these countries? And what is the role of the U.S. or even Russia in shaping these considerations? Further, China's ability to *eclipse* the IMF depends on the continued strength of the Chinese economy and sustained political motivation to invest in foreign countries. In the long-term, will China's slowing growth and the emergence of domestic economic and political challenges hamper its ability to use foreign lending strategically?

While Sundquist's work provides significant empirical insight in an area in which the theoretical research is developed, Ne̋mec and Stojarová (2023) provide an in-depth analysis of a specific case of Chinese investment and its effects on human security and democracy in the Balkans, a less examined region. They examine the relationship between Chinese investments in Serbia and human security and democracy in the Balkan nation. Specifically, they argue that Chinese investment in Serbia has led to environmental degradation and violations of workers' rights, many of whom are laborers brought in from China and Vietnam. They further claim that efforts to protest these trends from Serbian civil society have been met with opposition from the Serbian government, which they regard as evidence of democratic backsliding. This work represents a meaningful contribution to work on Chinese influence in other countries, as this literature has mainly focused on Southeast Asia or Africa. The paper's focus on environmental and human security also sheds light on an understudied aspect of Chinese activity abroad. Future research could test these arguments with quantitative data analysis that measures the effect of China's investment on environmental conditions or increased repression of civil society.

Overall, this work raises important questions about China's relationship to middle-sized countries and the world order more generally. Will environmental degradation and conflict with societal actors continue to be a characteristic of Chinese involvement in foreign countries? What are the long-term effects, and would it be sustainable for China in the long-term? And what should the U.S. do in response if it should respond at all? More rigorous evidence is necessary to answer

these questions and investigate a relationship, if any exists, between Chinese foreign aid and threats to human security.

Wilkins (2023) addresses U.S. action in response to China's behavior by outlining a brief history of U.S. strategies in Africa in response to China's actions on the continent. Wilkins argues that the U.S. has struggled to adapt to the new reality of Chinese influence and presence in Africa when crafting its own Africa strategy. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. strategy in Africa was grounded in countering Chinese influence there. In alignment with these goals, the U.S. strategy aimed at increasing US-Africa trade through "Prosper Africa," though this effort was cut short by the onset of the global COVID-19 pandemic. This strategy was also met with skepticism by African leaders themselves, who saw little room for African agency in this Cold War-era like framing of U.S.-Africa relations and feared a return to the politics of great power competition. There also continued to be a lack of credible alternatives to Chinese investments in China. Comments made by President Trump—most notorious of which was the reference to "shithole countries" – and contentious U.S. domestic racial politics contributed to a growing distrust of U.S. actions from African leaders.

The Biden Administration's Africa strategy pointedly de-emphasized competition with China, though there continues to be challenges in providing credible aid commitments to Africa. Along these lines, how U.S. domestic polarization and a divided government will play a role in shaping U.S. policy in Africa remains to be seen. Finally, Wilkins suggests that one potential way forward for U.S. strategy in Africa is to expand beyond traditional aid areas like health and design aid programs to spur African economic development, industry, and innovation.

Wilkins' treatment of two American administrations' strategic approaches to Africa highlights the struggle to create a coherent approach to a rising China. How can the U.S. compete with China, and what would that competition look like? Will it involve explicit hostilities? Should it include strengthening domestic institutions and becoming once again a model of progress and democracy (Ikenberry 2018; Weiss 2022; Wyne 2022)? Though all agree that alliances are key (Goh and Sahashi 2020; Simón, Desmaele, and Becker 2021), how should the U.S. strengthen those relationships?

Finally, we cannot ignore China's investments in its military capability in discussions about China's current and future impact on the world order. Salo (2023) describes the development of the People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) and suggests Chinese ambitions for projecting power globally. First, Salo points out that the PLANMC has increased to eight brigades. In a sign of growing prestige for the PLANMC, its commander now reports directly to the PLANMC headquarters. Though the traditional role of the PLANMC has been to prepare for amphibious operations in a potential invasion of Taiwan, Salo points out that the PLANMC has undertaken training exercises in extreme climates and conditions. Ultimately, Salo argues that the PLANMC has become China's new quick reaction force, comparable the U.S. military's Global Response Force. Rather than viewing the PLANMC as solely a Taiwan-oriented capability, the U.S. and others should regard it as having global projection capabilities.

In conclusion, emerging research reflects an urgent desire to understand China's actions in the global arena. What does China's aid to foreign countries, military build-up, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric mean for the current international order? How should the U.S. and other countries respond? The answers to these questions will depend on careful, theoretically grounded, and empirically solid research that reaches beyond hasty judgments. The papers discussed here offer some foundations for future work. Though China's rhetoric suggests a defiant stance toward the current U.S.-led international order, it struggles to construct and voice a viable

alternative vision. However, China can challenge the IMF's power through its economic reach. And while allies remain key in U.S. competition with China, they are hesitant to choose between the U.S. and China. Actions that undermine allies' own agency may lead to a backlash. A clear limitation of these works is the lack of information about how domestic processes within China and other countries impact China's interactions with the global order. A clear understanding of these effects, clearly communicated, will undoubtedly improve policy. ☆

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CHAPTER 7

ALTERNATE REALITY: RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

Graham Stacey,[1] John Mayle,[2] Robert Person,[3] and Morena Skalamera[4]

"If you know your enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." – Sun Tzu

"Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." – Napoleon Bonaparte

ABSTRACT

What is Russia's strategic vision for international order, and how might those who oppose the Russian vision do so effectively? Russia's view of its place and role in international order is complex and multi-faceted. History, religion, culture, nationalism, leadership, and geography all play a part. Russia's ability to achieve its vision for international order interacts with its opponents' ability to maintain, communicate, and deliver its own vision. Cohesion in the transatlantic community is vital; such cohesion requires acting consistently with the values that the community promotes while articulating those values simply and inclusively. At one level, a clash of strategic visions equates to global competition. At present, the countries that condemn Russian actions in Ukraine (in the UN General Assembly) represent approximately 61% of the global economy and only 16% of the global population. Addressing the concerns of some of the 84% of the global population "on the fence" is of grand strategic importance. The role of China will be key. China, Russia, and the United States are all competing for the allegiance – or at least the acquiescence – of the global majority. Doing so requires understanding the varied interests and desires of that majority. Russia's vision has weaknesses, flaws, and vulnerabilities.

The transatlantic security community can compete with Russia on its own terms, with a maneuverer approach, maximizing the opportunities our societies, values, and strengths offer and avoiding Russia's strengths.

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RUSSIA – STRUGGLING AT ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

In the Russian debate on the existing international order, there is a belief that the Atlantic system, dominated by the United States, is in decline. Russia aims to accelerate the process of change, weakening the West in favor of the Eurasian powers –Russia and China. In the aspirational sphere, the Russian elite recognizes that Russia should have a special international status, which can be described as "fortress Russia" (Legucka 2023).

Russia has tried to use the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a counterweight in the post-Soviet space to NATO and US. The "Russia - fortress" model consists of building a strong state based on nationalist and conservative-Orthodox ideas, whose task is to defend the sovereignty of the Russian state. It is a combination of isolationist tendencies, which involve consolidating and centralizing power with the international aspirations of society and the political elite. Russia has a sense of mission and uniqueness and believes it is waging a war of civilization against the West, but its greatest fear is the collapse of the Russian Federation. It believes that soon China will take the place of a superpower equal to the US, and Russia will benefit from this situation and become a leader on the Eurasian continent.

In its global mission, the CSTO has failed in its task: it is treated neither as a partner nor a rival of NATO in its quest to be perceived as an equal actor. However, Russia has succeeded in using the CSTO as an instrument of its policy in the post-Soviet area and to strengthen its position as a global player. The organization has increased its mandate to focus on new areas, including counterterrorism, extremism, narcotics trafficking, the fight against illegal migration, and crisis response. Member States have even used some of these competencies to fight internal political opponents or counter-revolutions. Under the pretext of carrying out a peacekeeping operation and invoking Article 4 of the Tashkent Treaty, the organization assisted the Kazakh leader in suppressing domestic protests.

Russia, which serves as the de facto leader of the CSTO, has declared itself the guarantor of members' security while simultaneously threatening the sovereignty and independence of those same members. Robert Keohane best describes this operation mechanism as an "Al Capone Alliance" that works like a protection racket; it ostensibly provides security against the threat of a common enemy but protects the small power from its ally (Keohane, 1969). However, this method of control seemingly has its limits in the case of CSTO member states. This became particularly apparent after 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and showed that it was prepared to defend its sphere of influence by military means.

Member states became concerned about their independence and territorial integrity and pursued a balancing policy with external partners like the United States, Turkey, and China. CSTO members took a pragmatic approach to commitments and burdens within the organization, rarely agreeing with Russia on their foreign policy positions. However, Russia, treating the post-Soviet area as a space of privileged interests, has indicated that it sees the security zone as reserved for its own ambitions. As a result, in recent years, and particularly after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has taken active measures to limit the opportunities for CSTO members' international relationships outside of the region. The war in Ukraine has increased the strategic value of Belarus and other member states for Russia; at the same time, countries such as Kazakhstan have become increasingly concerned and vocal about their territorial integrity and security.

RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC

The main strategic objectives for Russia in the Arctic were spelled out in an official document published in 2020: Ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike. TheIdocument largely confirms that Russian Arctic policy is pursued on two divergent tracks: (1) International cooperation to ensure development of the region's resources and (2) efforts to highlight Russian sovereignty over the largest portion of the Arctic. Since the start of Putin's 3rd term, especially since the Ukraine conflict began in 2014, the balance has shifted toward the second track, although Russia never completely foreclosed international cooperation (Gorenburg 2023).

After 2014, Russian leaders feared an increased likelihood of conflict in the region due to increased competition for natural resources; a decrease in sea ice as a natural barrier, combined with insufficient Russian military in the region; and the spill over of the overall deterioration in relationship with West. This has resulted in efforts to modernize infrastructure, including security and the military, that neighbors have seen as potentially threatening. The build-up included the establishment of Arctic Joint Strategic Command in December 2014, new ports and airfields in remote areas, floating nuclear power plants, two classes of new icebreakers (this means Russia has as many icebreakers as all other countries combined), and an accelerated military exercise program.

The situation is further complicated by the impact of the Ukraine war and NATO enlargement in Scandinavia. The war in Ukraine will weaken the Russian military for the foreseeable future and will likely to increase reliance on threats as deterrence. It will also leave Russia more dependent on China and may lead to concessions on China's role in the Arctic. NATO enlargement shifts regional security dynamics, turns the Baltic Sea into essentially a "NATO lake," and further increases Russian feelings of insecurity.

FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

It is important to consider options for a future European Security Architecture as a key contributor to Euro-Atlantic Stability after the fighting ends in Ukraine. Post-war Ukraine could be represented by victory for either side or a frozen conflict/stalemate. These represent different levels of risk to global and regional stability. The presenters considered six models: unstructured system, unstable multipolarity, stable multipolarity, concert, collective security, hegemony, and security community, and further explored unstable multipolarity, stable multipolarity, and concert (Ditrych and Laryš 2023).

In addition to the end state in Ukraine, any future security architecture will be heavily influenced by the military balance after a war of attrition, potential regional escalation, the political position in Russia, and the future role of China. Core considerations will include degraded Russian military capabilities, a weakened Russian economy, and the future relationship between Ukraine and the EU and the West. It is likely that Russia would remain a revisionist state: regional security is destabilized by Russian goals, and there is potential for division. Any future European security architecture should seek to consider all states in EU/Western Europe, including smaller States.

Without a regime change in Russia, there is no guarantee of positive changes in Russian ambitions or a radical shift in Russian political and military behavior. Russian current strategic culture is likely to endure.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

It was presented that Russia's main strategic goal is not to destabilize the EU or even Ukraine but dilute US power and influence around the globe. Through a series of interviews and literature and media research, it was concluded that the main tenets of Russian strategy are to undermine US global leadership, create and sustain an image that a US-led NATO dominates European security architecture and uses Europe to hold Russia down, and to seek economic influence over Europe and the post-Soviet areas of the region (Chiriac 2023).

On a more global scale, Russia seeks to promote and win a model of asymmetric competition with the West, wants to replace Western-minded institutions such as the IMF and WTO, and seeks an order based on opportunistic relationships, not mutually beneficial strategic relationships. For Russia, China presents a paradox. Although they are developing a "special relationship" and China is key to Russian success in Ukraine, it positions Russia as a junior member to China. At the same time, Putin has previously referred to the threat of China. From a US/Western perspective, although we are preparing for competition with China, we may have to deal with a resentful and aggressive Russia.

Key to dealing with a Russian foreign policy that seeks to dilute US power, we must: (1) recalibrate the US relationships with allies and maintain a relationship based on genuine trust and actions, not just words, (2) Understand Russia through Russian perspective, (3) understand that much of the globe, including the global south, do not currently relate to the US vision, (4) realize that the EU is normative power and Europe wants strategic autonomy and accept this could be an opportunity as well as a challenge.

RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

One construct of Russian nationalism can be divided into *russkiy* (based more on ethnic/nationalistic connotations) versus *rossiyskiy* (more civically oriented). The war in Ukraine has created a narrative that neo-Nazis are the enemy of Russia, and this is fueled by Russian nationalism. It is not just Ukraine that is accused of being a Nazi state; Latvia and others are as well, indicating that this is part of a wider strategy. Russian nationalism includes the political idea that a nation is a distinct social group, which can quickly develop into imperialism. Russians exist outside Russia, and nationalism in Russia places immense emphasis on protecting the human rights of Russians living abroad – evidenced by the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept. This can be a pretext for interference (or even invasion) of other States. It also promotes the notion that Russians living abroad must be loyal and feel a sense of belongingness to Russia (Berzina 2023).

Russia clearly has ambition beyond its immediate borders. The key idea is that for Russia to exist as a great power, it must exert influence on the internal matters of other states. Putin frequently cites principle of the self-determination to justify Russia's actions and protect the Russian-speaking population that resides outside Russia in the near abroad. It would be a mistake to think that this is just Putin's rhetoric and ignore that many in Russia feel the same.

Nationalism is present in almost all aspects of Russian society, politics, education, and religion. It is a crucial facet of Russian domestic and foreign policy. Our current research and

understanding are superficial; we must analyze deeper to see the implications. These are likely to include, but not be restricted to, suppression of civil society, nation-building in absence of democratic values, and the creation of autocratic states. Russia is hostile to other national identities and pursues imperialism as radical nationalism.

ALTERNATE REALITY: RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Special interest might be taken in Russians living abroad. In the past many of these would have been considered a post-colonial group utilized by the Kremlin to extend Russian influence.Recently, the Ukraine crisis has resulted in a mass exodus of Russians, especially young professionals, who might be much more open to Western ideas and ideals and could form the basis of a new relationship with the West. ☆

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CHAPTER 8

WAR AND STRATEGY IN EURASIA

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ABSTRACT

Sino-Russian cooperation is a strategic reality. Diffuse reciprocity suggests that both countries stand to gain more by working together than by being divided. Even if Sino-Russian cooperation is minimal at first, the trajectory should concern Western policymakers. A Eurasian axis, even a notional one, enables Moscow and Beijing to complement each other globally and achieve outsized gains. Confidence-building measures, like joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic cooperation tend to mature through experience and spread to other areas. Mutual support on issues like Ukraine and Taiwan can provide impetus to resolve historical issues like border disputes and limit industrial espionage. And a Eurasian axis that evolves and deepens could attract others, like North Korea and Iran, thereby providing even more vexing strategic concerns for American and allied policymakers.

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The US Government needs to consider China and Russia as a Eurasian axis and adapt accordingly. Deepening alignment between Beijing and Moscow creates a new tension between structural and political factors that shape national strategy and questions of war and peace across Eurasia—and throughout the world. Only by considering Russia and China a Eurasian axis are policymakers able to understand the totality of the challenge in front of America and its like-minded allies and partners.

But what is 'Eurasia'? A heuristic definition one draws a rough line along:

- *The eastern seaboard of China to the Bay of Bengal*
- *From the deserts surrounding the Tigris–Euphrates River System to the Bosporus*
- *Through central Europe to the Barents Sea*
- *Over the Ural Mountains and across Siberia to the Bering Sea*
- *And along the coast to the East China Sea*

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Halford Mackinder spawned the study of geopolitics 120 years because the combination of civilization and geography in Eurasia had the potential to dominate the world as he understood it. His Rimland Theory was crude, Eurocentric, and lacking critical economic analysis. Later, the defining characteristics of the Cold War, like nuclear weapons, proxy wars, and the USSR's closed economic system, prevented a Eurasian geopolitical order from manifesting. Moreover, US and Western naval dominance enabled Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) to connect markets globally, while the development of rail and road across Eurasia struggled to connect cities, let alone regions.

Yet, several developments in Eurasia over the last twenty years suggest that Mackinder's analysis was correct, even if it was off by a century, and the indications of a Eurasian axis in all-but-name are clear. In February 2022, Russia and China announced a 'No Limits Partnership' twenty days before Moscow started the illegal Russo-Ukraine War. China maintains support for the conflict, despite Beijing's loss of reputation in Western capitals for doing so. Xi Jinping's recent boast that ties between the two autocracies are flourishing into "new frontiers" only reinforces concerns that Russia and China are moving ever closer together.

Several academics and policymakers refute the idea of China and Russia are becoming a Eurasian axis. The two nations fought a war as late as 1969. Chinese still resent Russia for the loss of Vladivostok as part of the Treaty of Beijing in 1860. (Kallberg 2022) Despite the long-term demographic decline and economic malaise, Russia will never fill the role of junior partner to China. (Hoefer 2021) There is no infrastructure to satiate China's hunger for Russia's raw resources—and building it in some of the most forbidding climate on earth will take decades of sustained investment. (Vakulenko 2023) And China will never risk its trading relationship with the West to support Russia. (Bonner 2023)

These points have merit but miss the fundamental truth; both countries stand to gain more by working together than by being divided. Even if their cooperation is minimal at first, the trajectory should concern policymakers. A Eurasian axis, even a notional one, enables Moscow and Beijing to complement each other globally and achieve outsized gains. Confidence-building measures, like joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic cooperation tend to improve with age and spread to other areas. Mutual support on issues like Ukraine and Taiwan provides the impetus to downplay historical issues like border disputes and limit industrial espionage. And a Eurasian axis could attract other actors, like North Korea and Iran, thereby providing even more vexing strategic concerns for US and Allied policymakers.

One way to increase awareness about the impact of a Eurasian axis is to consider the insights below. Combined, they show how war and strategy in Eurasia could affect regions and activity beyond Eurasia itself.

Economic Interdependence Can Provoke Conflict

A Eurasian axis enables China and Russia to weaponize economic interdependence throughout Eurasia and beyond in pursuit of mutual interests.

Deepening economic ties between the Eurasian axis and elsewhere creates the illusion of stability. But recent experience in Ukraine should remind policymakers that economic interdependence alone does not necessarily lead to lasting peace amongst nations. Most of the

attention around Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 neglected the economic perspective. (Dijkstra et al. 2022)

The commercial peace (Bearce and Omori 2005) argument underpinned the West's approach towards Russia; in particular, western European nations expected economic interdependence to deliver peaceful relations between Russia and the rest of Europe. The liberal political and economic perspective states that economic considerations are often important, there are tradeoffs between security and prosperity, and economic interdependence leads to more peace (at least probabilistically), like the so-called 'commercial peace argument' (Bearce and Omori 2005). This rationale can lead to a mistaken conclusion that a Eurasian axis might be a net positive for the Rules-Based International Order (RBIO) by providing economic incentives for Russia and China, and whichever nations within their orbit, to resolve disputes peacefully.

Realists argue that security concerns trump economic considerations, wealth and power might be mutually reinforcing, and economic interdependence either does not have a strong effect on conflict or might even encourage it. (Ravenhill 2021). At first, realism provides a stronger explanation for Russia's motivations vis-à-vis Ukraine; it was a decision rooted in geopolitics. The Kremlin likely expected economic losses by starting an illegal war against Ukraine, and economic interdependence from abroad failed to deter. Interestingly, the economic dependence of European countries on Russia in terms of fuel imports was also not a deterrent for these countries to support Ukraine (Lanoszka and Becker 2022).

At the same time, Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be explained by a conditional and contextual liberal explanation. Economic interdependence does not necessarily lead to peace but is likely to do so under certain conditions. It is much more likely to operate for democratic regimes (Gelpi and Grieco 2003). On the one hand, Russia's case shows the limits of a universalist commercial peace theory; expectations in the 1990s turned out to be overly optimistic. On the other hand, commercial peace theory has merits; economic interdependence can enhance security and peace, but the relationship is contextual and contingent. Tellingly, the nature of economic relations, like reliance on commodity exports, has a higher probability of conflict. (Colgan 2013) Russia's case was the least likely one for commercial peace mechanisms to work in Ukraine. Policymakers noted that a Eurasian axis of Russia and China is rooted in a resource-based economic relationship.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION

- *As part of a broader effort to re-marry economics and security, policymakers should re-examine the relationship between economic interdependence and peace and conflict, particularly considering China's economic interdependence with America and likeminded nations. At the same time, they should not ignore the fact that economic interdependence can lead to more peaceful relationships in contexts.*

Invasions Can Make-or-Break Societies

Russia and China each have long histories of territorial expansion and brutalizing societies adjacent to them. Despite facing overwhelming odds, Ukraine and Taiwan may be defiant, but a Eurasian axis enables Moscow and Beijing to pursue aggression in other areas with more vulnerable societies.

History is full of examples where an invading force breaks the besieged society's will, like Nazi Germany in France circa 1940 or the Soviet Union in the states of the Warsaw Pact during the

Cold War. Yet, there are many examples where the opposite is true; Ukraine's defiance of Russian aggression is a recent example. War has strengthened the resolve of Ukrainian society to fight and promoted, in part, political pluralism and democratization. Russia's invasion strengthened the cohesion of Ukrainian society and its aspirations for sound democratic rule.

Yet, war does not necessarily produce these outcomes. Insights from theorists who study the effect of threat on group cohesion are relevant. For Lewis Coser and others, antecedent conditions are crucial (Coser 1956, Nollert 2022). Depending on their pre-war strength, the civic and the democratic identities of a polity can either harden or buckle under the pressures of armed conflict. Ukraine reached necessary thresholds in both dimensions before the war causing Russia's aggression to bolster civic and democratic identities in significant ways. For example, the war has significantly enhanced Ukraine's civic and national identity. On the eve of the invasion, 65% of Ukrainians saw themselves as citizens of Ukraine; this percentage rose to 85% six months later (KIIS July 2022). As late as August 2021, most Ukrainians wanted to live in a unified Ukraine, but only 49% of respondents held very strong feelings about being a Ukrainian citizen. Two months after the invasion, 90% felt this way (Rating Group August 2022). This deepening of national identity in Ukraine now provides strong protection against instability in a polity under duress.

Democracies are inherently variable phenomena. The effects of warfare often weaken political contestation, concentrate executive power, and undermine civil rights. Yet under favorable conditions, invasion can also enhance pluralism. In Ukraine, the evidence suggests that both opposing trends are at work. Since the invasion, the Ukrainian regime has engaged in censorship and political regimentation. At the same time, the war has mobilized Ukrainian civil society, augmenting its strength, autonomy, and size. The external environment, notably the EU and the US, is an important intervening variable; it provides strong incentives for Kyiv to preserve democratic norms. Thus, Ukraine will likely maintain its unified resistance to the Russian invasion while avoiding a descent into authoritarian rule (Onuch and Hale 2023).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- *The US should investigate variants of bilateral and multi-lateral security guarantees for Ukraine apart from NATO membership. Surveys in Ukraine suggest that non-NATO paths to security are acceptable for most of the population, for now (KIIS May 2022).*

- *The US should increasingly augment its military assistance to Ukraine with state-building support, including funding and expertise to strengthen key institutions, e.g., courts, national bureaucracies, and academies. The legitimacy and effectiveness of core state institutions work to sustain mass and elite support for a unified nation and democratic governance.*
- *The US should pay particular attention to the problem of corruption in Ukraine, which alienates society from the state. The EU already partners with Ukrainian civil society groups in forging anti-corruption programs. These programs should be sustained appropriately over the long term.*

- *Public opposition to territorial concessions remains strong in Ukraine, but this may change based on a variety of factors (KIIS December 2022). The US should remain neutral on this issue, allowing for shifts in elite and popular opinion that may be driven by battlefield fortunes.*

The Arctic is a Flashpoint for Competition

Increased trust and cooperation enable Russia and China to pursue objectives in the Arctic in ways previously unavailable to them.

Since the end of the cold war, the Arctic has been characterized by low tension where dialogue prevailed in the performance of statecraft—even amongst states with conflicts in other parts of the world (Young 1992, Heninen 2018). This is not true for today's international political climate in the Arctic (Wall and Wegge 2023). The region no longer fits the characteristics of an unusual or exceptional part of international relations where low tensions prevailed despite global trends elsewhere—a point argued by many scholars up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Käpylä and Mikkola 2019).

Traditional hard-power factors, like material capabilities and economic strength, continue to play important roles in the Arctic. Russia and NATO Allies invest varying but considerable sums to modernize national infrastructures in the region and develop related capabilities. For security experts, the Arctic is an increasingly prominent area of strategic concern. (Boulege 2019, Wegge 2020). Diplomatic and other non-material factors are also changing; regional cooperation bodies, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, ceased functioning due to the Ukraine War (Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2022, US Department of State 2022). And new uncertainty related to Russia and its future stability flavor Arctic-related discussions (Economist 2022).

With the deteriorating international climate, there is a need to reassess the political order in the Arctic and its underpinnings. The political order of the Arctic rests on factors emphasized by both the realist and liberal schools of international relations theory (Wegge 2011). Hence, material, or structural factors, such as power capabilities remain important, and other, non-material factors serve as crucial explanatory elements, e.g., the existence and type of international regimes or the influence of regime types on states' foreign policies (Wegge 2011).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- *Western Arctic states should increase their civilian and military presence and corresponding capabilities in the Arctic. This includes bolstering societal resilience in the Arctic region.*

- *NATO's Arctic allies should increase diplomatic cooperation and coordination in how to deal with Russia in the Arctic region through new international initiatives, like the Arctic Chamber of Commerce*

The Red Sea is a Testing Ground for Global Power Balances

Both Russia and China are developing new ways to project power globally. Working together as a Eurasian axis enables both countries to have outsized reach in areas like the Middle East and Africa.

Over the past several years, China has changed its approach to African countries from an investment model to a local development approach based on so-called "win-win" partnerships—all within its Belt and Road Initiative framework. This shift resulted in an expansion of China's economy and strategic influence in Africa. Understanding China's moves in the Red Sea provides lessons for how China and Russia may act in Eurasia and abroad.

Djibouti is a noteworthy case study to examine China's recent political, economic, and security interactions across the African continent. Chinese military consolidation made the small African state and the wider Red Sea region a potent testing ground for the dynamics of balance and rivalry among global powers. China's activity in the region can serve as a template for Beijing to apply elsewhere and threaten the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. In the short term, the greatest risk is that Chinese political influence disrupts Western alliance coalitions in Africa, like China forging diplomatic blocs to counter Western initiatives in international bodies. With the Ukraine conflict, strategic convergence between Beijing and Moscow adds new impetus to understanding how a Eurasian axis could affect American and allied engagement in other regions.

In the long term, China's military footprint in Djibouti poses a risk to Western lines of communication, maritime and undersea communications. Unchecked, Beijing will highly likely acquire a dominant position in the Red Sea and throughout the Indian Ocean. China's presence in Djibouti enables it project power on the continent up to and including an outpost on the Atlantic coast of Africa.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- *The US and its allies must monitor Chinese developments in Djibouti and the Red Sea, recognizing Beijing's deep transformation and increasingly assertive and intransigent positions throughout the region.*

- *The US and its allies should implement a strategy of containment of China in Africa through soft balancing within international and regional organizations. Adopting institutional soft balancing actions should complement a series of investment packages to develop an autonomous African security architecture.*

- *In qualitative terms, the US strategic presence should be consolidated, including its military, in the region. Opening a military outpost in Berbera (Somaliland) should be considered.*

The Conditions of Peace in Ukraine Will Affect the Rules-Based International Order

Several centuries of European history show the consequences of getting peace negotiations right—or wrong. Thinking of China and Russia as a Eurasian axis places new emphasis on any eventual peace settlement in Ukraine.

The Russo-Ukraine war will be like every other historical conflict; strategy does not stop at the armistice. In peace negotiations, strategic aims include the shape of the world to come—what is referred to as "orders" or "systems" of relations between States. When confessional wars receded in Europe after 1648, dynastic strife and ensuing territorial disputes once again became the dominant cause of wars until the French Revolution. But State representatives could also come together in congresses to make or maintain peace. After a couple of early precedents, this Congress system took off in 1641 with the peace negotiations aimed at ending the Thirty Years' War and lasted until 1731.

The 18th century saw the emergence of a Pentarchy in Europe: a pattern in which five monarchies in various configurations dominated Europe, aligning or changing alliances, creating considerable instability. After the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, a new Pentarchy ushered in a new Congress System that went strong from 1814 to c. 1833; with a few peace congresses still following several of them went to war with each other. Unlike the Congress

System of 1641-1730, it did not bring together representatives of all or most European States, but only the five great powers with the pretense of having the power and moral authority to settle issues among themselves and on behalf of lesser powers.

This time, a new formal Rules-Based International Order (RBIO) was created with the League of Nations in 1919. It included the proscription of war to further national interests – a commitment made even more explicit by the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 – and substituted conflict settlement under the auspices of the League. Ignored by the rogue powers Japan, Italy, and Germany, this order was obliterated by the Second World War.

Thereafter Britain, France, and the US returned to constructing RBIO, this time with US participation with the UN. Both the League and the UN, in fact, superimposed a 19th-century-style Pentarchy (respectively League Council and UN Security Council) on the community of States, mixing it with the Baroque congress system. The UN's order could not become fully operational as long as the great powers in the UN Security Council—three Western democracies and two Communist states—could block each other with a veto.

This period seemed to give way to a "new world order" when the USSR broke up, Russia abandoned Communism, and China embraced economic capitalism in the early 1990s. Yet, Communist China was building itself up into a challenger to a world dominated by the US as the sole remaining hegemon. Russia's democracy was fragile, gradually giving way to a new autocracy in 1999. In 2008, Russia went to war with another country, Georgia, in violation of borders, followed by war on Ukraine in 2014, becoming an open war in 2022.

Russia wants to return to the great-power system of the 19th century, using brute force to keep lesser powers within its sphere of influence. Let us recall how the Pentarchy of the 19th century ended: in the First World War. And when Russia proposes a congress of great powers (including the US, Britain, and Germany!) to guarantee future Ukrainian independence and non-alignment, this is untrustworthy by Russia's promise made in Budapest in 1994 that Ukraine's, Belarus', and Kazakhstan's borders would be inviolable in return for the abandonment of their Soviet-inherited nuclear weapons. With such divergent designs for the post-war order, peace seems elusive.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION

- *While Ukraine remains the ultimate decider regarding the form of an armistice with Russia, the US and its allies should recall that flawed peace agreements can prove more destructive over the long-term than those that serve Western interests at the cost of being harder to achieve in the short term.*

CONCLUSION

The first step to addressing the challenge of a Eurasian axis is to see it for what it is across all areas of human endeavor, not what US and Allied policymakers want it to be.

Developing approaches to China and Russia in isolation from one another is ill-suited for the strategic context in which America and its allies operate. The time for re-assessment and alignment of national endeavor to insulate the US and the West from the malignant activities of the Eurasian axis is now. Acknowledging the Eurasian axis consisting of China and Russia—and

defining its implications for the US should be the priority from which all other related policy considerations are based. Doing so begins by adopting a whole-of-government approach to answering how the US and its allies:

- *Acknowledge the existence of a Eurasian Axis consisting of Russia and China, and adapt policy, strategy, and organizational structures accordingly. For example, develop a Eurasian Axis Strategic Issues Group (SIG) within the Department of Defense that dovetails the work of Russia and China SIGs.*

- *Avoid siloed approaches to Russia and China by promoting complementarity amongst all levers of national power vis-à-vis a Eurasian axis of China and Russia.Factor a Eurasian axis in strategy and policy and identify its potential impact in other regions of the world, e.g., the Arctic, Africa, and the Middle East.*

- *Bolster a multi-faceted range of deterrence options that include reductions to economic dependence on Russia and China, and resilience-building efforts in societies most vulnerable to Russian and Chinese aggression.*

- *Ensure that any eventual armistice concerning the Russo-Ukraine War considers a sober analysis of European history, the reality of a contemporary Eurasian Axis, and the potential for gains that bolster the RBIO—if Ukraine is divisible to achieve peace, then so too is Russia.* ☆

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PART III. ORDER, CAPABILITIES & CONFLICT

CHAPTER 9

EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY

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INTRODUCTION

The impact of emerging technology on strategy can be difficult to discern because technologies affect the ends, ways, and means of states in competition (Lykke 1989). Technologies are often best understood as the capabilities (means) to pursue a strategy. However, emerging technology can also transform *how* states employ their means (ways). Pursuing exquisite technology can even be a stated national objective (ends) that requires a strategy to achieve. Because it is difficult to isolate the causal relationships of emerging technology on state strategic behavior, emerging technologies can have disruptive or ordering effects, depending on the political context (Kroenig 2021) and the nature of the technology in question.

Notions of a "fourth offset" are becoming less opaque as great powers race to achieve and implement technological breakthroughs with an emphasis on artificial intelligence and autonomous machines. The United States benefits from private sector research and design, a capitalist market system, democratized information, and creativity that flourish under a free system. By contrast, the People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks its technological edge under a state-directed and resourced apparatus. Technological advantages are likely to be fleeting for both due to similar resourcing and the effective, rapid development of countermeasures. Successful competition depends on states' ability to scale rapidly in times of crisis, to effectively establish norms of AI use, to compete in the diffusion of global dual-use technology, and to question assumptions of technological emergence.

TECHNOLOGY AS AN "ENDS"

A strategy to achieve exquisite technology should optimally employ ways and means inherent to the state. As a result, the PRC and the United States have different strategies to attain exquisite technological end states. The Chinese state directs academic, private, and public institutions that merge diplomatic, economic, and military elements of national power to their ends (Doshi, 2021). Currently, this system allows the PRC to have a more resource-efficient and faster acquisition cycle (Robertson, 2021; Holt, 2022). Within technological development strategies, the sources of risk for the United States and the PRC are also different. The United States has a free-market

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system that is not always incentivized to support national security priorities. The PRC, by contrast, can direct investment toward security priorities, but in so doing, it takes on the risk of betting incorrectly on "winning" technologies.

There are two important considerations to plan against the Chinese strategy and optimize the United States' technological development strategy. First, the United States should be asking how they can influence the PRC to make "bad bets" that are prohibitively costly (i.e. encouraging the faulty investment of state resources), effectively using Chinese risk tolerance against them. Second, during times of relative peace, the United States government must continue to foster partnerships with the private sector through open communication of needs and priorities. Emerging tech cannot be created instantaneously, and many potential market participants are unwilling to surmount barriers to entry participation without strong demand signals – it is, therefore, critical for the U.S. national defense enterprise to nurture relationships with private industry before crises emerge.

Countries go to war with the forces they have – they enter national security crises with the technology that has already been fielded, trained, and integrated into doctrine. It may be relatively easy to scale materiel production through executive order, but innovation and software do not scale in the same way. There must be a current plan to onboard and foster private talent for national security during impending or ongoing crises to ensure that the United States can continue to pursue cutting-edge technological ends.

Strategic Impact of Counter-Countermeasures

As technology truly "emerges," states turn their efforts to develop countermeasures. The successful development and adaptation of effective countermeasures create a reactionary effort to develop counter-countermeasures to prevent the loss of heavily invested and doctrinally integrated capabilities. Recently, low-tech strategies, like using balloons or drones to trigger air defense assets (Kallenborn and Plichta 2023), have served as effective counter-countermeasures. If the United States and its adversaries get caught in a never-ending cycle of counter-counter measures, the end state is either total destruction or a complete technological blackout. As a result, the United States military must be comfortable operating in the most austere conditions.

This poses a delicate conundrum: how do you train soldiers to trust and invest in their technology while simultaneously preparing them for when their technology fails? This implies a longer training timeline to gain proficiency in both technologically robust and technologically austere environments. Investment in research to understand human-technology trust can help overcome the psychological limitations of doubt that may arise when soldiers are told to train as if their technology has failed (Konaev and Chahal 2021). It also means that the military needs an understandable and user-friendly human-machine interface to mitigate human cognitive bias, improve trust, and ease of adoption of technologies. Often high-tech is associated with complexity that requires time to train and understand. A streamlined human-to-technology interface eliminates the stress of complexity on the user and would therefore reduce the training time necessary to field cutting-edge technology, creating time for redundant training in austere conditions.

TECHNOLOGICAL WAYS: HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING

Technology also impacts how we fight. The most recent emphasis on technological ways is the introduction of artificial intelligence in the kill chain. As the DoD moves to integrate artificial

intelligence into systems, ethical considerations will also need to be made and refined, including to what extent the human remains in or "on the loop." The DoD must be attuned to Human-Machine Teaming (HMT) or how it is paired with the human operator. With HMT, the strengths and weaknesses of persons and machines are combined to mitigate one another and achieve the greatest effect (Russo 2023). These technologies will liberate humans to perform functions only humans should do, especially with more echelons between the end machine and the human operator.

The DoD's move to create distributed "advance battle networks" (ABNs) –under the concept of Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)– integrates Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence into the kill chain. JADC2 will employ unmanned and/or autonomous (U/A) capabilities in unprecedented ways that inform and accelerate decision-making processes, increase employment options and precision, and integrate across all physical and digital domains (Haddick 2023). Underlying these systems-of-systems, decision makers must once again determine how to structurally implement Human-Machine Teaming.

As technological innovations often do, the United States's move to JADC2 has prompted the PRC to respond with its own Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) concept. While China and the United States both race to improve their ABNs, the DoD should be attentive to the structural difference in human-machine teaming between U.S. and PRC systems. Suppose the United States seeks to uphold norms of armed conflict and the ethics of warfare. In that case, humans will likely be placed at red lines in the ABNs, and human-feedback will be used to eliminate costly or unethical automated moves (Defense Innovation Board 2019). It is unclear whether the PRC will take these same steps, especially as norms in space, cyber and informational domains are yet to be clearly established (Muñoz 2023). Analyzing how human-machine teaming is structured within MDPW and JADC2 may provide a structural reflection of ethics, risk acceptance, and trust in the technology to meet its objective.

DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS WITHOUT NORMATIVE CONSTRAINT

Finally, from whom states acquire their military and dual-use technological 'means' matters (Sander and Hartley 2001). The U.S. has been slow to open its military technology for sale to other countries, even within its own alliances. Meanwhile, the PRC has embraced its role as a military technology provider, which may, in turn, increase its overall influence in the system.

As a growing number of developing economies show an interest in incorporating new military technologies into their defense postures, they will likely turn to the most affordable choice that satisfies the needs of their defense priorities. The PRC has generally sold older variants of their products, resulting in middle- and low-income countries–the PRC's target market– being better disposed to invest in PRC articles (Herlevi 2023). For example, in 2018, a Chinese state-owned company committed to selling the CH-7, a next-generation stealth UAV, with plans to begin global mass production in 2022 (Kang and Bodeen 2018). The CH-7 UAV underscores this willingness on behalf of the PRC to sacrifice the cutting-edge aspect of its technology for a more appealing price, which is important to countries seeking to spend just enough to gain an advantage over their adversaries and no more than that.

As a self-identified leader of the Global South, the PRC seeks to establish itself as the primary emerging and dual-use technology provider (Oomen 2021). It has arguably set a foundation to do so with the Digital Silk Road and the Spatial Information Corridor of its Belt and Road Initiative, through which China promotes AI technology and services and exports satellite

products to countries around the world (Sasaki 2022). Exporting previous-generation military technology and, even more broadly, dual-use technologies will likely create a path-dependent reliance on the PRC for purchasers. The PRC's approach also gives them an advantage in choosing which technological "have nots" to elevate.

The U.S. must recognize that technological reliance may increase support for a PRC-lead-order. At a minimum, the U.S. should incentivize its businesses to have a competitive market share in the Global South for dual-use technology and provide access to defensive technologies for states whose security is eroded by PRC arms sales. At the same time, the United States has published detailed and comprehensible guidelines for the development of AI-enhanced systems. While this level of transparency and norm-setting efforts can cost the United States a strategic advantage, this approach will improve U.S. legitimacy as a leader in the field and increase attractiveness among private sector innovators and countries who are concerned about the effects of AI on global stability.

QUESTIONING ASSUMPTIONS

Discussions of technology and national security are often predicated on assumptions that should be constantly challenged. The assumptions about technology and strategy below deserve further attention to avoid technological determinism.

1) Innovation is limited to High Tech and Kinetic Effects

With significant emphasis placed on being on the "bleeding edge" of technology, there is a temptation to continue to chase an infinite horizon without pausing to recognize the conditions of the starting line. In the discussions of technology and national security, there is a critical need also to consider novel and efficient uses of "low tech" as well as non-kinetic force multipliers.

Investments in technologies that reduce the administrative burden of the warfighter and improve the efficiency of the fighting force are essential to maintain the competitive edge of our military. Using AI to eliminate redundant or unnecessary tasks may save the time necessary to train the spectrum of technological capabilities. AI implementation to improve efficiency is an example of a place where humans must remain in the loop to ensure redundancy in case of a breakdown in the system, but the technology would reduce the volume of manpower necessary for a task.

Updating non-kinetic systems is essential to maintain an all-volunteer force during times of low recruitment and, equally important, during a potential great power war of attrition. While the military has started to explore solutions such as these (including the Army's IPPS-A rollout and AI-based maintenance tracking), the development and implementation are slow and limited in scope. A review of basic manpower hours and administrative tasks could identify areas where operational units are spending unacceptable amounts of time (Thew 2021) and where non-kinetic technology could provide the greatest efficiency gains. Ultimately, the U.S. military seeks to retain its competitive advantage among professional militaries by developing flexible, agile leaders who can respond to changing conditions on the ground and apply critical thinking in the fog of war. Non-kinetic technological solutions are essential to enabling humans to do so.

2) Integrated Deterrence is Here to Stay

Integrated deterrence remains the central concept of our National Defense Strategy but has received a lukewarm embrace from the national security community (McInnis 2022). Technologies enabling competition below the threshold of armed conflict are central to Integrated Deterrence,

underpinning the cyber and space domains while also accelerating non-kinetic competition (including IP theft). However, integrated deterrence remains a nebulous concept that does not better equip us to deter. Defined as "the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits (National Defense Strategy 2022)," integrated deterrence may work as a large-scale commander's intent to the U.S. security apparatus, but it lacks clarity of prioritization and roles among defense entities to functionally make deterrence seamless.

Effective deterrence requires affecting the adversary's cost-benefit analysis *ex-ante* to dissuade them from taking action (Schelling 1966). This is clearly understood in the stated definition of integrated deterrence. However, while nuclear weapons have clearly adjusted the costs associated with escalation, it is not clear how well integrated multi-domain operations change adversaries' costs because they are unlikely to properly calculate the anticipated costs of their actions. If the universe of possible punishments an adversary faces is all things, everywhere, all at once, then adversaries may not actually know what is at stake for each decision they make along the competition continuum.

One aspect of integrated deterrence that must be better understood is to what extent we expect allies to truly integrate with our technological systems. Does deterrence increase if the United States and their Allies nest doctrine and operate on the same systems (Munoz 2023)? Greater interoperability among Allies may be more likely to deter with greater actual and perceived operational capabilities. Alternatively, are different network structures, hardware, and software among Allies actually a greater deterrent because of the redundancy and diversity they provide? Articulating this tradeoff to both our Allies and adversaries is important to understanding the actual deterrent value of this integration.

3) Speed is King

It is nearly impossible to discuss the effects of emerging technology without referencing the importance of speed. However, it is important to note there are often two types of speed at play in the current environment: 1) the speed of technological development and adoption 2) the speed of decision-making. The first dimension of speed should continue to be a high priority for the DoD. Expediting acquisition cycles and finding efficiencies for fielding technology are essential to meet our pacing challenge. Speed in this dimension can force an adversary's hand in the investment of countermeasures. However, the second dimension of speed—the speed of decision-making—should be questioned (Biddle 2007).

Undoubtedly, emerging technologies have accelerated decision-making processes. The ability to process billions of data points in seconds to arrive at a conclusion is not something to be taken lightly. This leads to a generally held assumption that the quickest actor will reign supreme (Boyd 1995). However, this assumption should be questioned, particularly when the decisions get ahead of the human's ability to process their perceived reality (Johnson 2022). Rather than finding the fastest way to decide, and outpacing human cognition, the United States should consider how it can slow down or disrupt our adversaries' processes or, at a minimum, erode the trust competitors have in their accelerated outputs. The accelerated pace of a decision is only helpful when there is trust between the human and the system. Sowing doubt may be an effective strategy to mitigate technological acceleration.

CONCLUSION

"Emerging Technology" is often discussed in a monolithic fashion; however, it is critical to recognize that there is a technological impact across ends, ways, and means. As the United

States pursues its national interest in a technologically integrated and advancing world, it is essential to recall that technological advantages are fleeting –outpacing an adversary requires resilient systems to develop, integrate, and iteratively adapt technology. The United States must continue to focus on establishing and maintaining the norms that distinguish a U.S. led order while also keeping market share in the global dual-use economy. As the United States reflects on the PRC pacing challenge, it is important to ask: How does the United States force the PRC to make 'bad bets' on emerging technology? How does the U.S. slow down the PRC's automated processes or erode their trust in the output? Simultaneously, the United States must also ask itself: What investments can be made in technology with non-kinetic effects to improve the efficiency of the all-volunteer force and enable training across the spectrum of technological availability? How does the U.S. communicate increased costs associated with integrated deterrence to deter more effectively? How does the U.S. scale innovation before and during crises? Questions such as these will allow the United States to avoid technological determinism and properly strategize amid competitive technological advances. ☆

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CHAPTER 10

EFFECTS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY ON INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABSTRACT

It is difficult to predict how and to what extent emerging technologies will impact strategic calculations about power, threat, coercion, and deterrence. These impacts have secondary effects on the stability of the international order. This essay provides an overview of three avenues by which emerging technology impacts the international order: perceptions of technological effects, alliance integration and operability, and compatibility with liberal ordering principles. It concludes with three recommendations for policymakers. First, strategically implement the 'hype' surrounding emerging technologies. Second, when integrating technology into alliance doctrine, carefully address abandonment and entrapment concerns to ensure ally buy-in. Finally, understand that technological advances have changed the set of options available to policymakers below the level of armed conflict, which will reverberate on the durability and perception of the liberal international order.

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Few topics in national security generate more buzz than the revelation of emerging technology. Advanced technology and autonomous weapons have long captured the public imagination and have been a staple of science fiction for decades—for good reason. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology, have the potential to transform the way wars are fought, intelligence is gathered, and diplomacy is conducted. Beyond their battlefield effects, however, emerging technologies may have an even greater impact on the stability of international order.

Emerging technologies have been hailed as game-changers that can shift the balance of power between nations, disrupt existing alliances, and reshape the global order. This essay provides an overview of three avenues by which emerging technology impacts the international order: perceptions of technological effects, alliances integration and operability, and compliance with the liberal ordering principles.[5]

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[5] *The performative effects of advanced technology can have political, propaganda, and security benefits referred to as 'hype' in this article. Alliance cohesion can be the difference between technology having a stabilizing, rather than a chaos-inducing, effect on the rules-based world order.*

It concludes with three recommendations for policymakers. First, strategically implement the 'hype' surrounding emerging technologies. Second, when integrating technology into alliance doctrine, carefully address abandonment and entrapment concerns to ensure ally buy-in. Finally, understand that technological advances have changed the set of options available to policymakers below the level of armed conflict, thereby reverberating on perceptions of the liberal order and opening alternative routes to state alignment.

TECHNOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS

The hype surrounding emerging technology drives it to the forefront of concerns for policymakers, military leaders, and domestic audiences. Hype over emerging technology is a reaction to the uncertainty it induces about the future; people and institutions capitalize on this uncertainty to promote their goals. Hype's performative effects can increase political power and international status, threaten security, and bolster the economy (Kunertova 2023). Politicians can wield power from cutting-edge innovations under their administrations, proffering it as an example of their successful policies or driving permissive attitudes toward spending (Lee 2022). On the international stage, politicians may seek recognition for possessing technology or projecting power with the technology. In this usage, the efficacy of the technology is often secondary to status aims. Emerging technology can also create distractions on the tactical level as militaries determine the prevalence and severity of the threat. Finally, the hype surrounding emerging technology may benefit firms economically, as we have seen in the run-up of AI companies after the launch of ChatGPT (Mishra 2023).

The uncertainty surrounding emerging technologies allows them to be leveraged for multiple purposes, often leading to overstating effects. For example, hyping the capabilities of potential weapons systems can attract funding and economic benefits to the developing state and its industry but may also lead to exaggerated assessments of their effectiveness and eroding public trust in emerging technology. In many cases, the hype associated with a technology is not driven by the state pursuing the technology but by media and industry observers and actors. As a result, states may lose control over the narrative of the perceived effects of an emerging technology. Coupled with the increasing proliferation of fake news, misinformation,
and disinformation, news of emerging technologies has left some audience members overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information and unable to discern what is true and what is not.

This so-called "hype fatigue" has become a significant challenge in the security environment, with adversaries using disinformation campaigns to undermine trust in the efficacy of democratic institutions. Thus, this hype should be carefully dissected – is the hype merely hyperbole or necessary attention to keep pace with strategic rivals? The performative effects of hype can be leveraged to unite a domestic audience, project power on the international stage, and distract and deter enemies on the battlefield. On the other hand, the inflated assessment of capabilities and potential risks can confound decision-making.

Although emerging technologies may be overblown, states cannot ignore the potential benefits of early adoption of technology, nor discount the threat of a new technology disrupting international order. Sensationalized reporting on the development of autonomous weapons or artificial intelligence could cause other countries to view these technologies as a significant threat, leading to a technology-security dilemma and increased tension between nations. In bargaining theory, because war is costly, there must exist an option short of war that will leave both parties better off than fighting (Fearon 1995). In this model, bargaining fails, and war results when states cannot

credibly commit or when states have private information about the costs of fighting and incentives to misrepresent that information. As new technologies emerge, states are incentivized to misrepresent information about their possession of the technology and its capabilities. When new technologies are unproven and the acquisition process undefined, claims are difficult to disprove. The uncertainty around new technologies incentivizes distorted threat construction. Debs and Monteiro (2014) argue that imperfect information is a primary factor in wars, especially preventative ones. Their argument builds on the theory that large and rapid shifts in the balance of power set the conditions for war; they argue that the shifts in power are driven by endogenous state decisions to invest in military capabilities. Emerging technologies may tip the scales in favor of war by increasing uncertainty about how military investment will shift power.

Researchers must responsibly forecast the future implementation of emerging technologies to minimize the noise generated by technological hype. Political and military leaders should be attentive to the audience their hype is intended for and the potential strategic reverberations associated with their communication (Kunertova 2023). The arms control community can also implement anticipatory measures to help mitigate the risks associated with emerging technologies.

IMPACT ON ALLIANCE DYNAMICS

Alliances are central to international ordering, formalizing alignment among states to address common threats and challenges. The use of technology can shape alliance doctrine and strategy, as well as determine the ability of allies to work together effectively.

The advent of nuclear weapons mitigated the importance of alliances for nuclear states. Prior to nuclear weapons, small states, like North Korea, were dependent on alliances for survival. Post-nuclear weapon acquisition states, regardless of conventional size, have outsized international power. As part of the counter-proliferation campaign, the United States has updated alliance language to encompass protection in exchange for not developing nuclear weapons through the extension of a nuclear umbrella.

Even in less extreme examples, technological advances impact alliance dynamics. Doctrine in alliances must adapt to incorporate new technology; as alliances go through doctrinal change, they face two critical concerns –abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment and entrapment refer to competing forces that create a security dilemma in alliances: states want to ensure they are not deserted by allies (abandonment) while also preserving “enough freedom of action to avoid being dragged into unwanted conflicts by those same allies” (Driver 2023). Driver argues that there are three sources of military doctrine: rationalist, organizational, and cultural. Rationalist logic holds that doctrine is derived from the threat the state faces, the technology available to combat the threat, and the geography of the state. Organizational drivers of doctrine hold that all factors are interpreted through the self-interest of primary military actors. Finally, service and strategic culture are important to when and how doctrine changes (Driver 2023). Each of these drivers of military doctrine are affected by technological changes, placing emerging technology in an essential role in alliance formation and cohesion. Understanding how technology affects alliances is critical to getting members on board with investing in technology and integrating it into doctrine. Failure to integrate technology changes into alliance doctrine increases interoperability issues and calls the strength of the alliance into question. Successful integration of technology into doctrine requires navigating allies’ abandonment and entrapment concerns (Driver 2023).

TECHNOLOGY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

As the world of international relations refocuses on great power competition, the integration of alliance dynamics is especially prominent in the view of what the 2022 National Defense Strategy deems the most serious challenge to U.S. national security. Emerging technology has implications for the balance of power in Asia (Gholz 2016). The "PRC's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences" is the United States pacing national security challenge (Senior Defense Official One, DoD Press Conference). Creating an informal alliance between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India highlights the importance of alliances in this new and developing security environment. A core challenge policymakers encounter in this environment is determining how to pursue foreign policy goals in the national interest that may conflict with the liberal international order (LIO). Emerging technology can help policymakers successfully manage this tradeoff and exacerbate challenges in interstate relations (Poznansky 2023).

During the Cold War, competition over state alignment was fierce, and the outcome was often influenced by actions that were counter to the rules and spirit of the LIO. Intervening for regime change and election meddling is directly contrary to the rules and procedures of the liberal order but was often considered to influence alignment in contested states. In order to stay within the bounds of the LIO and engage in these activities, policymakers feigned compliance by using covert action, secrecy, and deception (Poznansky 2019). Technology complicates states' ability to keep secrets or conceal actions. The internet, smart devices, and social media make the spread of information nearly instantaneous and turn every citizen into both a sensor and a reporter. New technology also presents opportunities, opening a wider range of tools for state use. Cyber capabilities provide numerous avenues for actors to influence one with plausible deniability. A continuation of cyber capabilities, Artificial Intelligence is relatively untested but has the potential to be leveraged discreetly in support of national objectives. Additionally, emerging technologies will likely play an important role in exposing adversary hypocrisy (Poznansky 2023). New and emerging technologies have countervailing effects on the secrecy, and plausible deniability that states rely on to maintain compliance with the LIO in great powers competition.

FORECASTING ALTERNATE FUTURES

While it is nearly impossible to predict how technology will shape future global order, there are several alternative futures to consider, particularly from a U.S. alliance and order management perspective. While alliances are central to U.S. strategy, alignment among states is also critical (Wilkins 2012). States who may be hostile to democracy but content with the status quo are important stakeholders in achieving U.S. strategic objectives. First, the United States must consider to what extent they want to compete in technological diffusion in the Global South. Currently, China is competing to be the technological vendor of choice on the African continent (Morrissey 2023). If the United States believes technological diffusion has a path-dependency for state alignment, then there are long-term risks to permitting China to gain primary market share. The United States must also prepare for the possibility of a global technological divide, where certain countries have access to advanced technologies while others are left behind. This could exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and create new sources of conflict. The United States must work with its allies and partners to ensure that the benefits of emerging technologies are

shared widely and that the risks are managed collectively. This also includes democratizing technology to offset power asymmetries between autocrats and their people.

As policymakers navigate these alternate futures, they must understand and consider the strategic importance of hype (Kunertova 2023). Their policy decisions should consider their domestic audience, international allies, and adversaries. The norm should be an attempt to control the hype and generate appropriate expectations for our allies. However, there are times when hype could be used strategically to communicate with our adversaries to incite spending on research and development that is costly and distracting. This balance should be considered carefully, and any attempts to strategically lead our adversaries with hype should be monitored closely.

As an emerging technology transitions from its hype phase to a proven, acquired technology, policymakers should strongly consider its adoption and integration plan. Specifically, policymakers should explicitly determine the lengths to which doctrine should change due to acquiring a new technology and the secondary effects on interoperability with allies. While integrating new technologies, policymakers should carefully consider the entrapment and abandonment concerns of our allies (Driver 2023). Though unlikely, one could imagine an alliance becoming weak because of an unintended shift in doctrine due to emerging technology. Ensuring doctrine is considered during the acquisitions process is necessary to prevent any chance of breaking ties between our allies.

Finally, emerging technology will continue to impact order – both in how states align via dependencies and norm formation for technological use. During the Cold War, covert actions could be used to pursue national objectives. However, technology and the reemergence of great power competition means policymakers will have to find alternative ways to engage in covert actions or actually comply with the rules of the LIO. Policymakers should use non-attributional methods, such as cyber operations, to pursue policy objectives. Additionally, the U.S. should recognize the value of technological entanglement as a precursor to state alignment. Currently, PRC appears more apt to diffuse technology that provides dependencies or affinities for alignment with them (Morrissey 2023). The U.S. should compete in this sphere.

As we enter a new era of great power competition in a technologically integrated age, policymakers must consider the spillover effects of technological development and implementation. While emerging technologies do have the potential to upend international politics, technology alone is rarely sufficient to do so. Thoughtfully considering the hype, acquisition, and integration of technology requires communication between private and public sector partners, allies, and even adversaries. Understanding this landscape is paramount to advancing the United States and its allies' strategic objectives. ☆

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CHAPTER 11

IRREGULAR WARFARE IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION

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ABSTRACT

The pivot from focusing on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era to strategic competition between great powers today has led the U.S. military to prioritize preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, the dominant forms of conflict during the Cold War, the last era of strategic competition, were irregular and proxy warfare as the Soviet Union and the United States sought to pursue national security interests while avoiding direct confrontation that could escalate to nuclear annihilation. Irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition as well, with three areas the U.S. military can focus on to prepare for the new international security environment: first, strategic competition will require the ability to work effectively with partner forces, and there are many lessons from the post-9/11 conflicts that can help military practitioners navigate partner warfare dynamics; second, synchronization across the joint force and the interagency is imperative to success in IW contexts; third, U.S. strategists and military planners need to account for both the conventional capabilities of U.S. competitors and also their employment of IW.

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The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the shift in focus from counterterrorism to great power competition promulgated in the U.S. National Defense Strategy (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022) represents a major pivot in U.S. national security focus. As the U.S. reduces its footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and increasingly prioritizes threats from Russia and China, will irregular warfare remain important in a new era of strategic competition (Bowen 2022; Negatu 2022; O'Rourke 83)?

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While large-scale combat operations may be the most dangerous scenario, the most likely conflicts between great powers will manifest in forms more familiar to irregular warfare: proxy wars, information operations, security force assistance, unconventional warfare, and foreign internal defense. In this view, irregular warfare may become increasingly common as conventional and nuclear deterrence work to prevent direct war between great powers.

During the Cold War, arguably the last era of strategic competition, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each employed IW approaches extensively. IW featured training and equipping rival proxy forces, which allowed each side to pursue opposing policies and impose costs on each other while avoiding direct conflict, which could escalate to Mutually Assured Destruction (Byman 2018). Although the current Ukraine–Russia conflict is wholly different, the U.S. decision to prioritize training, equipping, and advising Ukrainian forces rather than direct engagement suggests that IW approaches remain important in great power conflict (Beauchamp 2022). Russia, China, and other state and non-state actors operate comfortably in the area below the threshold of armed conflict, often referred to as the gray zone. Examples of contemporary IW include Russia's use of private military companies like the Wagner Group, both Russia and China's use of information operations to influence U.S. domestic politics, and China's use of a maritime militia to intimidate countries in the South China Sea (Marco 2023; Gomez and Chase 2022; Young 2020; Jebb and Jones 2022). Advancements in space and cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and machine learning will further complicate the gray zone, making the understanding and employment of irregular warfare approaches increasingly important.

Recognizing the prominence of irregular warfare, the U.S. Department of Defense included an IW Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy (2020). As the *only* annex to the NDS, it served as an official statement that IW would play a seminal role in a new era of strategic competition. The annex states, "IW is a persistent and enduring operational reality employed by non-state actors and increasingly by state actors in competition with the United States." It defines IW as "a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will." It is executed through five core missions: unconventional warfare, stabilization, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. It also includes related activities such as military information support operations, cyberspace operations, countering threat networks, counter-threat finance, civil-military operations, and security cooperation.

The IW Annex to the NDS reflects the reality that irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition, just as it played a major role during the Cold War and in the decades since. While preparing for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and strengthening U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence postures is important, national security scholars and practitioners also need to understand the characteristics and demands of contemporary IW to compete successfully with other powers. Failure to do so would equate to only preparing for the most dangerous form of conflict while underinvesting in the most common form of conflict, which is, in fact, quite prevalent at present.

While many aspects of IW warrant further attention, we focus this paper on three themes. First, partner forces are as essential in strategic competition as they were in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fights of the last two decades. Second, IW is a team sport requiring joint and

interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented. Identifying barriers to coordination and mechanisms to facilitate integrated IW campaigns will give the U.S. a strategic advantage. Third, U.S. competitors will continue to rely on continuously evolving IW approaches to challenge the United States. Understanding how U.S. competitors use IW is just as important as understanding and responding to their conventional orders of battle.

THEME 1: PARTNER FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION

The 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the essential role of partners and Allies in strategic competition (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). A snapshot of U.S. activities worldwide highlights that managing partner dynamics is a critical component of modern conflict. For example, U.S. support for Ukraine hinges on training and equipping Ukrainian forces to defend against Russian aggression. Ukraine has successfully resisted Russian aggression, beyond the expectations of Russia and many in the international community, because the U.S. and NATO Allies worked to build Ukraine's conventional military capacity (Chinchilla 2022). Support comes from a combination of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional military units working to train and equip Ukrainian forces and reassure NATO Allies on the eastern flank (Atwell 2023).

Working with partners also remains essential to address internal and regional security challenges around the world. The decision to leave Iraq and Afghanistan did not end the threats of terrorism and insurgency, nor remove building partner capacity as a widely employed tool of U.S. foreign policy. To this end, the Defense Department requested $6.5 billion in security cooperation programs and activities in 2022. U.S. SOF deploy to over 100 countries annually to train alongside partner forces (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2021; Kashkett 2017, 27). Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABS) include military advisors meant to assist allies and partners with building conventional military capacity, created specifically in recognition that working alongside conventional partner forces is an enduring military requirement. These build partner capacity and counterterrorism efforts not only allow the U.S. to mitigate contagion and transnational threats that emanate from regional instability, such as the spread of refugees, terrorist activity, and disease – counterterrorism assistance also serves as a tool to increase U.S. influence with aid recipients in the context of strategic competition (Ware 2023). Multinational training exercises play a similar role, advancing U.S. influence by reinforcing partnerships and deepening the U.S. rolodex vis-a-vis U.S. competitors (Wolfley 2021).

During the past two decades, the U.S. relied on partner forces for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Partner forces advanced U.S. security objectives by providing local knowledge and expertise, and by supplementing or substituting for limited U.S. troop presence (Moghadam, Rauta, and Wyss 2023). Furthermore, building partner capacity of local forces was the linchpin for U.S. exit strategies from conflicts it did not want to be permanently engaged in (McInnis and Lucas 2015). Efforts to build partner capacity have a mixed record, however. For example, consider the notable collapse of western-trained Iraqi Security Forces to ISIS in 2013 and Afghanistan National Security Forces to the Taliban in 2021 after over a decade and billions of dollars invested in each of these forces (Hamasaeed and Nada 2020; Maizland 2023; Metz 2023). Since building sustainable local capacity is difficult, the United States has sometimes worked with partners to accomplish short-term counterterrorism objectives, as in Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, when direct U.S. intervention is politically unfeasible. Short-term

collaboration with partners over more narrow objectives has often proven more successful than building sustainable local capacity.

The mixed record of U.S. counterinsurgency with partners during the past two decades made some eager to move on and focus on retooling the U.S. military to wage large-scale combat operations. But ignoring the lessons of two decades of partner warfare would be a mistake. Though the goals of security force assistance will be different when the adversary is another state fighting conventionally rather than a non-state armed actor, the dynamics of persuading, coercing, and sometimes imposing upon a partner to make painful defense reforms or coordinate its military strategy with others will remain similar (Tecott 2021; Karlin 2018). A large and growing body of literature from both practitioners and scholars can help us understand why U.S. partners often struggle to build capacity. It also shows how to better manage partner dynamics by placing conditions on aid and crafting effective relationships with local counterparts (Schroden 2021; Berman and Lake 2019; Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2017). While working with partners is in many ways an art, subject to interpersonal dynamics – there is also a science to partner and coalition warfare with underlying mechanisms that characterize partner relationships. Understanding the social science of partner warfare will allow military practitioners to optimize partnered military engagements from the strategic to tactical levels.

Given the central role of allies and partners in strategic competition, three observations from the post–9/11 wars about partner warfare should guide U.S. force design. First, partner warfare requires cultural understanding and social intelligence. Second, long-term success when working with partners requires transition planning for when external assistance ends. Finally, working with partners often creates tension between U.S. interests and values.

Understanding a local population's language, culture, and heritage is an important component of irregular warfare at both the tactical and strategic levels. Understanding local culture and language can build rapport and influence at the tactical level (Ball 2021). Cultural awareness and relationships can play an essential role in strategic competition by increasing U.S. access and influence vis-a-vis adversaries (McGurk 2021; Koven and Mason 2021). However, culture and heritage also play an important role in war onset and become strategic targets in irregular warfare that states use to undermine U.S. allies or partners (Clack 2022). Aggressors can use appeals to a shared cultural heritage to justify false territorial claims based on "history" or "common heritage," as well as erode the nationalism of a local population that seeks to resist this subversion (Salo 2022). For example, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Russian government repurposed local Crimean cultural sites and historically significant monuments to reflect Russian rather than Ukrainian nationality (Kishkovsky 2021). This tactic of cultural manipulation is also evident in the Chinese funding of certain African heritage museums, which allows China to gain social credibility with a local population (Sutton 2018). China has also repeatedly referenced Taiwan as a historical part of China to stoke nationalism at home and justify its territorial claims to the island. In the event of the use of force to compel Taiwan to reunite with the mainland, China would undoubtedly use such references to shared history and culture to justify its aggression.

Understanding cultural heritage, then, serves multiple purposes. Fundamentally, if irregular warfare centers on influencing populations, then understanding culture and how to engage with it is a key pathway to waging irregular warfare successfully, as well as countering the attempts of competitors to wage irregular warfare. During conflict, understanding culture allows the U.S. to "mitigate threats, generate a soft power advantage, and protect cultural heritage directly" (Salo

2022). After conflict, such understanding informs the ability to reconstruct cultural sites and build local partnerships. This helps broker a sustainable peace that protects minority groups and strengthens a population against future attempts at subversion.

A second component of working with partner forces is transition planning. As previously noted, the U.S. has a checkered record of building sustainable partner forces to maintain security gains once external forces withdraw. While a surge in external forces can increase stability during an external intervention, long-term stability requires the partner forces to maintain that capacity once external resources withdraw. For example, a surge of U.S. resources in Anbar Province decreased insurgent activity during the intervention; however, after the Anbar Awakening, the tribal leaders who organized against al-Qaeda fell apart after U.S. forces withdrew (Stephen, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012).

While such failures may lead some to believe building partner capacity is universally ineffective, there are multiple cases of successful build partner capacity missions, such as U.S. assistance to Colombia under Plan Colombia and U.S. development of the Republic of Korea Army during and after the Korean War – and analysis of cases of success and failure provides an opportunity to identify the underlying mechanisms for future success (Sinnott and Atwell 2020; Berman and Lake 2019). There are multiple potential causes of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan which scholars and practitioners should continue to investigate. For example, a large U.S. footprint itself may crowd out partner forces from owning the security paradigm or undermine their legitimacy with the population (Atwell and Bailey 2021; Wilson 2006). Alternatively, the U.S. might need to accept that building partner capacity has limits and focus on choosing partners who can become self-sufficient upon withdrawal of external support (Paul et al. 2013). Either way, transition planning is a fundamental consideration when working with partners during irregular warfare, and we have more to learn through rigorous study.

Finally, balancing U.S. interests versus its values is an important challenge in working with partners (Jebb and Atwell 2022). The U.S. may not always be able to select partners with similar values. In the context of foreign internal defense, the U.S. often selects partners with misaligned values because corrupt and ineffective states are most likely to face insurgencies (Goldenberg et al. 2016). Sullivan and Karreth note that "When, despite its military superiority, a government is unable to prevail over a rebel movement, the key barriers are likely to be political—corruption, strong popular discontent, divisions within the regime—rather than military, and additional war-fighting capacity is unlikely to improve the regime's position" (2015). Many counterinsurgent governments actually commit more human rights abuses when receiving external security assistance (Sullivan, Blanken, and Rice 2018).

Despite their lack of shared values, these potential partners might still possess capabilities, access, and freedom of action that make collaboration necessary. This poses challenges from the tactical level, where, for example, in Afghanistan, U.S. troops worked alongside partner forces they knew were engaging in systematic child sexual abuse, to the strategic level, when the U.S. decides to align with a government it knows is corrupt or whose military forces conduct human rights violations or employ indiscriminate violence (Qobil 2010). While strategic competition may present scenarios where the U.S. must work with partners who do not share its interests or values, understanding the underlying mechanisms that drive partner relationships, can reveal practices to gain partner reform and compliance. For example, a growing proxy war scholarship addresses the challenge of ensuring compliance with patron demands on partner forces (such as

U.S. efforts to improve the human rights records of partner forces), including under conditions where the aid recipient may have more leverage than the external actor (Elias 2023; Mott 2002). Tactical and strategic military leaders need to recognize the gap between U.S. interests and values when working with partner forces and be provided a framework for operating with difficult partners (Tankel 2018).

THEME 2: JOINT AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

Irregular warfare is a team sport requiring significant coordination between joint and interagency actors within the U.S. government. Influencing populations and establishing the legitimacy of governments requires synchronizing all instruments of national power to sway sentiments of a target population favorably in support of a partner, ally, or the U.S. itself – or negatively against a competitor or, in the context of LSCO, an enemy. While DoD may sit at the pointy end of the spear in IW contexts, the shaft includes the whole of the U.S. government, working in coordination with a constellation of state and non-state actors toward a common national security objective.

First, working with partner forces, as described above, is a capability required from both SOF and conventional forces (Noonan 2021). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan saw conventional units engaging directly with partner forces from the strategic to tactical levels during large-footprint counterinsurgency. Given that such a conflict is not anticipated in the near future, it may be tempting to relegate working with partners to the SOF community since it includes units, such as Army Special Forces, designed specifically for this mission (1st Special Forces Command 2021). However, U.S. conventional units around the world are currently working alongside partners and allies down to the tactical level, from East Europe to East Asia, on land, sea, and in the air. Even in the context of a major power war involving LSCO, U.S. conventional troops will fight alongside partner forces at all levels of war – as occurred in LSCO from the past to include both World Wars. Both U.S. conventional and SOF commanders will benefit from understanding the underlying dynamics of working alongside partner forces.

Second, interagency and intergovernmental coordination are critical, given the focus on legitimacy in IW. For example, U.S. doctrine captured in JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) and much of the counterinsurgency scholarship contends that success requires winning the “hearts and minds” of the population (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018; Pant 2019). To be viewed as legitimate by the population, the incumbent government improves security and non-security services to separate the population from the insurgents and establish control. This not only sways the population from the insurgents but has practical warfighting benefits since civilians will share actionable information on the whereabouts of hidden insurgents to COIN forces when they are viewed as legitimate, helping the government overcome the insurgency identification problem (Berman, Felter, Shapiro 2018; Kalyvas 2006).

Given the need to improve partner government services, external actors seek to build not only partner military capacity but also government capacity – which in turn leads to a broad range of U.S. agencies participating in IW campaigns, from the Department of Justice to the Department of Agriculture, in addition to intelligence agencies and the military. The importance of interagency operations during large-footprint IW campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is evidenced through innovations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan – civilian-military organizations focused on promoting social and economic development (United

States Institute of Peace 2013). The requirement to work through interagency actors is reinforced by many less-visible IW missions in Title 22 (State Department led) environments, requiring military personnel to synchronize with interagency actors. An example of successful interagency collaboration in a Title 22 environment is U.S. foreign internal defense in Colombia (Alzate 2010). Understanding how to optimize interagency coordination, from the tactical to strategic levels, is another area that provides important lessons from the post-9/11 era relevant to strategic competition (Johnston and Shinnick 2022).

THEME 3: THE UNITED STATES MUST CONSTANTLY EVALUATE HOW ITS COMPETITORS ARE EMPLOYING IW APPROACHES

Scholars and practitioners must continue to develop an understanding of how competitors like China, Russia, and Iran are employing IW approaches to challenge U.S. interests. Ranging from Russia's use of "little green men" to annex Crimea in 2014 and its employment of Wagner Group to advance its interests around the world, to China's use of "little blue men" as a maritime militia in the South China Sea, to Iran's use of proxy forces throughout the Middle East to impose costs on the U.S. and its partners – U.S. competitors employ IW approaches to advance their interests while avoiding direct conflict with the U.S. (Shevchenko 2014; Marten 2019; Jebb and Jones 2022; Jones 2019). As mentioned previously, Russia and China justify their territorial aggression using claims of shared heritage – an IW strategy that can be effective for subversion. Therefore, countering U.S. competitors requires understanding not only their conventional order of battle but also the IW tools they will employ during competition and LSCO.

We often think that United States adversaries and competitors rely on irregular warfare strategies because of their conventional military weakness relative to the U.S. This may be the case for actors like Iran (Kreig and Rickli 2019). But as China develops its conventional military capacity to match the United States, its doctrine places irregular warfare – not conventional warfare – at its center. Chinese military doctrine emphasizes the "three warfares (三战)": public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as part of a whole-of-government approach to IW (Kania 2016). These three warfares are interactive and can be used together to shape the battlespace, with "legal warfare to provide the basis for launching an attack, public opinion warfare to delegitimize the adversary, and psychological warfare to demoralize the adversary" (Knoll, Pollpeter, and Plapinger 2021). This focus on IW could be a smart strategy. As we highlighted earlier in this article, IW strategies have an advantage because they can be employed to achieve strategic ends even when conventional and nuclear deterrence makes the use of conventional military force prohibitively costly.

While China's challenge to the U.S. includes a conventional military component, as witnessed by overt military threats to Taiwan, it relies heavily on IW tools to advance its global interests which the U.S. military must understand and counter (China Power Project 2023). China has relied on gray-zone conflict to alter the status quo in its near seas without triggering a conventional conflict (Cooper and Shearer 2017). In addition, China has embarked on a campaign to expand its global influence using economic and political tools. One such tool is the One Belt One Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013 to invest in developing more than 150 countries and international organizations (Knoll, Pollpeter, and Plapinger 2021; World Bank 2018). China relies on paramilitary forces to conduct portions of its irregular warfare strategy. Its maritime militia supports China's claims to territory in the South

China Sea. Additionally, China's tools of competition and influence increasingly rely on the private sector. Private security companies are essential in the One Belt One Road Initiative, and China leverages its relationships with or outright ownership of Chinese companies to maintain a global ports network that can be used for naval power projection (Karden and Leutert 2022).

Russia's strategic approach to irregular warfare similarly displays what has been termed "an impressive degree of political-military integration" (Sherr 2017, IV). This strategy involves using regular military capabilities and a full range of political, economic, and informational tools to influence operations in the gray zone short of conventional war (U.S. Congress 2017). In Ukraine, Russia's tactics included a covert operation combined with informational warfare to annex Crimea in 2014, working with local proxies to foment conflict in the Donbas, and the use of "lawfare" and informational warfare to legally justify its territorial claims and attempt to weaken and divide the Western response.

It is important, however, not to oversell Russian accomplishments in irregular warfare. Russia failed in 2014 to fully mobilize Russian-speaking populations in the Donbas; many Russian speakers instead formed volunteer militias to fight on the side of Kyiv (Chinchilla and Driscoll 2021). "Hybrid warfare," a fusion of conventional and irregular warfare with additional criminal and terrorist elements – failed in Ukraine when Russian proxies could not fight alone, and Russia had to rely on its own conventional infantry to defeat the Ukraine army (Kofman 2016). Since escalating its war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia has proved vulnerable to Ukraine's effective use of irregular warfare elements, such as SOF and informational warfare, to mobilize the Ukrainian public and gain Western support. Russia also received significant attention for relying on private military contractors, particularly the Wagner Group, as a tool of intervention in places such as Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. However, the Wagner Group has a mixed record regarding how much it contributes to Russian foreign policy goals (Marten 2019). Furthermore, after the armed rebellion launched by its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group's future utility to the Kremlin remains to be seen.

This cursory overview highlights the types of irregular warfare approaches employed by China and Russia. However, it does not claim that these two countries are consistently successful when employing these approaches. The essential observation is that IW is a valued tool employed by U.S. competitors, though its manifestations are not static – the U.S. military needs to systematize tracking how U.S. competitors employ irregular warfare and develop responses as they evolve into the future.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. defense establishment outperforms its competitors because it is a learning organization (Atwell 2023). It has a lot of lessons to learn from the post-9/11 era that will be valuable in a new era focused on strategic competition. If the past is prologue, we can expect the U.S., its allies and partners, and its competitors to continue employing irregular warfare frequently. In many ways, engaging in strategic competition will take the U.S. military back to the future regarding force design and strategy (Atwell and Gage 2021). While some in the national security community may believe strategic competition involves a hard pivot to LSCO that makes the lessons of the post-9/11 conflicts irrelevant, history and a survey of the current international landscape suggests reality is more complicated.

To prepare the force for success in strategic competition, scholars and practitioners can start by focusing on three areas to understand the character of modern conflict: strategic competition will require the ability to work effectively with partner forces; synchronization across the joint force and the interagency is imperative to success in IW contexts; and U.S. strategists and military planners need to account for not only the conventional capabilities of U.S. competitors but also their employment of IW. ☆

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CHAPTER 12

THE HUMAN DOMAIN MATTERS IN WAGING IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE ERA OF GRAY ZONE CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

Planning and waging warfare oscillates between the technologists and humanists. These two camps hold differing views of how competition looks, where technologists believe the next weapon system will provide an edge to dominate the next conflict, whereas humanists view humans as the primary locus of competition. As conventional warfare tends to focus on weapon systems, large scale combat operations, and maneuver, this naturally lends itself to the primacy of technologists. However, waging effective irregular warfare means focusing on achieving certain effects against an adversary in a way that limits their ability to respond in-kind. With gray zone conflict increasingly defined by successfully employing irregular warfare operations, this paper identifies, summarizes, and addresses the value of focusing operations on cognitive factors, the positionality problem for counterinsurgents, and domestic political appetite for waging covert and non-attributable cyber operations. Our analysis suggests that an emphasis on the next technological edge to offset and outcompete adversaries means that the human domain should remain a central and crucial role in current and future military operations.

* * *

Debates abound about what the current state of competition and conflict looks like, and how it will shape the future of warfare. Two primary intellectual camps emerge: technologists and humanists. The technologists rely on arguments about the value of weapon systems and achieving the 'next Offset' (or Third Offset) to technologically outcompete adversaries (Hasik 2018). The humanists, however, place a premium on people and their role in institutions mobilizing societies and conducting warfare. Human-centric approaches seek to achieve greater effects against a targeted population – citizens and soldiers – to influence outcomes of cooperation, competition, and conflict. U.S. influence in emerging international orders rests not on technological edges gained through new weapon systems. Instead, a 'Human Offset' can enable the U.S. and its allies to outcompete China, Russia, and other adversaries.

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The crucial element of irregular warfare in the context of gray zone conflict is achieving asymmetric effects to maximize strategic outcomes against an adversary, but that also limits their ability to respond in-kind. Unless a form of gray zone deterrence (Matisek 2017) can be achieved by either actor, an asymmetric blend of kinetic and non-kinetic activities are pursued to exploit an opponent at the seams, limiting their ability to respond. However, analyses of conflict and competition in the gray zone often miss the cognitive value of such activities in exploiting the human domain by altering perceptions, norms, values, and the utility of combat. Such reasoning is in line with Metz and Johnson's (2001) suggestion that "Military strategists and commanders must think in terms of *psychological precision*" for the purposes of "shaping a military operation to attain the desired attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions on the part of both the enemy and other observers, whether noncombatants in the area of operations or global audiences." By emphasizing the human domain for offensive and defensive gray zone activities, states can better leverage their instruments of national power to achieve desired endstates.

Even as the world focused on learning lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War, a growing amount of focus is shifting to a potential Taiwan Crisis over the status of the Republic of China (ROC). This potentially could be the next major issue in Asia, as western policymakers have become increasingly concerned with how the People's Republic of China (PRC) may decide to use conventional and irregular tools to reclaim the breakaway province of Taiwan (Culver and Kirchberger 2023).

COGNITIVE AND MENTAL WARFARE

While the Russo-Ukraine War exhibits many features of 20th century conventional warfare, like trench warfare, reliance on artillery, and armored assaults, it has also exhibited innovative implementations of new technologies (e.g., drones, open-source intelligence, etc.), as well as important strategic elements of the human domain. For instance, Ukrainian leadership has coordinated domestic and global narratives in favor of its views to ensure continued western aid and support – and to counter Russian propaganda and similar information operations (Chiriac and Matisek 2022b). At the same time, shaping the information environment to alter the human domain in the targeted society (and beyond) is nothing new. According to Bērziņš (2023), since Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine in 2014, Russia has increasingly emphasized "influence, information, and psychological operations, attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber operations, and the asymmetric use of kinetic instruments." These gray zone activities, which Bērziņš (2023) alluded to as hybrid warfare (referred to as 'New Generational Warfare' by Russian leaders), all have the same "common purpose of affecting behavior by protecting or influencing the cognitive process of the adversary to gain strategic advantage." Many of these core actions by the Russian government are similar to the same tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) utilized by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

While newly emergent technologies (e.g., AI, ChatGPT, social media, hyper-connectivity, etc.) can increase the scale, intensity, and targeting of such human domain attacks, they typically still rely on Cold War era TTPs as they are ultimately meant to dismantle and alter "situational awareness and sensemaking ability" of a specific individual and/or group. As noted by Bērziņš (2023), by combining industrial age TTPs with information age technologies, a new form of cognitive warfare has emerged, which alters "the subject's cognitive ability and perception of reality, making them act in congruence with the controller's strategic objectives." Ultimately, the aim of such non-kinetic actions is to avoid the use of costly conventional forces to violently compel

a target individual, society, or country to comply. Thus, effective cognitive warfare in the human domain can be informational or psychological; can aim at human consciousness and attitudes; and can occur via networks and similar information technology (e.g., smart devices, etc.). Successful offense and defensive operations in the realm of cognitive warfare require doctrinal shifts for the US and its allies. Occupying digital terrain to inhibit conventional military operations can be more important than occupying physical terrain. It also means unpacking how Russia (and similar authoritarian countries) utilize irregular tools of cognitive control to deprive targeted actors of their physical and digital sovereignty by being put under malign external control.

A POSITIONAL APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL AND IRREGULAR WARFIGHTING

Understanding the value of Russian cognitive warfare is important in devising new offensive and defense capabilities in this realm, first as a way of defeating Russian information-shaping operations, but also in deterring similar types of irregular warfare activities (in the present and the future) by the PRC against Taiwan in the event of a conflict breaking out over Taiwan's future status. Studying the characteristics and traits of prior internal wars can lend a pathway for thinking about future conflicts that may be muddied by identities and political alignments. For instance, the ways in which pro-government and anti-government forces conduct irregular operations – as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last two decades–provides insights on the value and role of positionality in an internal conflict as noted by Perez (2023).

A hypothetical scenario, such as a conventional invasion of Taiwan by PRC forces, would likely result in a pro-Taiwan independence insurgency where a host of various pro-PRC and anti-PRC actors – not to mention 'fence-sitters' and 'spoilers' – with competing interests would emerge in complicating the targeting and identification of 'friends' and 'foes' by both forces. For instance, the initial invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 provides clues on how complicated the political and human terrain might look like. Many citizens, soldiers, and government officials in Crimea and Donbas side-switched to occupying Russian forces (Memmot 2014). However, despite such initial successes by Russia in 2014, similar Russian assumptions were made about the human domain in Ukraine, as the first several months of the 2022 invasion were marked by major logistical failures due to Russian forces not being supported by local Ukrainians in the same way they were in 2014 (Chiriac and Matisek 2022a).

Relying upon US experiences in waging counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan as recent case studies, Perez (2023) notes that the landscape of any civil war should be conceptualized by theorists and military practitioners "as a contest between ever-changing alliance formations at multiple levels." Dynamic alliances are not a well-understand concept for most western military forces, especially the US, because most military education and training emphasizes tactics, combined arms maneuver, and technology to overcome and defeat local oppositional forces.

US, NATO, allied, and partner forces' counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2021) suggest a need to reassess how to identify and target enemies in complex political and human terrain where conventional combined arms maneuver is not possible. By emphasizing a positional approach to conventional and irregular warfare, Perez (2023) contends that, optimally, U.S. and allied military planners should: 1) understand local-level politics and motivations of all the various formal and informal actors, 2) discern how to best

posture and position their own forces to exploit shifting political dynamics between different groups of actors, and 3) succeed in choosing which actors are best to co-opt, exploit, or fight based on their preferences, ideologies, political preferences, and pragmatism. The crucial variable in such a positional approach to planning for military operations is centering on how best to favorably shape and influence the human domain of allies, partners, fence-sitters, spoilers, and adversaries towards a strategic end.

Shifting emphasis during competition from a binary focus on identifying 'friend' or 'foe' toward a more positional approach reduces the likelihood of conflict while increasing opportunities for peace and stability. With the US having begun its Asia pivot in 2011, and NATO recognized it in 2019 there is growing concern about likely conflict over the status of Taiwan. A positional approach to the Taiwanese government, military, and society, would give western advisors an opportunity to strengthen these various actors in deterring a (potential) conventional assault and/or an irregular operation by PRC forces (Matisek, Lowsen, and Amble 2022). With the prospects of a D-Day styled conventional assault looking highly unlikely due to the associated costs and risks, an irregular warfare operation relying on cognitive warfare by the PRC to influence the human domains of the Taiwanese government, military, and society into not fighting would be a viable outcome in the shades of a gray zone conflict. This type of outcome in Taiwan would make US and NATO responses difficult.

The tangible warfighting domains of land, sea, and air are conceptually well-established for conducting military operations. However, when it comes to the cyber and human domains, these become more abstract and intangible to the average warfighter, citizen, policymaker, and politician. Such differences may lead some to consider that deterrence and escalation in the cyber and human domains are different from the more tangible land, sea, and air domains. To better understand if one domain is more important than the other when it comes to kinetic and non-kinetic attacks, Hedgecock and Sukin (2023) conducted an experiment with American citizens on the question of when the US military should retaliate against a kinetic or non-kinetic attack. Their findings demonstrated consistency in American citizen support for US military retaliation regardless of the domain in which the attack occurred – cyber or kinetic. However, the difference in respondent's preferences regarding retaliatory options rests in the features of the attack: "the attack's means, timing, attribution certainty, and the scale of its damage." The attribution certainty effect showed the largest drive for a respondent's retaliatory support. Moreover, timing was a significant factor, highlighting a correlation between an attack's novelty and public support for retaliation. Additionally, Hedgecock and Sukin (2023) identified that "vengeance of an individual was a significant indicator," as respondents that demonstrated a higher personal feeling of vengeance were more likely to support an escalatory US military response instead of typically hypothesized de-escalatory tit-for-tat responses. This implicates the crucial role that the human domain plays in drumming up domestic political support for military interventions and the level of commitment.

Hedgecock and Sukin's (2023) analysis suggests implications for how irregular warfare tools should be employed by US and allied militaries. For example, recent US responses to Iranian provocations in the Middle East have been mostly de-escalatory, such as the 2019 US cyber-attack against Iran in response to them shooting down a US Navy drone in the Persian Gulf. Increasingly common Chinese and Russian influence operations against the US population (i.e., human domain) are often meant to shape and influence American attitudes more favorably

towards preferences in Beijing and Moscow. Hedgecock and Sukin's findings indicate that there might be more American domestic political willingness – than typically assumed – to support robust irregular warfare responses (kinetic and non-kinetic) across the gray zone.

Broadly speaking, US and NATO policymakers must devise and implement tools of resilience – across all domains – but especially the human domain to harden their own populations and societies against kinetic and non-kinetic activities in the gray zone that may alter perceptions and preferences for intervening against an adversarial attack. For instance, China might rely on cognitive warfare operations against western societies to convince them that coming to the defense of Taiwan would not be worth the economic pain that might result. This is similar to current Russian attempts to sow disunity in western societies via social media about the costs and dangers associated with continued support of Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

The human domain remains a bedrock principle of warfighting across all kinetic and non-kinetic activities. As some may advocate for hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and various other next-generation weapons systems, as being a cornerstone of achieving the 'next Offset' to deter and defeat China, Russia, and similar authoritarian countries, this is not sufficient for maintaining US-led international order. Anti-western states and violent non-state actors are bent on tearing down the US-led international rules-based order through whatever asymmetric advantages they can exploit. Western strategists must prioritize the human domain as a critical component of any current and future irregular warfare operation. The next 'Human Offset' is the best way for the US and its allies and partners to outcompete adversaries in the gray zone. ☆

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PART IV
SOCIETAL ORDERING & SECURITY ORDERING

CHAPTER 13

SOCIETY AND SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS

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ABSTRACT

The military rightfully focuses on foreign threats abroad. But that outward gaze over the horizon can leave threats at home unattended. Borrowing a term from Michele Wucker, we refer to these as "gray rhinos" - a highly probable, high impact yet all too often neglected threat. These threats have serious consequences but go unnoticed and unaddressed until crucial moments when a hypothetical threat becomes a realized harm. This paper identifies, summarizes, and addresses several gray rhinos, including: An underdeveloped Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) corps, eroding civilian oversight, an anachronistic model of civil-military relations, and disparities in troop morale due to trust in medical care, and cultural corrosives already in the organization. To avoid being hurt by these threats in critical moments, the Department of Defense should consider the blind spots raised in this paper and address each intentionally.

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Recognizing and addressing blind spots is difficult in any organization, but for the U.S. military, missing a threat can be catastrophic. Some blind spots are subtle and unobtrusive, while others loom large and require little effort to uncover. We identify potentially neglected threats that loom large for the national security enterprise—these threats are what Wucker (2016) calls "gray rhinos"— "highly probable, high impact yet all too often neglected threats." After summarizing these threats, we draw out implications for policymakers and future research.

Schmidt (2023) considers a unique strain on American civil-military relations. While there is an ongoing dialogue regarding the strain on civil-military relations, academics, and policymaking officials have overlooked the atrophy of civilian expertise on military matters. Schmidt notes that the classical model for Huntington's objective control of the military is increasingly reliant upon an "effective" and "competent" civilian government (Huntington 1957). He juxtaposes this ideal model against an observable shift of military expertise for civilian overseers. He proposes that civilian

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leaders are increasingly abdicating their decision-making authority to the military and decreasing their willingness to conduct oversight. He further posits that this is due to a leadership vacuum in civilian defense policymaking positions, with military personnel increasingly occupying traditionally civilian positions. For example, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster served as National Security Advisor under President Trump. The debate over Lloyd Austin's waiver for Secretary of Defense also illuminated the issue with retired officers who occupy civilian national security positions and bring a military mindset to their work. Civilians who have not served in the armed forces are also coached by their military counterparts, changing the culture within policymaking circles. Schmidt (2023) proposes that politicians rarely disagree with these military advisors, such as with Army officers in the Congressional Fellows Program. As illuminated by Schmidt, the overriding assumption that the military knows best could potentially explain why the divide between America's civilian government and military has become increasingly hazy.

This leaves us with the question: is there truly civilian oversight of the military if senior military officials are "telling" civilians what to do and civilians are listening with little pushback? Schmidt calls the ideology of objective control a "useful fiction" in the modern world. Contending that the nuances of civil-military relations will not be successful when defined by empty normative power structures, Schmidt proposes pragmatically focusing on improving civilian expertise on the military and mending contemporary political issues such as extreme partisanship and poor civic education. Schmidt argues that working through these systematic issues would create senior civilians who can learn from and control the military effectively.

Providing both empirical support and nuance to Schmidt's arguments, Griffiths (2023) utilizes new data on flag officer confirmations from the congressional record. He finds that the Senate confirms 97.2% of flag officers, nearly all by voice vote. Additionally, he finds substantial variation in adjudication times across lists of nominated officers and between Congresses depending upon the composition of a particular Congress. For example, adjudication times consistently go down during periods of unified government, suggesting that the political makeup of government shapes confirmation timelines for these supposedly nonpartisan appointments. This may have an impact on the politicization of senior officers. Schmidt warns that military personnel are shaped to control their operating environment; if volatile politics stand in the way of getting a promotion confirmed or making any number of military decisions, officers are likely to get involved in those politics. The assumption that military officers only put on their political caps once they step out of the military and appear in public with their rank and retired status displayed may not be valid. Partisan politicization of current military officers is worth considering as a related blind spot.

Crosbie and Smith, however, argue that some politicization of the military is not necessarily a threat. They prefer to frame the debate around "appropriate" versus "inappropriate" military-political behavior. Crosbie and Smith suggest an adaptation to Feaver's "Work-Shirk" model (Feaver 2003) involving more agency on both the civilian and military side with nine outcomes of varying desirability. They emphasize that NATO doctrine promotes the functional need to be politically savvy instead of avoiding politics. Furthermore, they discuss the need to develop both horizontal (across agency) and vertical (hierarchical) political skills in field-grade and senior officers. This conversation illuminates a potential false assumption that military officers should remain apolitical. Apoliticism refers to a complete lack of involvement in political matters, a term not applicable to an organization asking Congress for $800 billion a year. However, the well-grounded rule of nonpartisanship, which refers to a lack of support for a particular political party, engages with Crosbie and Smith's frame for appropriate and inappropriate political behavior.

While nonpartisanship is a necessary attribute for the military, there is room for further discussion on how politically savvy military officers can navigate this increasingly complex environment.

While we have thus far focused on the relationship between the military and its civilian leaders, other threats are wholly internal to the DoD. One such threat is the definition of professionalism and who is a professional in the military. Since Huntington's *Soldier and the State* was written in 1957, the structure of the military has significantly changed, yet the Army still largely follows Huntington's ideal conception of the "professional" military as canon. Rigdon and Kim (2023) problematize Huntington's depiction of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps as tradesmen and not professionals, arguing this depiction is outdated and no longer describes the modern force. When Huntington published *Soldier and the State* in 1957, there were reasons for Huntington's categorization of the NCO Corps, including a drafted force and educational divide—10% of the U.S. was college educated in the 1950s compared to 40% today. According to a RAND survey, over 1/3 of Army enlisted personnel have completed some level of college education (Helmus 2018). Rigdon and Kim argue that military policies should reflect a substantial shift in leadership skills and achievement among NCOs instead of assuming the NCO as defined by Huntington. As a result, they propose changes to the current structure of the development of NCOs aimed at treating NCOs more like professionals and developing their human capital during their career in the military in a more deliberate and targeted fashion through shared education milestones and greater access to civilian higher education. Such advances would facilitate deeper collaboration between Officers and NCOs at higher levels of command.

Rigdon and Kim's proposed policy changes raise an important conversation largely unaddressed in military, academic, and policymaking circles: What is the appropriate type and level of human capital investment in the NCO Corps? NCOs have proven to be a pivotal reason for Russia's tactical failures in Ukraine, which is why examining the U.S. NCO Corps for optimization and shortfalls is important (Barany 2023). Assuming potential recruits, as well as current enlisted personnel, are low-level workers who will gain most of their development through on-the-job training rather than through the deliberate process associated with the development of officers could have a negative effect on recruitment and retention; this is an area for future research. With recent shortfalls in recruiting new enlisted soldiers, failure to provide meaningful development for soldiers might be the beginning of a "gray rhino" revealing itself.

Perhaps a more immediate threat to military readiness is that of corrosives. Castro (2023) explicitly looked at known corrosives that the military is now beginning to address, including sexual assault, military radicalization, discrimination, and suicides. The phenomena have both short-term and long-term impacts that affect not just those directly impacted, but the military at large and even the families of service members. Attempts to combat these corrosives have been difficult, even with a significant investment of time and resources. Castro contends that military corrosives do not self-correct. Instead, these corrosives ruminate in every motor pool and office and are difficult to track on paper, providing a significant threat to military readiness.

Fazal et al. (2023) present an additional threat to military readiness – that of service member morale. In their study of active-duty personnel and veterans, the authors used two survey instruments to investigate how the access to and quality of a unit's medical care impacted morale. They found a clear link between medical care and morale, including a stark 5% decrease in morale for those told they would be triaged based on operational needs if wounded in combat. On the flip side, respondents indicated much higher morale if told the U.S. would stage medical equipment

in an area of operations for care and evacuation. This underappreciated aspect of unit morale may become crucial in the context of a near-peer conflict, in which isolated units or a lack of air superiority may cut off engaged units from dedicated medical facilities. When medical personnel cannot reach these units within a "golden hour," unit morale may be detrimentally impacted. Policymakers may consider options such as rolling out forward medical teams with brigade combat teams or pre-staging medical equipment in potential areas of operation. Regardless, assuming that the military can deploy and fight efficiently without regard to morale and the proximate causes of changes in morale, including both the availability of resources like medical care and the existence of negative corrosives, is likely a false assumption and could threaten the national security mission.

The preceding suggests a need for greater attention and study of the DoD's potentially unfounded assumptions in the search for "gray rhinos." Further research should examine whether Schmidt's claims about excessive reliance on recent military personnel in senior civilian national security roles negatively affect variables of interest for the DoD. At the same time, scholars should evaluate the extent to which Crosbie and Smith's NATO-centered approach can be applied to the U.S. While Schmidt warns about atrophying civilian expertise and increasing officer politicization, Crosbie and Smith suggest redefining the current architype to reflect politically savvy officers. Both paradigms illuminate a paradox surrounding civilian control of the military: how can civilians obtain enough expertise to regulate the military without learning from the military? In other words, how can civilians avoid becoming subject to regulatory capture? Such questions should be urgently and intensively examined to determine policy prescriptions for issues involving domestic security ordering. They illuminate conversations not being had enough among senior defense officials—a blind spot in civil-military relations that could become detrimental to national security.

Gray rhinos exist in all parts of the military. Some are the byproduct of assumptions in our theoretical priors about what civil-military relations "ought" to look like in liberal democracies. In our case, we re-examine the false dichotomy that military officers are political actors or not, that civilian leaders possess the requisite expertise to manage and shape policy, and that canonical work that characterizes the enlisted soldiers holds true today. It is also the case that corrosive elements still exist in the ranks, even if we think we have identified the problem. Discrimination issues now receive attention and attempts at corrective action but identifying them and seeking to educate the workforce about them is not tantamount to a solution. While elements of discrimination (rightfully) have received attention, other institutional constraints harm DoD personnel. Those left unattended are the quintessential gray rhinos: a foreseeable problem just waiting to inflict harm on the organization.

The preceding reflects only a sampling of institutional constraints causing harm to national security enterprises in the U.S. and its allies. Future work should consider the strain the current DoD career pathways place on families (especially dual military professionals), how costly to time and happiness, not just money, frequent relocations are, as well as how poorly linking jobs to the passions of soldiers leads to a frustration with the military as a career. All these problems loom large, defy simple solutions, and require nimble and creative thinking. But not addressing them risks them fully emerging in a catastrophic fashion. Waiting until failure is so apparent that it cannot be ignored is not a viable strategy for peacetime management of organizations expected to fight and win wars. ☆

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CHAPTER 14

SOCIAL ORDERING AND SECURITY ORDERING: UNCERTAINTY AND ORDER

Jason Lyall,[1] Rachel Radvinsky,[2] Mike Rosol,[3] Simon Smith[4]

ABSTRACT

Security studies scholars have long recognized the important role that information uncertainty can play as a destabilizing force in the international system. While uncertainty underpins many bedrock international relations theories, it may be time to revisit the concept for two reasons. First, changing international dynamics on a host of issues, from the shift to multi-polarity to disruptive emerging technologies to political culture suggests an international order in which uncertainty is endemic and likely to increase. These dynamics hold both for military alliances between major powers, making alliance formation and alliance maintenance more difficult, and for non-military activities in the great powers' peripheries. Second, political scientists have yet to develop a method for measuring uncertainty beyond treating it as a "known unknown." A recent project by the MESO Lab at The Ohio State University may offer a solution to this problem that will both allow theorists to better integrate uncertainty into their theories and allow policymakers to account for it in decision-making.

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Information uncertainty is at the core of theoretical explanations of interstate and intrastate conflict and international stability. Uncertainty about capability, intentions, and resolve underpin realist and rationalist explanations for war, while liberal theories point to institutional mechanisms to increase information certainty as major facilitators of international cooperation. Yet, despite the key role that information uncertainty and asymmetry play in explaining conflict and cooperation, political science lacks clear means to measure the prevalence of uncertainty in relations between states. Scholars and policymakers need to better understand both the practical implications of an increase in information uncertainty caused by changes in the contemporary global environment and develop better measures of uncertainty itself.

This paper first reviews the role of uncertainty in existing international relations theories and then examines changes in the international environment that increase uncertainty between and

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within major power alliances and in the great powers' periphery. It then reviews a promising new project by the Modeling Emergent Social Order (MESO) Lab at The Ohio State University to measure uncertainty.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY

Security studies and international relations literature have long recognized the important role that uncertainty can play as a destabilizing force in the international system. In fact, certainty and uncertainty underly the most fundamental theories of international politics. Realist theories accord it a key role in fueling security competition and incorporate it into polarity-based theories about stability. Liberals argue that domestic and international institutions can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty. And uncertainty plays a central role in the bargaining model of war.

Scholars working in the realist tradition make the case that the anarchic international system, combined with states' inherent uncertainty about other states' intentions, creates an environment of fear and intense security competition. These same realists have also argued for uncertainty as a mechanism that makes some configurations of power more stable than others. Specifically, they argue that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, partly (though not exclusively) because increasing the number of great powers increases the potential for miscalculating other states' capability, intentions, or resolve. In short, uncertainty increases in multipolarity, which in turn decreases stability (Waltz 1979, 160-193; Mearsheimer 2001, 30-36, 42-46, 338, 343-344).

Liberal theories also rely on uncertainty – specifically, mechanisms that reduce it – to explain increased stability in an anarchic system. Democratic peace theorists argue that mature liberal democracies rarely fight wars against each other in part because in democracies, "the process [of gearing up for war] is more public than in an authoritarian state" so "…a democracy will not fear a surprise attack by another democracy, and thus need not cut short the negotiating process or launch a preemptive strike in anticipation of a surprise attack" (Russett 1993, 38-39). Process transparency reduces uncertainty about a potential adversary's intentions. Similarly, liberal institutionalists argue that institutional provision of information reduces uncertainty, increasing enduring cooperation between self-interested states (Keohane 1984).

In no area does uncertainty play a greater role in explanations for conflict than in bargaining models of war. Bargaining model theorists begin with the insight that war is costly for all participations; therefore, there is always a pre-war bargain that would have left all actors better off than war, whatever its outcomes. Why, then, would rational actors fight wars? Barring rare cases of indivisible issues, the bargaining model attributes the decision to go to war to uncertainty about outcomes or the credibility of an adversaries' commitments. Bargaining states have powerful incentives to keep information about their capabilities and resolve private to maximize bargaining leverage. However, this private information may lead both states to believe that war will produce better outcomes than any available bargain their opponent is willing to make. Combat, however, reveals information about capability and resolve. As the probable outcome of a conflict becomes more certain, states are more likely to reach a bargain. Similarly, whatever

one's intention in honoring an agreement today, a range of factors, from anticipated shifts in the balance of power to new state leadership, may undermine the long-term credibility of a state's commitments and encourage others to make preventive strikes (Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995; Reiter 2003).

Uncertainty plays a role in a host of other theories, but sampling a few of the most prominent suggests its central importance in studying international conflict, cooperation, and stability.

UNCERTAINTY AND ALLIANCE

Not the least of international interactions in which uncertainty is central in creating and maintaining alliances. At the heart of alliance formation and management is what Glenn Snyder refers to as the "alliance security dilemma." On the one hand, alliance partners fear their allies may be insufficiently committed to the alliance, abandoning them in times of war. On the other, they also fear that an ally may entrap them, pulling them into wars it is not in their interest to fight (Snyder 1997, 180-192; Schmitt, 2023).

Building on Snyder's insight, Schmitt (2023) identifies five trends that will influence the dynamics of alliance formation in the 21st century: strategic competition between great powers, the consequences of increasingly complex economic interdependence, the emergence of cyber-conflicts, an increasing stress on military integration, and normative changes within the international system. Each of these trends threatens to heighten the alliance security dilemma and increase uncertainty between current and potential alliance partners and across the larger international system.

Strategic competition is certainly not a new phenomenon, but Schmitt suggests that the international order in which it occurs may be more complex than previous unipolar, bipolar, or multi-polar orders. Instead of a return to simple bipolarity or multipolarity, the system is seemingly shifting to a new hierarchical system with a superpower or superpowers (the United States and possibly China), a group of great powers with capabilities well below the superpowers that reach beyond their regions; regional powers; and secondary powers. If traditional realist thought about multipolarity introducing uncertainty and instability is correct, this complex constellation poses significant dangers.

On its face, economic interdependence may increase international stability, but in its contemporary context, in which trade partnerships cross alliance lines, it risks exacerbating the alliance security dilemma by increasing fears of abandonment. Unlike the Cold War, during which trade was largely conducted within alliance blocs, economic interdependence now crosses alliance lines. China, for example, is Europe's largest trading partner, and Russia its fifth largest. At the same time, states within military alliances are economic competitors with each other. These cross-cutting relationships raise serious questions about the credibility of alliance partners and weaken confidence between allies, as support of an ally may risk economic devastation beyond the military costs of war. They will also force states to carefully balance security and commercial interests and may open space for economic coercion – the "weaponization of interdependence" – to weaken adversarial alliances (Farrell and Newman 2019).

Nor do technological changes bode well for stability and certainty. Buchanan (2016) argues that the cyber domain creates an especially intractable version of the security dilemma. Given the

nearly unlimited number of attack points in a cyber system, the offense has the advantage over the defense. Further, to either achieve early warning in support of cyber defense or to credibly threaten cyber retaliation, even a status-quo minded cyber actor must enter into potential adversaries' systems well ahead of any attack. Yet there is no way for a state to know the intention of an adversary intrusion, making offensive and defensive postures indistinguishable. (Buchanan 2016) Schmitt (2023) extends these issues to argue that even allies have incentives to spy on each other through cyber intrusions, but discovering these intrusions risks undermining mutual trust. Even pure military forms of technology outside of the cyber realm challenge stable alliance formation. On the one hand, military integration – equipment, weapons systems, and doctrine – produces a more militarily effective alliance. Conversely, integration may require sacrificing autonomy, often to the strongest member of the alliance.

Finally, Schmitt points to changing domestic and international norms as potentially destabilizing for alliances. The Cold War was marked by general ideological homogeneity between the two blocs. NATO, the US-South Korea relationship, and the US-Japan relationship have arguably endured beyond the common Soviet threat, at least in part because of a shared commitment to liberal democracy. Domestic populist-authoritarian attacks on liberal democracy among many alliance members may undermine these ties and the credibility of alliance commitments.

UNCERTAINTY IN THE PERIPHERY

Increasing uncertainty presents a challenge between alliance partners and allies and between the US, China, and states in their periphery. Kendall (2021) suggests that in addition to building close economic ties with states in Africa and Latin America, where it is the primary trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, China is undertaking active "political warfare" in the global south. Specifically, it capitalizes on the resentment and disenfranchisement of those who have lost out in globalization to support populist movements that undermine democratic norms and oppose cooperation with the Western developed world (Kendall 2021, 17-19). These states may also be especially suspectable to Schmitt's weaponization of interdependence.

China's alleged actions in these regards fall well short of military activity, and Kendall does not recommend a military response. Instead, Kendall (2021, 20-21) suggests that the US and its allies should engage in "enduring competition" which seeks to "defend democracy and disrupt adversary tempo through foreign partners" through diplomatic, information, and economic support of democracy, civil society, and mutual interests. The military may play a supporting role in these relationships, with the leading actors including USAID and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury.

Yet even these limited-cost prescriptions invoke issues of uncertainty. If these regions and actors truly are part of the periphery, how does the US determine which are worthy of significant expenditure of resources? By definition, being peripheral should suggest limited interests and expenditures. Does engagement risk entanglement and escalation, as each subsequent commitment increases the probability of committing the sunk cost fallacy and heightens policymakers' fear that global perceptions of US credibility and resolve are at risk? And what are the measures of success for these non-military instruments of power, which have a checkered record of effectiveness? In short, the prospect of non-military competition in the periphery may open as much uncertainty as military alliances with major powers .

MEASURING UNCERTAINTY

If uncertainty is central to the most important theories of international politics, it may be undertheorized and under-measured. Political scientists lack a clear metric for measuring the level of uncertainty in the international system. This poses problems for both social science and policy. For social scientists, the "identification" of uncertainty often amounts to observing outcomes, then assuming a causal role for uncertainty in accordance with pre-existing theories. This circular approach does not allow for theory testing. For the policymaker, more precise measures of uncertainty would help predict state behavior.

Alam, Van Beek, and Braumoeller (2023) address this shortcoming through the construction of a structural model to measure uncertainty. Beginning with a formal bargaining model of war (see above), they develop a statistical model, then derive measures of dyadic uncertainty between states. Long used in economics, structural models remain relatively rare in political science, but Alam et. al.'s project offers great promise to provide a measure of uncertainty. To test the plausibility of their measurement, they match their uncertainty estimates against sets of state-on-state dyads that include Russia/USSR or Iran. They find their measure of uncertainty varies much as one might expect, increased significantly after periods of regime change, whether revolutions, coups, or the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Alam et al. recommends caution in interpreting the results of their model, as they are still refining, developing, and testing it. However, their early counterintuitive results suggest the potential usefulness of the project in forcing a re-examination of widely held theories in security studies. They found "no evidence that any common configuration – be it unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar – impacts uncertainty" (16). They "do not find evidence that democratic/autocratic distance significantly impact uncertainty" (16). while "IGO membership and foreign policy similarity (FPSIM) increase uncertainty" (16). If correct, these findings question the basic logic of widely accepted realist theories about polarity and liberal theories about regime type and institutions. These findings do not negate the possibility that multipolarity decreases stability, that democracies are unlikely to fight each other, or that institutions foster cooperation. However, they suggest that if these relationships hold, they do so for some other causal reason than increases or reductions in uncertainty. In short, a bit more uncertainty about uncertainty means that uncertainty as a concept may no longer be able to carry the analytical load it has so far carried. Scholars and strategists may need to investigate new causal mechanisms driving conflict and cooperation.

Again, the authors stress, "Our results are very preliminary, and we urge the reader to critically assess the model and measure" (21). It is not yet time to throw away some of the central theories of international politics. However, these sorts of findings suggest the theoretical importance and potential of continuing this line of research.

Most importantly, this work offers the promise to both scholars and policymakers of developing a way "to integrate uncertainty in a meaningful and empirical application, as opposed to relegating it to an 'unknown unknown' quantity that cannot be estimated" (22). Beyond testing and validating theories, it offers a way to apply them in useful ways to inform policy previously unavailable because, while we might suspect uncertainty had causal effects, we had no *a priori* way of measuring it. It also holds the potential to identify real causes of uncertainty, which could drive strategies to reduce it and create a more stable international order.

CONCLUSION

In the short term, global trends will increase the level of uncertainty in the international system. At the core, the reintroduction of strategic competition between multiple great powers, economic interdependence that crosses alliance lines, the increasing role of cyber, challenges of military integration, and normative challenges to domestic and international liberal values may all undermine trust in the credible commitments of alliance partners. Reintroducing great power competition also opens up its own set of uncertainties in the periphery.

Policymakers will need to pay special attention to these impediments to alliance formation and alliance maintenance and carefully consider how to credibly signal commitment. They will also need to think carefully about commitments to the periphery – how to limit those commitments in proportion to state interests, how to prevent escalation dynamics that advance such commitments beyond their limited value, and whether the available policy tools are effective.

In the medium and long term, the effort to measure uncertainty beyond treating it as a "known unknown" has tremendous potential to make a major contribution to our understanding of international politics both theoretically and practically. ☆

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CHAPTER 15

ABSTAINING FROM "POLITICS," SUBJECTING TO RISK: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Isabella Sullivan,[1] Scott Limbocker,[2] Patrick Kelly[3]

ABSTRACT

Militaries are extensions of states and their policies, and domestic politics are fundamental to the U.S. military's missions and force composition. Yet the military is prone to distorted conceptions of proper civil-military relations. Desirable qualities like nonpartisanship and subordination collapse into simplistic notions of an "apolitical" military that can build blinders against all things political. Given especially tumultuous or contentious domestic political dynamics, the risks of neglecting domestic political realities constitute a "gray rhino" – a high probability, high impact, yet neglected event. If left unattended, these domestic political realities could potentially harm U.S. society and the military.

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Militaries are extensions of states and their policies. Even for "expeditionary operations" (Egnell 2006) beyond the nation's shores, domestic politics shape missions and force composition. The centrality of domestic politics is especially obvious whenever the military is called upon to respond to domestic emergencies or perform other "non-traditional" tasks short of decisive ground combat. And regardless of the character of ongoing operations, alignment with national values facilitates recruiting and retention efforts. However, the U.S. military often communicates unrefined conceptions of the norms that underwrite civilian control – like a simple dichotomy of objective control of the military by professionals above the political fray as proposed by Huntington (1957). Desirable qualities like nonpartisanship and subordination to or ignore. Such beliefs risk discounting or misinterpreting the political realities of the military's language of "apolitical," which can lead to beliefs—articulated or not that the military exists on a separate sphere from politics and anything encroaching on that sphere is something to push away

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missions and its standing in society. Under especially tumultuous or contentious domestic political dynamics, the risks of neglecting domestic political realities constitute a "gray rhino."

Wucker (2016) defines a gray rhino as a "highly probable, high impact yet neglected threat: kin to both the elephant in the room and the improbably and unforeseeable black swan." We identify civil-military relations, racial and ethnic composition and cohesion, and public opinion as facets of domestic political realities. These complex realities are often difficult to observe and quantify materially, but they have political effects at the national and international levels. Notably, they affect how states perceive one another in the international system (Albrecht 2020; Nielsen 2012; Velázquez 2010; Jenne 2021; Hofmann and Martill 2021; De Sá Guimarães and De Oliveira E Silva 2021). Thus, we can treat military inattention to domestic political realities as a gray rhino – a threat that is neglected to the extent military leaders disengage from thinking about political realities because of their conceptualization of the military's role in government—yet something that is highly probable to determine the military's activities and capacity. This perspective can motivate military institutions to seek to see themselves and their environment more clearly by setting aside preconceptions. The military must weigh domestic politics in accounting for its position in the state in order to achieve its nested objectives to support political ends within national security strategy. In a burgeoning multipolar system, cohesion and alignment between the strategy and the executing agents may be even more crucial.

"POLITICAL" THINKING IN THE MILITARY

Military underappreciation of domestic political realities is a natural byproduct of a literal and dogmatic interpretation of "objective control," one of the key concepts in Samuel Huntington's theory of civil-military relations. In *The Soldier and the State,* Huntington describes two essential forms of civilian control: objective and subjective. Objective control entails a differentiated and professional military with jurisdictional expertise separate from civilians and the political system. In this view, political leaders and military professionals maintain a distinct focus on their realm of expertise and sphere of influence. The military is separate from the political system, and political leaders are meant to avoid interference in military tasks that fall outside of their realm (Nix 2012). The professional military, meanwhile, is obedient to the elected authorities rather than being "subjectively" obedient to only their preferred partisan partners.

This vision of civilian control has theoretically desirable components but has important drawbacks. For one, stringent restrictions on civilian oversight of "military" operations run up against principles of democratic accountability. Moreover, military leaders can use portions of the theory to justify the construction of blinders against "politics" writ large. What follows are examples of serious political realities that the military may neglect because of principled yet flawed thinking about its role in the U.S.[4]

4 For more on objective control, see: Gaub, Florence. "Objective or Subjective Control?" Civil-Military Relations in the MENA: Between Fragility and Resilience. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2016; Weigley, Russell F. "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell." The Journal of Military History 57, no. 5 (1993): 27–58; Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations." Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 67–87.

POLITICAL REALITIES AND THE MILITARY

The preparation and execution of military missions demand an understanding of the political realities shaping those missions. In this context, Amoroso (2023) investigates the political effects of the U.S. military's employment in domestic affairs. He begins by noting several recent salient times the U.S. has mobilized the military repeatedly for domestic missions, including responses to protests in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Southern border issues. While these activities might not be what the military considers part of its core mission, civilians tasked them to participate, and the military must consider the implications of these domestic missions. Although confidence in the military has remained higher than any other government institution since 2001, it declined 25 percent from 2018 to 2021 (Amoroso 2023). Amoroso places this domestic political reality into context by showing respondents' racial demographics and perception influence public opinion toward the military. Using two indexes of social resentment (racial background and immigrant status), Amoroso finds that black respondents have lower confidence in the military than white respondents, and immigrants followed a similar trend. Yet much of the decline in the near term is rooted in declines from the exceptionally high support of Republicans. All told, he finds confidence in the military is tied to deeper partisan and social dispositions than the military presently acknowledges. High levels of trust in the military cannot rebound if these underlying mechanisms, which contribute to a lack of trust, go unattended.

Effective national security strategies require political – and public – support. Vallone (2023) shows, through survey work on partisan politics and strategic competition, that foreign policy continues to be a low priority for Americans. Vallone finds 90% of Americans think the greatest threats to the U.S. are internal, see a greater possibility for "unity" in a national approach to China than to Russia, and that Russia complicates national unity of purpose towards China. As military strategy flows from national security and defense strategies, overlooking the dynamics of public support for such strategies will likely weaken military strategies as the civilians shaping policy towards foreign adversaries must weigh priorities from their constituents domestically and abroad.

Rather than foreign policy, Americans prioritize "kitchen table" issues like inflation, healthcare, and climate change across parties. China, Russia-Ukraine, and national security ranked lower on each subsample's (Democrats, Republicans, and Independents) priority list. Vallone finds support for the argument that national security strategy must overcome three challenges, all of relate directly to domestic politics. First, there is "intense affective polarization in the American political landscape" which relate directly to domestic politics. Second, there is partisan polarization regarding how to handle Russia and the war in Ukraine. Third, Americans do not prioritize strategy. These challenges may affect the government's ability to sustain a commitment to defined national priorities and to consistently muster means to support their accomplishments. Martin Armstrong (2023) argues that a "colorblind" approach to personnel leads to tensions about race (and other categories of diversity) to permeate the military as a "gray rhino." Racism, he contends, disrupts the U.S. military in a way that has domestic and global effects. He attempts to understand integration in the military today and explores the conditions that have hindered successful integration. The onboarding process, through something like basic training, is presumed to strip away the individuality of soldiers and make them equal parts of the organization. Yet this contends with modern calls for greater diversity in the ranks. This tension rooted in a misunderstanding of what justice requires and the assumption that the military functions solely as a meritocracy. By ignoring this tension, the military stands to have unnoticed divisions in the ranks.

Lyall (2023) also analyzes relationships between racial and ethnic identity and strategic leadership by studying irregular exit of political leaders during war. Contrary to existing accounts, irregular leader exit is not well predicted by pre-existing regime type—instead, the probability of leaders being violently overthrown during wartime or immediately following is driven by ethnic and racial inequality in their nation's military. Lyall first contextualized his research question with historical statistics: there have been at least 272 violent overthrows of leaders during wartime since 1800. Many of the existing studies have only looked at the role of existing political institutions in this irregular exit. With this novel data, Lyall finds that pre-war inequality within that military's ranks—along ethnic and racial lines—dictates how well the military fights and the potential longevity of the leader's reign. Inequality has corrosive effects, and commanders must adopt suboptimal policies to manage unequal, divided armies. These policies poorly prepare the military for combat. Although his current work focuses on how inequality affects irregular leader exit, his past work (2020) has shown that inequality has direct battlefield consequences. Specifically, "bigotry and racism are threats to national security" (p. 428). As such, his method of measuring inequality and conclusions regarding inequality's corrosive effects are generalizable to understanding various political contexts where internal divisions lead to worse outcomes militarily.

Chiriac (2023) bridges domestic political realities directly to their impact on security strategy, using Russia as a case study. Focusing on ordering and international governance from a Russian perspective, Chiriac contends that the Russian Federation looks at the international system in a mathematical way, paying closer attention than the U.S. government and public assumes. Broadly, she contends that the U.S. needs to improve its understanding of Russian society and politics in order to develop an effective approach to interacting with Russia in the international system.

Strategy cannot ignore domestic politics—in the state making the strategy, its allies, or its adversaries. Armstrong, Lyall, and Amoroso all privilege the military perspective on this society-military relationship. Vallone and Chiriac focus more directly on complex domestic political realities and national security, complementing military-focused analyses. By developing more accurate insights about our adversaries and a better understanding of their complex domestic political realities, strategists gain a complete understanding of the overall security environment. Siloing the making of strategy into "high" instead of "low" politics increases the risk of ignoring gray rhinos in national security.

CONCLUSION

Presentist bias tempts analysts to frame contemporary challenges in terms of historic change or unprecedented complexity. Such premature identifications of societal inflection points or critical historical moments risk hyperbole and often ring hollow for observers who have witnessed more than a few cycles in strategic thinking. Moreover, presuming such inflection points are necessary for change only entrenches resignation toward preexisting threats that can and must be sorted out before something fails. We contend that under-analyzed priors about the relationships between domestic politics and strategy are themselves one of those preexisting threats. Realities at home will shape all facets of military life, from the force's composition to the missions it takes on, to the stature of the military in society. Because military conceptions of civil-military relations can reinforce total disengagement or tepid detachment from politics, military decision-making can leave under- or unappreciated the role of domestic politics in shaping the readiness and capacity of the military to achieve its missions on behalf of the nation. ☆

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CHAPTER 16

DOMESTIC POLITICS, POPULISM, AND RHETORIC

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ABSTRACT

How do ideology, foreign policy, and the international system interact with and shape one another? This paper examines the relationship between ideology and foreign policy in the United Kingdom, India, and China and finds three common threads. First, while ideology likely affects foreign policy formulation, the causal mechanisms involved are complex and not necessarily uniform across states. Second, destabilizing forces like populism are increasing around the world with the potential to disturb current conceptions of the international order. Finally, from a policy perspective, distinguishing between a state's operational and symbolic rhetoric can reduce the likelihood of strategic miscalculation. With these commonalities in mind, we contend that foreign policymakers must approach other states understanding that each state's domestic situation is unique and that while Sino-American competition looms large in American policymaking, it might not be the driving force behind other states' foreign policy decisions.

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While international relations scholars often conceptualize actors and influences in international politics in terms of Kenneth Waltz's three "images" or levels of analysis—individuals, states, and the international system—comparative politics scholars and practitioners have long recognized that all three levels interact, sometimes in complex and messy ways, with causal arrows pointing in all directions (Waltz 1959; Gourevitch 1978). However, while previous work tended to focus on the effects of military and economic factors on states' foreign policy, the rise of populist cynicism towards traditional domestic and international liberal institutions has inspired scholars to reexamine the influence of ideology. This essay examines the complex ways that domestic and international politics interact with ideology to impact foreign policy strategy around the globe.

We identify three common threads in emerging work on ideology and foreign policy. First, while ideology likely affects foreign policy formulation, the causal mechanisms involved are complex. Domestic ideologies can affect foreign policy but are also shaped and bounded by international systemic factors. Second, in every region of the world, destabilizing forces like populist politics

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appear to be rising, disturbing traditional conceptions of the broader international order. Finally, when actors in different states attempt to interpret one another's foreign policy decisions, logic, and motivations, distinguishing between operational and symbolic rhetoric is vital to preventing strategic miscalculations.[6]

Our central policy observation is that those formulating American foreign and defense policy in the shadow of China-US competition must understand the links between states' unique domestic ideological dynamics and their foreign policy choices. Accordingly, the rising destabilizing forces around the world are, in many instances, driven by such considerations. China-US competition is more of a backdrop than a shadow then: while the competition is impossible to ignore, it might not be the driving force behind foreign policy decisions, and the US should not assume that the varying domestic dynamics and destabilizing forces exist on a binary scale. As a corollary of this, the US must take the examination of foreign political rhetoric seriously and strive to separate operational rhetoric from symbolic rhetoric.

The remainder of this paper proceeds in four parts. Part one reviews the role of ideology in three cases: the United Kingdom's decision to forgo a formal EU security relationship, the (limited) effects of ruling party changes on Indian foreign policy, despite significant ideological differences; and the role of symbolic versus operational ideology in Chinese foreign policy. Part two examines the rise of populist ideology, while part three offers a deeper examination of the role of ideology and rhetoric. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for policy and future research.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THREE CASES: BRITAIN, INDIA, AND CHINA

Waltz's second image of the state recognizes that the internal dynamics of a state affect how they interact on the international stage. Foreign affairs decisions are not made in a vacuum; political leaders must make foreign affairs decisions that align with their broader goals, and all political leaders, even authoritarians, have domestic constituencies of some type to which they must answer. Through the examples of the United Kingdom, India, and China, we seek to understand how varying political realities can affect the relationship between (contested) domestic ideology and foreign policy.

Post Brexit Policy: The Power of and Constraints on Ideology

The changing negotiating position of British governments and parties over formal EU-UK security cooperation presents a study of the role that domestic ideology can play in foreign policy and the limits of that impact. The initial Brexit vote narrowly divided the nation and was a source of contention within British political parties, as much as across them and in the wider body politic. Since then, Brexit implementation has challenged several Conservative Prime Ministers. The ruling Tories and the opposition Labour Party have varied their position on formal security partnership with the EU. The Conservative May government, despite its public rhetoric, favored

[6] Gregory and Ho (2023) define operational rhetoric as specific, concrete rhetoric that "actually influences state action," while symbolic rhetoric is more general and abstract and "does not directly relate the actual ideological motives of…state action."

such a partnership, while the Conservative Johnson government did not. When negotiations on a security partnership were ruled out in February 2020 under the Johnson government, the Labour Party, which had previously adopted a position of ambiguity, then supported a second referendum, announced it would negotiate a new 'security pact' without the referendum should it win the general election expected in 2024 (BBC 2023; Martill and Mesarovich 2023). The volatility and politicization of this issue are surprising on its face, as the security relationship has low levels of public salience, is technical, and is aligned with the shared UK/EU interests. Nor did the timing of the shifts correlate with changes in external threats or commitments in bilateral partnerships (Martill and Mesarovich 2023).

Instead, Martill and Mesarovich argue that UK politicians' desire to showcase their ideological commitment to their domestic audience drove the politics around a security partnership. While May promised to carry out Brexit, she also sought a softer, "bespoke form of association for the UK [with the EU]," but Brussels was unwilling to accept this selective limited partnership with a non-member on most issues. While the 'cherry picking' Brexit endorsed by both the May government and Labour Party was not achievable in other domains, May pursued the security partnership as a means of demonstrating a limited continued relationship with the EU (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). By contrast, the Johnson government publicly supported a much harder break but faced the challenge that a full "hard Brexit" would, in practice, have intolerably catastrophic economic effects. The Johnson government cut off security partnership negotiations to advance the image of the 'hard' Brexit even as the 'hard' Brexit policy was not viable in the economic domain (Martill and Mesarovich 2023).

On its face, this case seems to show the power of ideology to drive security policy changes, both across and within parties. However, the role of ideology itself appears bounded by two conditions – the optionality and availability of the ideologically driven policy (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). The security partnership with the EU was optional because the UK did not have an urgent need for it. The UK's NATO membership and its bilateral partnerships provided sufficient security. At the same time, accepting or rejecting the security partnership was an available option, whereas partnership with the EU in other areas to signal a commitment to a softer approach was not available due to Brussels's unwillingness, and hard economic Brexit to signal greater Euroscepticism was not available due to its forecasted devastating economic consequences (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). In short, a government's ability to act on ideology may face significant international structural constraints. A similar example in the US may be the Paris Climate Agreement, which the US has entered and withdrew from as the governing political party changed. The US is not bound by significant economic or strategic interests to remain in the agreement and can reenter it at any time if it pulls out, making the agreement a strong fit for use as an ideological symbol domestically.

India: State Level Ideology Over Domestic Ideologies

On the other hand, in India, a shared perspective on the country's role in the world has led to little difference in foreign policy between governing parties. From a Western perspective, one might expect the center-left Indian National Congress (INC) party to promote a less aggressive, less militaristic foreign policy and the right-leaning Bhartiya Janata Party (PJP) to promote a more muscular foreign policy. On its face, the historical statements from both parties lend some support for this expectation. However, while some disagreement has materialized, most notably during debates on nuclear weapons, both major parties have adopted "a shared conviction of

civilizational greatness" and the "deeply felt sentiment that India so far has not been attributed the status it is entitled to" (Destradi and Plageman 2023).

This unity has largely been driven by the center-left Indian National Congress (INC) Party's divergence from Western-style left party ideology. It has put particular emphasis on internal security, arguing for a "zero-tolerance" policy on terrorism and promising to "address the challenge of Left Wing Extremism with a firm hand" while also emphasizing defense preparedness and an "unwavering pro-India foreign policy" (Destradi and Plageman 2023). Indeed, INC-led governments have pursued military build-up at a similar pace as their rival right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) (Destradi and Plageman 2023). Additionally, there is reason to believe that the convergence of party ideology in foreign policy has been exacerbated in recent years as the BJP became the dominant political faction fueled by Hindu nationalism (termed Hindutva). While secularism is a core feature of INC's ideology, in recent years, they "have increasingly used religious rituals and symbolism for electoral purposes," indicating at least a symbolic shift away from its ideological roots to reach an electorate that has overwhelmingly supported Hindu nationalism since 2014 (Destradi and Plageman 2023). Overall, the evidence from India's party governance demonstrates that both the shared view of a state's international position and a dominant political party can lead to foreign policy unity in a democratic state. While ideology undoubtedly drives much of India's international decision-making, there is little diversity in foreign affairs ideology between major parties.

China: Operational versus Symbolic Ideologies

Finally, authoritarian China is not bound by proclaimed or popularly held ideology in the same ways as the democratic regimes in India or Britain. In China's case, Gregory and Ho (2023) suggest that its *operational ideology*, that which influences state action, can frequently diverge from its rhetorical *symbolic ideology*, which serves as a tool to build legitimacy. As a result, China's actions appear to be less restricted by expressed ideological constraints, as its control over information allows it to frame foreign affairs to its domestic audience in a lens that makes its political interest align with its symbolic ideology (Gregory and Ho 2023). That is not to say that their domestic goals do not still influence foreign policymaking, as authoritarian regimes may use foreign policy for the ends of state control or state maintenance (Anceschi 2010). Yet, China is evidence that, given sufficient state control over rhetoric, foreign policy can have a flexible connection with expressed ideology.

The three examples of the UK, India, and China present three different models of the relationship between domestic ideology and international policy. The UK presents a pluralistic model of how competing domestic ideologies can form fluctuating state foreign policy in a democracy, though it also demonstrates how international structural conditions can constrain the influence of ideology on policy. On the other hand, India demonstrates that foreign affairs can be mostly consistent across party ideologies in a democracy when there is a dominant view of the state's preferred international position. Finally, China shows the potential for authoritarian regimes to conduct foreign policy relatively unrestricted by expressed ideology.

RISING POPULIST IDEOLOGIES: VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON THE INCREASING AND HETEROGENEOUS SALIENCE OF POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY

The previous section outlined differences between the UK, India, and China in terms of how each state's domestic ideology—including populist ideology—impacts its foreign policy approaches. Chryssolegos (2023) refers to this mechanism as an "inside-out" process. However, international politics can also have "outside-in" causal effects on domestic ideology, as his recent literature review on populism shows. In short, the causal arrows may point in both directions at the same time.

Over the last decade and a half, the world, and particularly the West, has seen a marked increase in the salience of group political sovereignty, which here refers to the broad concept of various groups (racial, ethnic, ideological, geographic, or otherwise) seeking more control over their own affairs (Chryssolegos 2023). This is not a monolithic concept by any means, but for simplicity's sake, we refer to this idea as populism with the understanding that it is not globally homogenous and can exist at the subnational, national, and supranational level. While populism is frequently associated with nationalism and a rejection of international institutions in the West, Chryssolegos notes that this has not necessarily been the case for populist ideologies in the global South. It would be incorrect to imply any type of ideological homogeneity when using broad terms like populism or nationalism; however, there is ample evidence that the idea of "reclaiming powers from international elites" has become a rallying cry for recent leaders across the globe (Chryssolegos 2023). The common theme of all these populist movements, despite significant policy differences, is an appeal to "individualism, group superiority, entitlement, and identity politics" and a call for "'taking back control' of its [the nation's] borders or economic policy…" (Becker 2020, Chryssolegos 2023). What follows is an examination of this broad international trend and then a description of specific examples of that trend in the UK and India.

Chryssogelos (2023) initially describes this increase in populism as a direct "outside-in" response to globalization that manifests itself either in economic or cultural terms. The first major school of "outside-in" populism scholarship argues that populism grows out of a response to "economic crisis and market dislocation" (Chryssogelos 2023). In the United States, for example, former-President Trump emphasized the negative impacts of globalization as seen in the 2008 financial crisis and the creation of the 'left-behind heartlands' by the shipment of jobs overseas. Other examples of this phenomenon include harsh critiques of the IMF in Turkey and Argentina and opposition to austerity measures in Southern Europe (Aytac and Onis 2014, Katsanidou and Otjes 2016). The second school of thought is that populism is a cultural backlash to immigration and multiculturalism, which "form[s] the backbone of populist radical right parties" (Chryssogelos 2023). The immigration issue in America and the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe typify the events that lead to this form of populism. While distinguishing between the economic and cultural causes of populism has some utility, it is problematic because there is evidence "that the two factors appear to be interrelated," meaning economic crises might spark nativist sentiments and cultural isolation might lend itself to economic alienation (Chryssogelos 2023). Chryssogelos' (2023) proposed solution to this problem is to view populism as a broader response to the "democratic and representative implications of globalization." Globalization has led to the perception of a loss of national political agency, which has resulted in a system-wide populist backlash, as will be demonstrated briefly in the following case studies.

The UK and its 2016 Brexit vote provide perhaps the starkest example, in the West at least, of a larger yearning for increased national political sovereignty across the international system. The UK has a history of seeing itself as somewhat separate—geographically and culturally—from Europe. Its refusal to adopt the Euro currency and its "relative skepticism" toward proposals for a

European Community defense policy distinct from NATO demonstrate this perceived separation (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). The 1973 decision to join the European Community and the 1998 Anglo-French St Malo declaration indicated a certain willingness to buck those anti-Continent tendencies and participate in broader European cooperation, but the 2016 Brexit vote marked a clear and explicit break in the UK-EU relationship (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). In the build-up to that vote, even Prime Minister David Cameron, who ultimately argued against Brexit, negotiated with the EU to "enhance the role of national parliaments" vice the European Parliament and "end Britain's obligation to work towards an 'ever closer union'" with the rest of the EU (Cameron 2016). These negotiation points might appear relatively moderate in the post-Brexit order, but they sent a clear message from the highest leadership in the UK that Britain strongly desired increased autonomy and was willing to leave the EU to obtain it.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and the BJP, India has seen similar trends toward increased national sovereignty over the last ten years, primarily in security and trade policy. Under Modi, India has used nationalist rhetoric to take a "more decisive stance of security matters" in response to recent deadly border disputes with China and militant attacks in Jammu and Kashmir (Destradi and Plagemann 2023). These events have led to a generally deteriorating security relationship with China but a potentially growing sense of national identity. Trade policy has taken a similar turn with a renewed emphasis on the protectionist concept of *Swadeshi*. Between 1990 and 2009, before Modi's election as Prime Minister, average tariffs decreased from 81.7 percent to 9.4 percent (Destradi and Plagemann 2023). Since Modi took office, however, he has reversed course, created a 'Buy Indian' initiative and abandoned the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in an attempt to highlight the Hindu nationalist concept of economic "self-reliance vis-à-vis the outside world" (Destradi and Plagemann 2023).

These efforts, combined with the Brexit vote and the increased salience of issues like immigration and economic alienation in places like Europe and the United States, provide clear evidence of an increase in destabilizing forces around the globe. The rules-based liberal international order is being questioned by factions within the same states that provide the foundation for that order, which brings into question the long-term viability of that system.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING IDEOLOGICAL POLITICAL RHETORIC

The previous two sections considered the complex causal relationships between domestic ideology, international politics, and foreign policy. One common thread worth examining is the role of ideological political rhetoric. Understanding who is speaking on the international stage, who they are speaking to, what they are saying, and what they are implying is a vital, although difficult to understand, component of foreign relations. This section first outlines a framework for analyzing political rhetoric at the international level and then provides examples of the different types of rhetoric and their potential impacts on foreign policy decisions.

Gregory and Ho (2023) introduce the concepts of *operational rhetoric* and *symbolic rhetoric*. Both occur within a state's official discourse but differ in that operational rhetoric "actually influences state action" while symbolic rhetoric "does not directly relate the actual ideological motives of…state action." Distinguishing between these two types, or rather failing to distinguish between them, can have disastrous consequences, and thus, it is the task of foreign policy officials around the world to analyze and sort state rhetoric into simple posturing and action. What follows are several examples from recent literature that will hopefully aid in the categorization process.

Gregory and Ho's (2023) examination of Chinese discourse concerning Russia's invasion of Ukraine illustrates this distinction between posturing and action. They identify three distinct streams of symbolic ideology frequently used by the Chinese government: Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric, liberal-democratic terminology, and "classical Chinese *wangdao-badao* descriptive dichotomies" (Gregory and Ho 2023). The first draws from China's historical formation as a communist state. The second co-opts traditional liberal terms and concepts, drawing from liberal discourse and sources such as when the PRC described the violent crushing of Hong Kong civil society as a "restoration of the rule of law." Finally, the "dichotomy between *wangdao*, the kingly way of virtuous governance and *badao*, governance grounded in hegemonic bullying" has "deep roots in Chinese history and culture" and allows the regime to "frame the CCP as benevolent government and…the United States and its allies with the *badao* tradition" (Gregory and Ho 2023, 11).

Individually, these three streams of rhetoric help legitimate the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy approach to Russia's war, but they do not actually reflect the CCP's operational ideology. For instance, the CCP's use of liberal-democratic terminology in no way represents any semblance of a generally accepted understanding of the terms. Instead,

> …the CCP sees international moral arguments as a contest in legitimating discourse. Important for understanding how the PRC may act in international deliberative bodies, such as the UN, the PRC sees moral arguments as instrumental and leaves itself no room in the short term to disassociate from Russia because it has framed itself as the moral actor and thus its relationships are moral as well (Gregory and Ho 2023, 17).

Further, the virtue-vice dichotomy from the *wangdao-badao* discourse can illuminate "how the CCP conceives of its own power" and how it relates to Russia and its war in Ukraine (Gregory and Ho 2023).

Martill and Mesarovich (2023) demonstrate the complex ways that operational and symbolic rhetoric might overlap in examining the signaling of post-Brexit prime ministers. Although both major parties shifted priorities to align with the post-Brexit political reality, leaders signaled their commitment to a hard or soft Brexit through their rhetoric concerning security cooperation with the EU. Prime Minister Teresa May, for example, "was keener to signal a closer relationship in security than in other care areas of integration" and thus represented a softer take on Brexit (Martill and Mesarovich 2023). Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on the other hand, refused to negotiate on security cooperation, thereby clearly communicating a hardline approach to Brexit. On the one hand, both examples clearly demonstrate the implementation of operational rhetoric that ultimately resulted in concrete security policies. On the other hand, the very real policy towards security cooperation simultaneously served as a tool to build ideological legitimacy with constituents when preferred harder or softer approaches were not available across a broader spectrum of issues.

Chryssogelos (2023) briefly examines the role of rhetoric in the recent rise of populism discussed in the previous section. In his analysis, populism writ large is less about specific populist policy preferences, which are heterogeneous and inconsistent across states and populist movements, and more about the method of communication between populist leaders and their supporters. Leaders such as former President Trump utilize symbolic rhetoric to paint "the relationship between power and the people in antagonistic terms" in order to "strengthen [their] hold…over their supporters" (Chryssogelos 2023). In common American political parlance, this type of rhetoric is used to simply "stir up the base" and might not carry any specific policy implications.

In practice, the effects of this form of populism may be greater on *policy processes* than on specific *policy outcomes*. Populists may come to similar policy outcomes to their more traditional predecessors but tend to undermine bureaucratic expertise and professional diplomats in favor of concentrated, personalist leadership. As demonstrated in the British case, they may use foreign policy as a tool for signaling to domestic and international audiences (Chyrssogelos 2023, 9; Martill and Mesarovich 2023). Beyond serious concerns about populism's effects on institutional democratic safeguards, these process changes may have significant implications worthy of future research for policy volatility and predictability and for the long-term credibility of commitments by populist regimes in their relations with other states. Further, long-standing literature suggests that personalistic regimes generate less state capacity and capability, not the least in military affairs – an important consideration in assessing adversaries and populist allies (see, for example, Talmadge 2015).

The three case studies above provide examples of operational and symbolic rhetoric, but parsing out differences between the two is rarely black and white, especially when taking regime type into consideration. In authoritarian states like China, the state apparatus may control not only the official discourse but public access to information that might influence that discourse. This makes it difficult to determine at what level symbolic speech becomes accepted truth that is then acted upon. In more pluralistic societies, distinguishing between various types of rhetoric is no less difficult since leaders must garner popular support while making policy suggestions. In the United States, for example, "build the wall" was an oft-quoted phrase at many of President Trump's rallies which did indeed relate to his desire to build a wall the length of America's border with Mexico – though the symbolic effects of the wall for Trump's base constituency might have been more significant than such a wall's actual effect on immigration flows.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

This paper illuminated several important concepts concerning the impact of political ideology on foreign policymaking. First, when viewing the question through Waltz's second image of the state, domestic political ideology provides valuable information that enables some level of foreign policy predictability. Second, when examining the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy through Waltz's third image of the international system, a pattern of increased focus on national sovereignty reveals itself. This global tendency is not monolithic, but there is a clear trend of various leaders appealing to economic and cultural incentives to pit populations against established powers. Finally, there is value in correctly distinguishing between operational and symbolic rhetoric. Failure to do so can have disastrous consequences, including war, when symbolic rhetoric for domestic conception is interpreted as threatening to foreign states.

In addition to these three findings, this paper's cases suggest the value of future research on the influence of ideology across the full spectrum of regime types. Although the sample size is small, there is some initial evidence that a state's location on the authoritarian-pluralistic regime continuum may correspond to the general population's role in foreign policymaking. In more authoritarian states like China, policy control emanates largely from the central government, creating an elite-driven, top-down foreign policy approach. This does not dismiss the general population entirely (see Reilly (2012) for a potential role of the Chinese populace in policymaking) but identifies the locus of control firmly in the state's sphere of influence. In pluralistic societies, on the other hand, the general population potentially plays a greater role, though not necessarily large enough to call it a pure bottom-up approach. This dichotomy should not be seen as absolute by any means because the literature is far from settled, but it should serve as a starting point for future comparative studies in public opinion and foreign policy (Bruner 1944, Holsti 1992).

How can the US apply these takeaways to its foreign policy going forward? First, given the rise of populist-like ideologies around the world, the US must recognize that there are serious destabilizing forces that have the potential to undermine certain facets of the Western-led liberal international order. Second, the US should not assume that these destabilizing forces exist on a binary scale amid the backdrop of China-US competition. States practice foreign policy in unique ways based on a variety of cultural, historical, and economic variables. This means the complex task of foreign policy analysis requires understanding the combination of domestic variables, including political ideology, which distinguish one country from another. Finally, as a corollary of this, the US must take the examination of foreign political rhetoric seriously and strive to separate operational rhetoric from symbolic rhetoric. Success in this endeavor has the potential to yield significant fruit, while failure could lead to serious negative consequences. ☆

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CHAPTER 17

PERCEIVING AND MISPERCEIVING STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING ORDER: IDEOLOGIES' EFFECTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

Hegemons can work to stay in place and keep their preferred order in place, and recent research attends to legitimation strategies to sustain international systems. Effective order-preserving strategies require correct causal beliefs, which depend on states accurately perceiving other states' interests and values. Domestic political contestation within ally and partner states can complicate this strategic assessment, even more so because the hegemon's own political contestation shapes other states' perceptions of the hegemon's commitment to international leadership. Thus, the United States' ability to preserve the liberal international order requires accurate higher-order beliefs and accounting for their consequence in strategic interactions. Higher-order strategic reasoning is always demanding, but correctly sorting through the implications of political tumult abroad, simultaneous with assessing foreign perceptions of America's contested interests and intentions, may be both more difficult and more vital than ever in an era of broad contestation over the liberal international order.

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INTRODUCTION

Concerns about the rise of China, the end of America's unipolar moment, and the decline of the post-1945 liberal international order have escalated in recent years. Scholars and policymakers are attentive to the possibility of hegemonic decline, fundamental shifts in the global distribution of power, and interstate conflict over these changes. An emblematic argument is Graham Allison's (2017) about the possibility of a "Thucydides trap," where the decline of a dominant power in the face of a rapidly rising adversary increases the risk of great power war.

Much of the scholarship on conflict under power transitions and hegemonic decline treats the "inefficiency condition" of a power shift as an exogenous shock outside of the control of the competing states (Powell 2006; Fearon 1995; Gilpin 1981). This is theoretically essential to understand the consequences of changes in power. It is also an empirically useful framework for understanding contemporary international politics, given ongoing shocks to states' value for the existing international order and their perceived membership in that order.

At the same time, it is important to remember that power shifts are not preordained and are never purely exogenous to the hegemon's actions. As Robert Gilpin acknowledges in his foundational work on war over changes in international power distributions, the current hegemon can take action to "arrest its decline" (Gilpin 1981, 197). Hegemonic shifts are not inevitable, except perhaps over the very long run. Rising powers are not destined to displace or supersede current hegemons, nor are they assured of constructing an alternative international order. The choice of the current hegemon is not just war or not war, preventive violence or resignation to displacement. Hegemons can work to stay in place and keep their preferred order in place.

What can hegemons do to preserve preferred orders? For one, they can act. To prolong cooperative membership in an existing international order, hegemons can inspire confidence in their own engagement. Repeated cooperation into the future proceeds from confidence in cooperation now, which derives from yesterday's actions (Schelling 1966; Tomz 2012; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Hegemons can also legitimate their material actions. One way to think about persuasive messaging and other legitimation strategies is as complements to the actual provision of goods with clear signals of providing goods (reassuring allies, deterring adversaries) and of willingness to keep providing them. Legitimation can therefore instill confidence that a hegemon's underlying interests and values around the provision of public goods will carry into the future.

Recent research attends to this kind of order legitimation (Goodhart 2023) and the importance of correct causal beliefs for shaping order-preserving strategies (Blanken and Overbaugh 2023), which depend on states accurately perceiving other states' interests and values. Political contestation within ally and partner states can complicate this strategic assessment (Alam 2023; Becker 2023; Greene 2023), all the more so because the hegemon's own domestic political contestation shapes other states' perceptions of the hegemon's commitment to international leadership (Hertling 2023).

Thus, for the preservation of the postwar order, both challenge and solution connect back to domestic contestation. Higher-order strategic reasoning is always demanding, but correctly sorting through the implications of political tumult abroad, simultaneous with assessing foreign

perceptions of America's contested interests and intentions, may be both more difficult and more vital than ever in an era of broad contestation over the liberal international order.

THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Contrary to the theoretical conception of international politics as anarchic, strong states can, in fact, construct international hierarchies which flow from the authority of the hierarch (Lake 2009, 2013). Dominant states can construct security hierarchies, which protect subordinate states from adversaries' coercion and force, or economic hierarchies, wherein they create subordinate interconnectedness and dependencies, or both (Lake 2009).

One way of conceiving international politics since the Second World War is in terms of a liberal international order, with the United States as a hierarch with a degree of legitimate power (Lake 2013, 80). More than a consolidation of power to the hegemon with less powerful states joining in fearful alliances of convenience, the post-1945 system (especially after the fall of the Soviet Union) involves durable and generally cohesive order. The order rests on a grand bargain by which the United States provides political stability in exchange for member states cooperating within the system. Liberal democratic states like the United States may have a unique ability to embed other states in their order as willing participants (Ikenberry 1999, 2001). Democratic hegemons are transparent and institutionally constrained, which means they can bind their own action and credibly restrain from dominating subordinate states in exchange for subordinate states foregoing forceful gambles for power that would disrupt the order. Participating states, hierarch and subordinate alike, can therefore bond together and reap the benefits of stable cooperation (Ikenberry 1999).

Thus, from scholarship on hegemonic orders and the liberal international order in particular, one way to conceptualize the role of the United States since 1945 is in terms of providing certain public goods (Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; Olson 1971) and helping member states coordinate and commit to cooperative actions that maximize welfare. The United States benefits in the construction and maintenance of order from its liberal democratic character, which provides transparency and makes commitments trustworthy. Moreover, this political character fosters particularly strong ties with states who share in liberal democratic identity and values.

PRESERVING THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

If the liberal international order arose after 1945 and consolidated in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, there is reason now to worry about its decline. The liberal international order may now be especially vulnerable to contestation over actions, interests, values, and identities. However, the key insight from Goodhart (2023) is that the hegemon can do something about it. Hegemons can shape member states' allegiance to and confidence in international orders.

In Goodhart's theory, hegemonic states do not merely provide public goods to construct favorable international systems. They also work to recruit and sustain international cooperation with persuasive messaging. In other words, shocks to a hegemon's provision of goods are not purely exogenous, as discussed in this essay's introduction, but neither are shocks to states' perceived membership in an international order.

Goodhart studies the effect of great powers' legitimation strategies on their ability to build and maintain their preferred international order. He draws insights from the history of the Ottoman Empire, but with apparent relevance to ongoing debates about United States foreign policy. Dominant states work to construct and sustain international orders with "legitimation claims," defined as "value proposition[s] that hierarchs make to subordinates to gain compliance" (Goodhart 2023, 4). Goodhart conceptualizes these propositions as primarily ideological or performance-based while acknowledging that, in practice, hegemons necessarily combine these frames. Ideological claims emphasize shared ideological in-groups and common beliefs about how to arrange society. Meanwhile, performance-based legitimation claims revolve around the hierarch's ability to provide goods like security guarantees, economic development, or institutional solutions to coordination and cooperation problems.

Goodhart focuses on an exploratory case of the Ottoman Empire at its peak under Suleiman I in the 16th century. During its rise, the Ottoman Empire provided and advertised its provision of goods like the protection of Muslims and trade rights. However, as military expansion stalled and the task became one of consolidation rather than recruitment, the Empire emphasized the religious basis for its hegemony — and the particularity of its ideological basis because the Ottoman Empire was also competing for support against rival Persian and Portuguese hierarchs.

The key insight from the case is what Goodhart theorizes as a durability-size tradeoff in hegemons' legitimation claims for structuring their preferred international order. Performance-based claims are effective during recruitment because they are more expansive and focused on conditionally accessible goods rather than essentially bounded identities. However, performance-based memberships are more susceptible to defection when hegemons fail to provide the public goods promised. Meanwhile, ideological legitimation claims are less effective for recruitment during hegemonic expansion because they are definitionally exclusive. Still, they generate stronger cohesion among member states and are therefore effective for the consolidation and maintenance of orders. In brief, performance-based legitimation is magnetic during recruitment but fragile for order maintenance, while ideological claims are targeted but sticky.

Implicit in Goodhart's theory is a strategic hierarch. Goodhart expects to observe a positive relationship between ideological claims and order duration in his data, which means he must tend to observe hierarchs opting more frequently for ideological framing after consolidation to (successfully) preserve their orders. This requires that hierarchs infer the theoretically better strategy for recruitment or consolidation, at least on average. Constructing and preserving order requires a given hierarch to reason accurately about the steps more and less likely to bring about that outcome and the associated tradeoffs.

Of course, a theoretical expectation of on-average strategic reasoning by hegemons does not guarantee that every hegemon in every era will select the optimal strategy to build or sustain its preferred international order. Blanken and Overbaugh (2023) criticize the modern United States foreign policy establishment for flawed strategic reasoning. Specifically, the authors argue that strategic leaders have mixed up beliefs about how the world should be with beliefs about how the world is.

Blanken and Overbaugh frame their critique in terms of "principled beliefs" and "causal beliefs" from work by Goldstein and Keohane (1993). Principled beliefs are about right and wrong, justice

and injustice. Causal beliefs are about what causes what and therefore help individuals inform strategic thinking (to apply means in ways to achieve ends).

Principled beliefs are essential to inform ethical state behavior and construct international norms to shape ethical behavior, so policymakers *should* draw from principled beliefs in strategic decision-making. The issue for Blanken and Overbaugh is not that strategic leaders have informed policy with principled beliefs but that they have conflated these beliefs with causal ones.

Specifically, the authors take issue with America's strategic confusion about globalization and nation-building. Blanken and Overbaugh argue that strategic leaders lacked clear causal beliefs about the effects of open markets on China's trajectory, betraying excessive optimism about Chinese democratization and integration into the liberal international order. Similarly, per the authors, leaders confused principled beliefs about national obligations to fix destabilized regimes with causal beliefs about America's actual ability to re-stabilize these regimes and principled beliefs about the moral and material value of democracy with causal beliefs about prospects for democratization. According to Blanken and Overbaugh, errors in strategic reasoning contributed to the United States' failures in Afghanistan after 2001.

CONTESTATION OVER INTERESTS AND VALUES IN THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

If the core of the U.S.-led order is a grand bargain over goods, grounded in shared values, and if order-preserving strategies require correct causal beliefs, then the maintenance of the liberal international order demands an understanding of member states' interests and values. Recent research depicts challenges to the liberal international order, in action and shared identity, arising from domestic political contestation (Alam 2023; Becker 2023; Greene 2023). Domestic politics are shaping states' willingness to collaborate for the provision of collective goods, their underlying value for the collective goods, and the underlying values that shape these interests and the strength of states' shared identity.

Greene (2023, 1) evaluates the "interaction of increasing political and identity polarization within Western societies with the increasing complexity of a multipolar world order." Greene argues that NATO and the broader Western security system depend on both material interests and ideology to endure. From the perspective of member states in the liberal international order, it matters who "we" are and what we want (Greene 2023, 1). Greene places special emphasis on national role conception in shaping member states' willingness to participate in, and identify with, the liberal U.S.-led and rules-based order (Greene 2023, 15). Greene is specifically interested in how role conceptions arise from contests over domestic political power. He evaluates policy discourses in the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Israel after Russia's invasion of Ukraine to illustrate the utility of his framework.

Role conceptions as members of the liberal international order are under strain. Broadly, according to Greene, nationalist right parties are rejecting mobility across borders and prioritizing national rather than supranational communities. Meanwhile, radical left parties are rejecting globalization and economic interdependence, notwithstanding benefits to the average consumer, because of concerns about wealth or income inequality.

Beyond describing broad trends, Greene attends to national dynamics. The UK has traditionally conceived of itself as a "shoulder to shoulder" partner with the United States (Greene 2023, 8). However, Greene points to the competing forces of an anti-globalist movement that drove the state's exit from the European Union and an anti-capitalist movement (associated with Jeremy Corbyn's leadership) against exploitative forces of the West, specifically the United States. Even so, Greene argues, the UK's anti-West viewpoints were marginalized electorally by the time of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, so the UK has been able to generate and sustain support for Ukraine along with allies and partners, even at a national economic cost.

Greene also evaluates dynamics in France and Israel. France's national role conception is under constant tension, with a mainstream conception as a "defender of liberty" along with a "Gaullist conception" of France's absolute independence from the United States (Greene 2023, 15). The tension is apparent in practice, as President Macron calls for "strategic autonomy" even while committing to staunch support for Ukraine. (Marine Le Pen and Rassemblement National represent a deeper anti-Americanism.) Greene depicts Israel's political contestation as between elites who emphasize the centrality of the state's Jewish character and elites who additionally emphasize the state's liberal democratic character. While Israel's centrists want to improve relationships with mainstream liberal Europe, Benjamin Netanyahu is more concerned with Israel's relationship with Russia and more ready to contradict the preferences of Western allies — tendencies informed by hostility toward foreign (Western) involvement in Israel's sovereign politics.

By evaluating domestic political dynamics and policy debates around Russia-Ukraine, Greene can draw connections between domestic polarization over national role conception and the solidarity of the West. Russia's invasion is a strong test of national role conceptions in the liberal international order because it has forced states to consider their commitment to their allies and partners, specifically how to vote in the UN, how to enforce sanctions, and how much aid to contribute (or not) to Ukraine.

Another specific collective action problem facing states in the liberal international order is collective defense, and this is the outcome of interest for Becker's (2023) analysis of populist politics in Europe. Becker theorizes a relationship between populism and the willingness of European states to share the burden of providing for Europe's security. He argues that populist politics "drive states to a more particularistic conception of both values and security, also limiting contributions" (Becker 2023, 11). Populist parties and their leaders are more focused on national and foreign elites and threats from immigration than on external threats common to the transatlantic alliance, and they are less sensitive to the reputational costs of reneging on commitments to allies and partners. As a result, Becker expects populist electoral success in NATO member states to correspond to reduced defense spending.

To test his hypothesis, Becker uses electoral data from 1980-2019 on the performance of authoritarian populist parties in European national elections and a constructed data set of defense spending on equipment, operations, and maintenance. By measuring patterns in five-year moving averages of this spending as a proportion of GDP, Becker is able to operationalize European states' commitment to collective defense since equipment and operations and maintenance spending are priorities of both NATO and the European Union (Becker 2023, 3).

Becker uses a variety of models to assess the relationship between populist parties' electoral

success and burden sharing, including regressions of defense spending on populist vote-share (overall, rightwing, and leftwing), incorporating controls and specifications with country-fixed effects, along with two-stage least squares regressions using personal authoritarian and libertarian values as instruments. Across specifications, Becker finds a significant negative relationship between populist vote share and spending on equipment, operations, and maintenance. The relationship is consistently significant for rightwing populist vote share, whereas the significance of leftwing populist vote share is sensitive to model specification.

In short, Becker finds that more rightwing populism means more "burden-shifting" and less "burden-sharing." More than statistically significant, the relationship is substantial: per Becker's findings, a one standard-deviation shift in the 5-year moving average of rightwing populist vote share across all NATO allies would shift total NATO defense spending by ten percent, or approximately $80 billion (Becker 2023, 37). Becker concludes that the measured pattern bodes poorly for collective solutions to European security. If populist-motivated burden-shifting persists, "the core of the current international order will simultaneously become more *prone* to conflict and less *prepared* for it" (Becker 2023, 4).

While Becker traces a link between tumultuous domestic politics and (deterrence of) interstate conflict via collective action, Alam (2023) evaluates conflictual interstate policy as an outcome of individual leader tendencies. Specifically, Alam is attentive to the causal role of time horizons in shaping leaders' decisions about foreign policy persistence.

Alam focuses on two key explanatory variables that affect leader time horizons: culpability (the extent to which the inability to accomplish coercive policies threatens the leader's political survival) and satisfaction (the degree to which the individual leader is satisfied with existing policy, according to personal motivations). In Alam's theory, culpability and satisfaction affect how far leaders are willing to look into the future to determine the success or failure of policy.

Alam focuses on leader persistence in or termination of specific coercive policies rather than a commitment to the liberal international order, but core insights complement work by Greene and Becker and readily map onto considerations of collective policy decisions by states. Echoing Greene's focus on specific political personalities, Alam argues that individual leaders are consequential. Their personal preferences for policies can drive state policy persistence even in the face of domestic political backlash.

Alam's work also complements Greene and Becker's focus on political contexts shaping incentives for leaders. In addition to imposing electoral consequences and other mechanisms for holding leaders accountable, political parties can socialize leaders into principles. Alam also introduces the possibility of leaders yielding to populist tendencies across national boundaries, with culpability shaped by both domestic and international audiences. The internalization of international attitudes means that populist dynamics are likely to have transnational effects, but it also reinforces the possibility of the United States shaping other states' attitudes toward the existing order (Goodhart 2023).

PERCEPTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The implication of work by Goodhart, Blanken and Overbaugh, Greene, Becker, and Alam, along with prior scholarship on hegemonic leadership, is that the maintenance of the postwar

liberal international order requires the United States to make accurate assessments of domestic contestation in other states and its implications for cooperation with allies and partners. That is,generating correct causal beliefs about how best to provide goods and legitimate the liberal international order requires that the United States understand the political dynamics in member states which affect both their interest in collective goods and their identification with the collective. Otherwise, the hierarchy cannot expect to select optimal actions and optimally legitimate those actions.

More than that, though, preserving international order requires understanding what other states think about the hierarch's *own* intentions and commitment. Correct causal beliefs must account for America's domestic contestation informing national ends concerning the liberal international order but also for other states' perceptions of the consequence of American domestic contestation for the United States' willingness to provide public goods and commit to the order.

According to Hertling (2023), international confidence in America's commitment to the liberal international order is far from guaranteed, as the "charged nature of [the hegemon's] partisan domestic political environment threatens [the] *perceived* reliability" of the hegemon in supporting allies and partners (Hertling 2023, 2).

Hertling begins his analysis with a formal model of alliance reliability. He argues that the contribution of his model is in accounting for an "autonomy benefit," a parameter that describes the hierarch's benefit from isolationist or unilateral actions, perhaps as a function of electoral rewards from parties favoring retrenchment. Hertling's model also accounts for "institutional advantage," like reduced transaction costs via continued leadership of the hegemonic order and greater costs of war to potential challengers.

The formal model motivates Hertling's subsequent observational studies because it demonstrates the theoretical importance of hegemonic benefits from commitment to or withdrawal from international orders, and how allies perceive these interests, and the fact that these values and perceptions are a function of the hegemon's domestic politics. Using survey data of American attitudes toward commitment to NATO from 1974 to 2022, Hertling finds that diverging attitudes toward NATO are predicted by partisan polarization in the United States (Hertling 2023, 15). Then, Hertling shows that greater partisanship corresponds with reduced favorability toward the United States among NATO states. Thus, partisan polarization in the United States predicts both turbulence in America's public commitment to NATO and reduced confidence among NATO allies in the United States (Hertling 2023, 3).

However, the institutional strength of the NATO alliance may help to offset the corrosive effects of polarization. Using a database from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project, with a sample of 2,461 alliance arrangements from 1815–2018, Hertling finds that certain institutional features affect the likelihood of member states terminating their affiliation. Consulting with member states during crises, existing as a standalone organization with a headquarters, resting on a foundational charter, and providing for cooperative behaviors outside of military issues reduce the likelihood of ally termination (Hertling 2023, 24–25). The institutional features of the NATO alliance may therefore mitigate the risk of member state defection generated by declining American commitment to the alliance or ally perceptions of that retrenchment.

CONCLUSION

America's ability to preserve the liberal international order requires forming correct higher-order beliefs, updating them properly, and accounting for their consequence in strategic interactions. United States foreign policy leaders must therefore generate correct "first order" beliefs about the nation's democratic will toward national ends, "second order" beliefs about the beliefs of allies, partners, and adversaries as a function of their own domestic contestation, "third order" beliefs about allies, partners, and adversaries' beliefs about the beliefs of the United States, and so forth.

The complexity of higher-order beliefs and consequences for strategic (mis)perception in international politics is not a novel insight (Dafoe, Zwetsloot, and Cebul 2021; Jervis 1976). But scholars increasingly appreciate that orders and their meanings among members are fluid and subject to contestation within and across nations (Greene 2023, 6).

United States strategy will therefore benefit from accounting for the dynamism of the liberal international order. This means attending to the existence of multiple hierarchies, geographic and temporal, within the broader imagined West, rather than homogenizing across all bilateral or multilateral international relationships (Lake 2013). And this demands an accounting for internal political contestation, especially if Greene is correct that commitment to the West as an "imagined community" (Anderson 2006) is "more variable than ever" (Greene 2023, 6). ☆

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CHAPTER 18

TERRORISM & INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism recently dropped from the list of national security priorities, vacating its spot for growing concerns like strategic competition with adversaries like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, among others. Even as academic, policy, and military experts continue to delve deeper into understanding pressing concepts like strategic competition, terrorism still touches the international order and necessitates study. Put differently, terrorism could still affect international order through cooperation or disruption. In this paper, terrorism and its effects on international order are investigated by looking at terrorism in the past, such as in the reintegration of formerly armed actors, the pressing threat of domestic terrorism in the present and its international implications, and what terrorism could be in the future. The paper concludes by examining cooperative measures between interested states in quelling terrorism and maintaining international order.

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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism recently dropped on the list of national security priorities. However, it has reverberating implications for international order. Terrorism can influence how non-state groups, states, and international institutions, among other actors, interact with each other – whether, for example, from a place of seeking to guard again the reoccurrence of terrorism or by supporting violent groups on two sides of a conflict, as we saw in the Syrian civil war. It was also an act of terrorism on September 11, 2001, that led to invasions in the Middle East, which resulted in a shift in regional and global power dynamics, repercussions of which are still being felt today.

While international order once was characterized by alliances with the US and the Soviet Union on two ends of a bipolar system and later by US primacy in the international arena, we now discuss great power competition and "near peer" competition (Byorick 2017, 5) – which we can refer to broadly as strategic competition – with Russia and China when talking about what constitutes international order. While much was conducted through proxy groups and states, Ambassador James Jeffrey, a Middle East foreign policy expert with former affiliations such as the former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, attests that the Cold War saw the two great power confrontations – the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and 1973 Yom Kippur War – between the United States and Russia vis-à-vis proxy states (Wilson Center, "James F. Jeffrey;" Irregular Warfare Initiative/Combating Terrorism Center, "Terrorism and International Order"). The US is in the midst of a strategic competition that will shape the future of the international order for generations to come. While proxy conflict may continue to be a means by which great powers compete with one another strategically (Irregular Warfare Initiative/Combating Terrorism Center, "Proxy Warfare;" Social Science of War, "Theory and Practice of Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition), various facets of terrorism could still affect international order, whether through cooperation between such powers or disruption of international order.

Even as academic, policy, and military analysts seek to understand pressing challenges like strategic competition, terrorism continues to shape the international order. This article considers the evolution of terrorism and its effects on international order by looking at terrorism in the past and the reintegration of formerly armed actors, the pressing threat of domestic terrorism in the present and its international implications, and what terrorist tactics and methods look like in the future. Finally, it looks at cooperative measures between interested states in quelling terrorism and maintaining international order.

TERRORISM IN THE PAST: REINTEGRATING FORMERLY ARMED ACTORS

Reintegrating formerly armed actors (FAA) involved in insurgencies, cartels, and guerilla groups intersect with terrorism and international order in a few ways. First, FAAs, current and former, are a market for labor to produce global insecurity. These individuals and their former armed groups – on the micro-level of the international system – have implications for the macro-level as well: e.g., international recruitment of foreign fighters (Gudzowska and Dukhan 2023), regional (de)stabilization (Center for Preventative Action 2023), and transnational organized crime, among other dynamics (United Nations 2021, 35). While their role in this violent labor market is possible, on the other hand, FAAs can be useful allies in informing security-building practices. For example,

former Al-Shabaab members helped their friends and families to leave the group (Ottosen et al. 2022), highlighting the potential allies that former members – and their networks – can be for security building.

Intentional and creative resource allocation can simultaneously create supportive structures for FAAs while leveraging their experiences to better understand adversaries in the context of strategic competition (Röders and McFee 2022b). Challenges exist, however, as reintegration can differ from one individual to the next and highly context-dependent (McFee 2016). In looking at Ukraine, one way would be to integrate former Donbas fighters from the previous 2014 invasion. While there would be a need to provide services for trauma and physical injuries and reconcile the influx of arms, there is currently an incentive for those FAAs, given the collapsed economy in that region. As a best practice, integration can be sustainable if the conversation between stakeholders – such as the government, FAAs, and civil society, among others – starts early, involves all implicated actors within FAA social networks (Röders and McFee 2022a), and acknowledges the fact that FAAs often do not experience armed group exit as a form of "return" (or that such a presumption would even be desirable in many contexts) (McFee and Röders 2023).

Reintegrating fighters has challenges in an online era. For example, in the context of domestic terrorism, the "battlefield" is social media, whereas the "frontline" are platforms like Facebook, etc., and, as such, can transcend borders (International Peace Institute 2010). Alternatively, it could be argued that social media is given too much weight, as conspiracy theories have taken root and spread for centuries and, as such, may be endemic of a deeper distrust in society. In such an approach, violent rhetoric on social media is more of a symptom, while distrust in society is the cause. It bears mentioning that in an era of virtual engagement: what are the different pathways for FAA (re)integration that must be considered? In this environment, reintegration programs must consider pushing back against disinformation without challenging freedom of speech. This has resounding implications for the fight against domestic terrorism and other forms of organized violence, not just in the US but also among its partners, allies, and adversaries.

In addition to the role of terrorism in irregular warfare, it is important to understand how the discourse around terrorism affects opportunities for violence. For instance, the Center for the Confinement of Terrorism in El Salvador is the largest detention facility in the Americas ("El Salvador opens one of Latin America's largest prisons," 2023; "First Inmates Transferred to El Salvador's New Terrorist Confinement Center," 2023). The government has cultivated the language of combating terrorism as a wide range of possible actions that can either stabilize or destabilize national and regional security. It bears further analysis to consider how discourse around China may legitimize the invasion of China into other spaces, including those with a focus on FAAs in nonstate groups. For example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been actively involved in anti-piracy efforts in the waters off the coast of Somalia. This is part of a larger effort to protect economic interests, gain political influence in the region, and project the image of a responsible global power. In this way, anti-terrorism discourses can be used as inroads to gain footholds in other salient domains of power. FAAs thus offer one woefully underexplored inroad into thinking about (de)stabilization and the international order.

TERRORISM IN THE PRESENT: DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Over the past decade, large parts of the US counterterrorism bureaucracy in Washington DC have shifted inwards: to face a domestic terrorism threat, manifesting primarily in the form of violent far-right white supremacist and anti-government forces that have struck in communities all over the country and even abroad (e.g., Kriner et al. 2022; Macklin 2019; Crawford and Keen 2020; Amarasingam, Argentino, and Macklin 2022). That domestic terrorism has emerged as a leading national security threat is clear: whether this is a purely domestic issue, individual to each country suffering its rise, or a problem with international ramifications. And does it have great power implications? Domestic terrorism that targets minority communities and the government and undermines the government's monopoly on the legitimate use of force risks challenging the very foundations of our democracy. It undermines the rule of law, faith in institutions, and the legitimacy of the U.S. government both at home and in its relations abroad.

Regardless of whether Americans were able to reach a consensus on defining the incident—although most of those in the counterterrorism community clearly view that incident as an act of terrorism against the U.S. government (e.g., Tucker and Jalonick 2022)—our allies and adversaries were unequivocal: January 6 was a sign of a weak, fractured, vulnerable America. Internal crisis opens the opportunity for those challenging international order to undercut that order and call into question the collective security principle that is the center of international order. January 6 accordingly directly weakened the US-led liberal international order. And the damage was seen in the following years—particularly in Germany and Brazil. In both countries, conspiratorial movements plotted to attack and possibly overthrow the government. In Germany, they were caught in a massive police operation; in Brazil, they were successful, although nothing came of it. Both cases were partly inspired by the terrorist attack at the U.S. Capitol on January 6—indicating that the U.S. has become a net exporter of domestic extremist ideology (Bergengruen 2022; Staiano-Daniels 2022; Benhold and Solomon 2022). Both cases weaken democratic norms in those key allied countries. And both cases will embolden our authoritarian adversaries as they continue to seek to undermine democracy and the Western-led liberal international order however they can—including by encouraging anti-democratic forces within our own countries (e.g., Ware, 2023).

This is an area where state adversaries take active steps. Russia, for instance, has supported neo-Nazi groups, such as the Russian Imperial Movement, which was designated as a specially designated global terrorist group by the Trump administration in 2020. They hold an open, symbiotic relationship with the Russian government and have trained Westerners, two of whom returned to Sweden and conducted a string of attacks (Gartenstein-Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke 2020). More recently, this group was responsible for the letter bomb campaign primarily targeted at Spain towards the end of last year (Wong, Barnes, and Schmitt 2023). Iran has also taken steps to encourage domestic far-right terrorism in the West. After the prior president questioned election results in 2020, Christopher Wray of the FBI and Cristopher Krebs of Homeland Security, along with at least ten other officials, were put on a hit list and labeled "Enemies of the People." Iran was also linked to the site (Nakashima, Gardner, and Davis, 2020). Even if such violence did not actually happen, it is still an indication of a threat, and crucially, it is an indication of what our adversaries believe our vulnerabilities to be.

TERRORISM IN THE FUTURE: TACTICS AND METHODS IN THE MARGINS

When looking at the future of terrorism under the shadow of great power competition, two factors are critical: whether and how terrorists build formal organizations and the geopolitical context in which terrorists operate.

Although the Global War on Terrorism failed to eliminate terrorism as a tactic (and it is not clear it ever could), the significant national and global investments in counterterrorism have done a good job of disrupting, degrading, and destroying terrorist organizations. The shift to networked, leaderless resistance organizational structures made it more difficult for al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to mount complex, coordinated attacks (e.g., Shapiro 2013). Degraded organizational capacity incentivizes terrorists to shift towards simple attacks such as rampage terrorism. Rampage attacks are terrorist attacks in which terrorists attack targets of opportunity over an indefinite attack duration, and the attacker is physically at risk during the attack (Kallenborn, Ackerman, and Tinsley, n.d.). For example, after declaring itself a sovereign entity, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria urged followers to engage in "lone wolf" attacks as part of a foreign terrorism campaign (Reed 2016). Among other attacks, the Islamic State inspired Omar Mateen to carry out a mass shooting in the Pulse Nightclub, killing 49 and injuring 53 (Zambelich and Hurt 2016). Although shifting to rampage terrorism offers terrorists high-body counts and publicity at low cost, it also entails high uncertainty about the effects of an operation, and requires significant human capital to sustain a long-term campaign (Kallenborn, Ackerman, and Tinsley, n.d.).

Yet the impact of terrorism depends not only on the characteristics of terrorist organizations but the external geopolitical environment in which they operate. In the right circumstances, extremists can cause massive global consequences with minimal resources. Most famously, when Gavrilo Princip used a pistol to kill Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914, it kicked off a series of reactions that resulted in World War I, which saw 40 million fatalities. Looking to the future, it is plausible that the growing tensions between the United States and China could create an opportunity for terrorists to catalyze a similar conflict. That could include false flag operations to spur fighting between the US and China (or another US rival) or attempts to destabilize regional security (e.g., in Southeast Asia), facilitating the US-China conflict. Alternatively, if conflict breaks out, extremists could spoil attempts at de-escalation, such as by disrupting peace talks. In an extreme case, extremists could spoil global collaborative efforts to protect humanity's very survival, such as disrupting climate change talks, removing safety barriers on future artificial general or superintelligences, or delaying or disrupting planetary defense against near-earth objects (Kallenborn and Ackerman, n.d.). And, of course, the US, China, or allied states may encourage terrorist organizations as proxy tools in great power competition, resulting in more terrorism writ large.

How these two factors – organizational capacity and the geopolitical environment – manifest is also significant for future counterterrorism operations. If the shift in focus towards great power competition and de-prioritization of counterterrorism lets terrorists build up new, complex organizations and capabilities, the US and allied nations may once again face large-scale terrorist threats. They may then be forced to return to these threats, diverting resources away from great power competition to metaphorically trim the grass. This could set up a vicious circle of insecurity. Even if terrorist capacity remains low, the US will still need to worry more about terrorist approaches like rampage terrorism that have few opportunities for law enforcement identification and disruption of plots. Overall, the US needs to better understand the interplay between

geopolitical competition and terrorism to mitigate the impacts of both phenomena on international security.

OVERCOMING TERRORISM: COOPERATION TO COUNTERING TERRORISM

Cooperation and burden-sharing between the US and like-minded groups are crucial to overcoming terrorism because it helps build the capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to terrorist threats throughout the world (Department of State, 2021). These capabilities may be developed through intelligence sharing, law enforcement, direct action counter-terrorism networks, deconfliction of operations, and other coordinated interaction.

The US can inform its future efforts for cooperation against terrorism with the lessons it has learned from previously successful partnerships. Despite difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, several cases exist where international cooperation between the US and other like-minded groups has worked well. For example, in Syria, the US identified a strong partner that wanted to fight—the Kurds—and provided the weapons, intelligence, and air support needed to counter ISIS terrorism. Here, the US arrived at quite a good model for counter-terrorism cooperation.

The US essentially used the same approach with partner forces in Ukraine—and did so effectively. Moving forward, the US can continue to implement this model in areas where it does not currently have large counter-terrorism efforts. An urgent example of such an area includes Sahel Africa, where the Wagner Group plays an increasingly destabilizing role (Clarke 2023). The private military's transactional relationship with various Sahelian governments exposes these governments' lack of monopoly on violence, which delegitimizes their regimes and further emboldens jihadist terrorist groups in the region.

It is not enough to simply identify good partners and share resources with them. As the US looks to build new institutions and organizations for international cooperation, it must also put effort into purposefully designing the interactions between partner states to support successful outcomes. One example of such organizational design is the preservation of an informal environment in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, which is led militarily by US CENTCOM and politically by a secretariat from the State Department with augmentees from several European countries. Because the coalition does not require vote-taking or reporting of its decisions to the respective parliaments of its members, the coalition had the flexibility to, for example, respond to the Turkish intervention into northeast Syria in 2019 without much political bluster, per Ambassador James Jeffrey (Irregular Warfare Initiative/Combating Terrorism Center, "Terrorism and International Order"). Ambassador Jeffrey also attests when former president Donald Trump suggested supplanting coalition presence in Iraq and Syria with NATO, European coalition members resisted—and this was partially because they preferred the informal way in which the coalition worked (Irregular Warfare Initiative/Combating Terrorism Center, "Terrorism and International Order").

Although most potential partnerships will consist of cooperation between the US and like-minded countries, there also exist opportunities—albeit highly nuanced and very much context-dependent—to cooperate with adversaries in a limited capacity. For example, although Russia and China might not make great partners with the US in most cases of domestic terrorism, it is plausible that they would cooperate in cases of existential terrorism. Historical behavior by China

and Russia shows that they will cooperate in matters threatening their existence—such as when they aided nonproliferation efforts against North Korea in the early 2000s (Einhorn 2022).

CONCLUSION

This essay considered the evolution of terrorism and its effects on international order by looking at terrorism in the past, present, and future through the reintegration of formerly armed actors, domestic terrorism and its international implications, and what terrorism could be in the future, respectively. As it seems, the US-led liberal international order is fundamentally weakened—leaving space for authoritarian adversaries to fill that vacuum. Counterterrorism—however defined—must therefore remain part of the national security toolkit. Future steps should be taken to ensure counterterrorism is also a strength, not an inadequate response to a gaping vulnerability. International efforts to build consensus and share best practices be funded, encouraged, and broadened. Domestic and international terrorism and great power competition are not zero-sum; they are compatible, working in concert to both boost US national security and align its foreign policies with allies (e.g., Hicks 2021; Costa 2022; Sales 2021; Levitt 2021; Clarke 2021). Helping combat terrorism and insurgency at home or abroad will help the US win friends and partners and keep away authoritarian alternatives, ultimately reinforcing the post-Cold War international order. ☆

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CHAPTER 19

INTERNATIONAL LAW, ORDER, AND JUSTICE

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ABSTRACT

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 raised the question of the consequences of the liberal world order's replacement by other forms of world order, which may be described as realist, multiplex, or something else entirely. Key issues in this emerging order include the extent to which states providing arms and intelligence become parties to war, the frequency of state intervention in a foreign conflict, and the future role of multilateral pacification in deterring interstate war. This essay illuminates the challenges to international law and the liberal world order created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and outlines policies the United States can pursue in this emerging security environment.

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that international order is becoming increasingly complex and less liberal. These dynamics hearken back to the some of the more permissive norms prior to the Second World War, when it was more common for states to violate their neighbors' sovereignty. In the post war era, allied powers established stronger legal protections for the norm of sovereignty and reinvigorated the international institutions responsible for upholding these expectations. Russia is now violating many of these international norms and the laws that enforce them. In doing so, Russia has brought to the fore many difficult questions in international law regarding the status of aid-granting states, intervention, and the viability of nonmilitary deterrence methods in a post-liberal world order.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

February 24, 2022, was a crucial turning point for European security. Russia's invasion of Ukraine required countries to reevaluate their own security and analyze the domestic and international implications of providing aid to the Ukrainian effort. Many countries have responded to Russian aggression by delivering weapon systems to the Ukrainian military. International law, however, remains an underutilized asset in the effort to undermine the Russian war effort.

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Several factors influence countries' decisions to grant or increase aid to Ukraine. Politicians, society, the military, and lawyers all shape a country's stance toward providing military assistance to Ukraine. Politicians are the most important deciding factor in this relationship because they must make the final decision to grant aid or not. Society also plays a critical role because leaders must consider public opinion regarding the war to maintain their respect and legitimacy. Third, the military is a key actor in the decision to grant aid, for they have the technical knowledge of battlefield needs to inform what equipment, if any, would assist the war effort. Finally, lawyers assist decisions by providing expertise regarding the Law of Armed Conflict and UN Charter laws.

However, legal institutions have not clearly and consistenly distinguished between self-defense versus military assistance on request (de Wet 2020). (de Wet 2020). Since the war began, Ukraine has been utilizing every means at its disposal to accrue military assistance by request. What level of aid makes a state a direct party in the conflict? The answer to this question carries serious consequences for the United States and the many states providing material assistance to Ukraine.

Rafal Tarnogorski (2023) argues that providing arms and intelligence to victims of illegal warfare does not make a state a party in the war. Tarnogorski bases his argument on the recognition of Article 103 in the UN Charter, which states:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Character shall prevail (U.N. Charter, Art. 103).

This provision provides the justification for states to grant Ukraine the assistance it needs without becoming a belligerent in the conflict due to the illegal nature of the war (Tarnogorski 2023). The Russian invasion violated international law, granting member states both the basis to not only condemn Russia for its actions, but also the right to support a victim of illegal warfare by providing arms and other material support.

Ukraine's requests for military assistance are lawful, but the legality of state actions in response to these requests must be carefully considered (Schmitt 2022). The war in Ukraine has provided ample opportunity for testing many technological advancements, such as integrating cyber and space operations and producing 3D-printed weapons (Nasu 2022; Goines et al., 2022). For many of these advancements, laws have not kept pace with technology, thus much of their legality remains undetermined. In addition, Ukraine's status as a victim of an illegal war leads it to criticize the existing international order, in particular, the UN collective security system. Despite Ukraine's free hand in seeking aid, states granting aid must always consider the political and legal ramifications of their actions both in the short-term, in responding to Russia's invasion, and in the longer term as precedents for future conflicts (Tarnogorski 2023).

AID IN A REALIST INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The war in Ukraine is the most recent demonstration that the fight for human rights is unyielding and constant, despite the mechanisms born from the liberal international order that attempts to protect them. The international human rights regime inherently relies upon liberal order (Hopgood 2022; Lake et al. 2021), sustained both by normative and institutional frameworks that support its end (Peak 2023). Since the horrors of the Holocaust during World War II, nations began to act out of a moral obligation to intervene in humanitarian crises, but now that motivation may be evolving due to the increasingly realist nature of the international order.

In the most idealistic vision of the liberal international order, states were frequently considered to be motivated by ideological crusades, with the United States leading the cause for democracy and freedom. This perspective characterized many conflicts stemming from the Cold War, as battles were fought for the Western way of life. Despite this historical characterization, the functions at work in the liberal international order have always been realist as well, and more obviously so in today's conflicts.

Russia's recent actions and many states' responses suggest the world is returning to an international order increasingly governed by realist logic. Peak (2023a) explores this transition in his analysis of states' intervention in genocides. Regardless of whether the motivations for intervention are realist or liberal, Peak finds states will continue to intervene to stop genocides (Peak 2023b). A great power, for instance, may be willing to lend its materiel and political support to generate social capital and to be perceived as a good leader in the eyes of the states they wish to influence (Peak 2023a).

The same argument can be applied to intervention efforts in Ukraine. Most states have limited their role in the conflict to supplying arms to the Ukrainians. The absence of boots on the ground results from intervening states' realist considerations taking precedent over moral obligation, further signaling realist limits to liberal principles of intervention. Given the predictable result of this cost-benefit analysis, it is understandable why even liberal states continue to respect Russia's red lines rather than directly involve themselves in the conflict.

MULTILATERAL PACIFICATION – A POSSIBLE DETERRENT?

Despite the inability of current international legal systems to act as a deterrent against human rights violations and illegal warfare, there are other nonmilitary means at countries' disposal to exact justice for Russian aggression and prevent similar actions in the future. Multilateral pacification, the "use of decentralized interstate cooperation to threaten the use of sanctions to forestall use of military power in a particular region or against particular states," can mitigate the risk of conflict escalation or initiation by minimizing its scope and intensity through targeted sanctions that can hinder or deter a state's actions (Levshin 2023).

Levshin (2023) argues that multilateral pacification can be useful for alleviating the burden of systemic risk and preventing wars from escalating. Alliances and other forms of interstate coordination allow states to negotiate the expected costs of being dragged into a conflict where they would otherwise prefer to remain neutral. According to Levshin, the institutional design of multilateral pacification has three main dimensions: orientation, function, and membership. Orientation identifies who the states desire to pacify, and its function and membership detail which

states conduct the pacification and by what means. Historical examples of multilateral pacification include cases of permanent neutralization, multilateral guarantees, collective security, and collective defense. Each form of multilateral pacification embodies a decision about whom to pacify and at what cost—i.e., how to achieve optimal cost-efficiency under different topographies of systemic risk. Given the emergence of an increasingly realist international order, multilateral pacification may be a powerful nonmilitary deterrent to interstate war since states increasingly value material self-interest over ideological pursuits.

In practice, neither the threat nor the imposition of sanctions deterred Russia from invading Ukraine. But the concept of multilateral pacification may prove valuable in understanding why this conflict has not escalated more rapidly than it has. Suppose neighboring states had not been fortified by collective defense, collective security, and other forms of multilateral pacification. In that case, they may have found themselves dragged into the conflict as full co-belligerents with their own troops on the ground. As of this writing, multilateral pacification has helped to avoid that escalatory scenario—and it may help to prevent escalation in future conflicts as well.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The emergence of a post-liberal order – one that may be characterized as realist, "multiplex" (Acharya 2017), or something else entirely – has implications for a range of issues, including belligerent status in international law, foreign intervention in conflicts, and nonmilitary deterrence methods. We offer the following policy recommendations by way of conclusion:
International law. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated (as of this writing) that states can grant assistance without becoming belligerents. It has also demonstrated that international law still serves to rally support for nations suffering from illegal invasions. The United States should therefore strive to strengthen recognition of international law and adapt it to the emerging technologies being deployed in Ukraine.

***Intervention*.** The emerging international order will not necessarily entail a reduction in the number of state interventions, whether for self-interested or humanitarian reasons. How states intervene may change from direct deployment of a nation's soldiers ("boots on the ground") to more indirect means consistent with the state's self-interest. The United States should take this change into account in considering the way it intervenes in conflicts and the sort of intervention it can reasonably expect from allies.

***Multilateral pacification*.** Interstate cooperation to sanction a particular state (or threaten sanctions) remains a powerful tool to prevent conflict escalation. The United States should take its failure to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an occasion to expand options for multilateral pacification, not as an indication that this means of preventing conflict and limiting the escalation of existing conflicts is obsolete.

These are just some of the policies the United States should pursue to strengthen its international position through its engagement in the Ukraine conflict. Although the emerging international order will alter international law, state intervention, and the role of multilateral pacification, all three themes discussed here will remain relevant to the future of U.S. national security. ☆

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PART V. POLITICAL ECONOMIES & INTERNATIONAL ORDER

CHAPTER 20

FINANCE, ECONOMICS, STRATEGY AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Russia's war on Ukraine and the rise of China are raising serious questions about order in international politics. If the West is to have a fighting chance at maintaining its military supremacy and upholding global order, it needs to answer some fundamental questions about the United States (US)-led alliance system and what is expected of allies. This essay addresses burden-sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the US focuses its attention on China and the Indo-Pacific, greater responsibility for the security of Europe seems likely to fall on European shoulders.

After nearly 80 years of the US underwriting European security with material and human resources, will recent shocks be enough to spur Europeans to do more for their own defense? If so, how much more? We argue that the shocks should be enough to elicit significant additional defense efforts. NATO's Vilnius Summit in July 2023 is a key opportunity to address the question of how much more spending the shocks merit, and, more precisely, articulate the capabilities that additional spending is directed toward.

This essay offers three primary observations: first, gearing up for an era of great power competition means that NATO and EU members need to increase defense spending and need better data metrics to ascertain their real commitment to defense. Second, the 2023 Vilnius Summit may result in 2% becoming the baseline rather than the ceiling for allied defense spending, but defense should also address the quality of defense spending. Third, EU states and European NATO allies will come under increasing pressure to boost defense spending, and increased spending will be at the heart of transatlantic unity. Questions remain about Europe's ability to take on more of the defense burden.

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Russia's war on Ukraine and the rise of China are raising serious questions about order in international politics: the collapse of arms control treaties, the weaponization of raw materials and technologies, and the use of unconventional tactics to subvert international law and prey on

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vulnerable countries are the hallmarks of the emerging order. For most of the West, there is a need to re-learn the fundamentals of power. The risks posed by nuclear-armed adversaries and their greater reliance on war and aggression means that there can be no substitute for sustained investments in Western militaries: defense and deterrence are again the order of the day (Horovitz and Arndt, 2023). However, if the West is to have a fighting chance at maintaining its military supremacy and upholding global order, it must answer some fundamental questions about its alliance system and what is expected of allies.

This essay examines the West's military alliances, mainly focusing on burden-sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In order for the United States (US) to focus on China and the Indo-Pacific, Europeans must bear more of the responsibility for securing Europe. Seventy-eight years after the conclusion of the Second World War and 73 years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, during which time US material and human resources have underwritten European Security, Europe is already late in doing more for its own defense – but there is no time like the present. While any systemic decoupling of the transatlantic alliance should be avoided, the current distribution of responsibility for European security – including supporting Ukraine's defense of its territory – is not sustainable. Europeans must do more.

THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

The first line of defense of the Western world and Europe is NATO, which is underwritten by American power. The alliance's (and allies') contributions to collective defense can be seen as imperfect public goods in that it is non-rivalrous (one ally's consumption of it does not impinge others) but is partially excludable because allies *can* derive private benefits from their own investments in national defense (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Cornes and Sandler 1984). The current arrangement benefits all members and ensures all allies feel secure, but responsibility-sharing remains unequal – the US has traditionally made an outsized contribution to collective defense. As we saw with the previous US administration, however, the question of burden-sharing is a deeply political issue that underlies the healthy management of NATO. While they represent over half of transatlantic GDP, NATO's European allies represented less than a third of defense spending in 2021. While European defense spending has increased since the 2014 Wales Pledge, Europeans have generally failed to meet the "2% of GDP" pledge at the heart of NATO's defense investment plans, and many still do despite Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine with only seven allies meeting the 2% pledge in 2022. However, with the US increasingly focusing on defense and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, calls for Europe to do more for its defense will only become louder – regardless of who sits in the White House.

We have already seen how questions of burden-sharing in NATO are intensely political, and NATO as an organization has had to adapt to pressure from Washington in this regard. To this end, in 2017, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined the importance of "cash, capabilities and contributions" to capture what individual NATO allies bring to the alliance (Stoltenberg, 2017). At a time when former President Trump was calling for more investment in defense, NATO headquarters was at pains to show that commitment to the alliance could be measured in more than just defense spending. The reality, however, is that arguments for greater spending rang more loudly than any appreciation for commitments to military operations or what capabilities NATO allies were purchasing – even when acquired from the US.

There are, of course, numerous academic studies that have probed the realities of burden-sharing in NATO. Some scholars have argued that free-riding in NATO is an overblown argument, not least because there are questions about the causal link between increased defense spending and influence in Washington – top European defense spenders do not necessarily enjoy a closer relationship to the US (Kuokstyte, Kuokstis and Miklasevskaja, 2020). This same school argues that burden-sharing and free-riding should be understood in a geographical and temporal context – free-riding may fluctuate over time and depend on geopolitical circumstances (Kuokstyte, 2023). Another school of thought argues that many European NATO allies are not really driven by geopolitical or strategic considerations when planning their defense expenditure (Becker, 2021). Instead, the analysis and data show that regional political economies drive burden-sharing choices.

"SPENDING MORE, SPENDING BETTER"

The idea that NATO countries have to 'spend more and spend better' is not new, but the specific dynamics of spending better are often overlooked. Whenever political leaders speak about the need to increase defense budgets, analysts immediately consider a country's overall defense expenditure, expressed in real terms or as a percentage of GDP (NATO, 2022). Such a metric forms the basis for NATO's "2% of GDP" target. Of course, many analysts have already questioned the value of such meta-metrics (Schuette, 2021), not least because, in some cases, they may be artificially reached by allies due to inflation or budget cuts – it historically takes defense longer to feel budgetary cuts, and this raises defense spending artificially against other areas of government spending. For example, during the Covid-19 crisis, there was a risk – that did not eventually materialize – that as the GDP rates of European countries decreased, the share of defense spending as a percentage of overall GDP would artificially increase, all while not doing anything to raise real rates of defense spending (Barrie, Childs, McGerty, 2020).

Therefore, discussing top-line defense spending figures occurs we should immediately focus on the overall quality of the spending (Dunne and Becker, 2023). In other words, there is a need to focus on precisely *what* alliance defense spending is geared toward. Fortunately, scholars have already attempted to disaggregate military expenditure in NATO, and this has led to at least four main baskets of spending: 1) equipment costs (e.g., weapons systems); 2) personnel costs (e.g., payroll and social costs for civilian and military employees); 3) operations and management costs (e.g., spare parts, supplies, and utilities); and 4) infrastructure costs (e.g., fixed military installations) (Becker et al., 2022). Both NATO and the EU have established a "20% target" for equipment modernization as part of the allies' and member states' overall investment in defense. However, the data reveals that more than half of spending (56.5%) went to personnel costs, 24% went to Operations and Maintenance (O&M), 15.75% on equipment, and 2.7% on infrastructure (Becker and Dunne, 2021).

Disaggregating defense spending in this way is important, especially in an alliance setting, so we can enhance transparency and get a better handle on the state of burden-sharing. In this sense, if collective defense is to have any real meaning, then allies have a vested interest in knowing where each dollar or euro is being spent. The lack of transparency in NATO countries certainly does not help overcome suspicion and accusations of free-riding among allies – mutual

trust is at the heart of any alliance, yet trust can be eroded without transparency on spending outputs. Today's reality is that the data and accounting methods of defense spending in several NATO countries are not conducive to producing a realistic and clear-eyed picture of allied commitments due to a lack of transparency. A lack of transparency may damage NATO's ability to identify vulnerabilities or gaps in its defense innovation and capability suite.

We should also not neglect the importance of public opinion concerning defense spending. Historical evidence suggests that governments have found creative ways to raise capital from society for defense. Traditionally, we have considered defense investment as the result of taxation, borrowing, or a reduction of public spending in other areas of government budgets. Work on "financial repression" has shown that governments can raise defense spending by, for example, offering political incentives to the banking sector to provide loans to security providers (DiGiuseppe, 2015). The benefit of such steps is a less transparent form of raising capital that will not incur the attention or displeasure of the public (DiGiuseppe, 2023). Although there is a need for further evidence of this type of action, it should alter us to the myriad ways governments can raise capital for defense. This is important given that NATO countries will seek to increase spending relative to rivals and competitors, and fully understanding how Russia and China may use "financial repression" for defense spending is necessary if we are to have a complete picture of what Beijing and Moscow are likely to spend in the future.

EUROPE'S BURDEN?

Ever since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Europeans have been called upon to support Kyiv with financial assistance, military advisory capacities, and military equipment. As part of this effort, vulnerabilities in Europe's defense manufacturing capacities have been exposed to challenges associated with production times and scale for basic supplies such as ammunition. Even though the EU has developed new ways of delivering and reimbursing the military equipment sent to Ukraine, Europe still falls short of American levels of military support. For example, whereas the US is estimated to have delivered €44.3 billion in military equipment to Ukraine since January 2022, the EU27 have delivered approximately €10.7 billion over the same period (Kiel Institute, 2023). In this respect, the EU has delivered the bulk of non-military financial assistance to Ukraine since January 2022 rather than military equipment – by January 2023, the EU Institutions had provided €30.3 billion to Ukraine compared to €25.1 billion by the US (Kiel Institute, 2023).

Despite Europe's support for Ukraine, however, the continent's commitment to defense cannot simply be measured in terms of the legacy equipment and ammunition it hands to the Ukrainian armed forces. Indeed, European investments in defense are required to ensure collective defense and deterrence – not simply to deter current and future Russian aggression but also to help manage future military friction with rising powers such as China. In this respect, several European countries have invested in a relatively rapid fashion in new equipment (Runkel and Lawrence, 2023). Countries such as Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have moved quickly to buy air defense systems; others such as Finland, Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands have procured next-generation fighter aircraft such as the F35; Poland has procured battle tanks and howitzers and the Netherlands have agreed to acquire howitzers too; and others, like France, have prioritized seabed warfare and nuclear modernization. This is a very material contribution to NATO and EU defense (Boswinkel, 2023).

In the future, however, Europe will be challenged to sustain defense investment. The level of ambition shown so far is quite underwhelming: only €8 billion over seven years under the European Defense Fund, €5 billion over seven years for military assistance, and a proposed €500 million for a short-term, two-year financial vehicle to support ammunition production. While all these figures represent a real breakthrough in how the EU approaches defense spending – for years, the question of using EU funds for defense was taboo – these amounts are too timid for the strategic reality facing Europe today. This is why some have called for a massive and sustained increase in defense investment (Bergmann and Haddad, 2022). Looking at EU action during the Covid-19 recovery period, the European Commission initially borrowed up to €100 billion for economic support (Christie, Claeys, and Weil, 2021). Why not something similar for defense?

Such a financial level of ambition would be more than welcome for Europe's contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing. However, the EU is still hamstrung by several structural factors that impede bolder action on defense. For one thing, Europe does not have an integrated banking and financial system, which certainly cannot be likened to the US federal system. Borrowing for EU strategic projects cannot yet rely on mutualized debt. European states still protect and promote national banking (and defense industrial) champions for their benefit rather than EU-level or NATO efforts. The truth is that, despite the steps taken in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the European banking system is still too fragmented, and governments are not prepared to leverage existing financial sources found under the European Investment Bank. European nations will struggle to finance collective defense without a proper banking union that integrates capital markets and allows for more fluid cross-border transactions.

TOWARD AND BEYOND VILNIUS

This essay has addressed the issue of transatlantic burden-sharing, and we underlined the importance for Europe to become far more ambitious on defense spending. We have focused on the steps the West needs to take to maintain the order it has enjoyed for several decades. Russia's war on Ukraine clearly undermines international order and the long-established principle of territorial sovereignty. Europe has stepped-up its game and realized that the geographical proximity of the war means it needs to invest in military equipment and overcome political taboos in defense. Yet, without US support, Europe's effort would likely have been inadequate (and may not have happened without US leadership and coordination): clearly, the US continues to undergird the NATO alliance in critical ways.

However, Europeans need to read the runes of the coming years. The primary structural issue today in international politics is China. The US has underlined its resolve to respond to this rise and its destabilizing effects and has focused on the Indo-Pacific theatre (White House, 2022). Europe may not see China through a military lens, but the coming era of great power competition could see a return to war between states. The NATO alliance and the EU need to come to terms with the challenge posed by China. In this respect, while there is growing attention to securing supply chains and reshoring manufacturing capacity, there can be no substitute for military power. When leaders sit down at Vilnius in the summer of 2023, they need a new vision for collective defense not only pegged to top-line defense spending: we need to see a real commitment to the quality of this spend through equipment modernization and investment, overhaul and maintenance, defense innovation and munitions, in addition to personnel. ☆

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CHAPTER 21

MONEY AND FINANCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

The United States (US)-led world order that has prevailed for the past few decades is being contested by rival powers such as China. A crucial aspect of great power competition is economic statecraft, and China is skilfully fusing various aspects of its economic diplomacy and financial strength to undermine the US and its allies. China's rise occurs in a specific context: the looming challenge of a more decentralized global economy marked by non-state actors and alternative currencies. Maintaining the US dollar's dominance has become a key plank of Washington's overall grand strategy toward China. However, the West still needs to collectively develop a coherent strategy for economic statecraft. This note outlines and analyses the prevailing global economic context, the counter-order being developed by China, and the growing importance of geo-economics for Western countries.

This essay makes three primary observations. First, Western countries need to reflect on their economic statecraft, as they are not sufficiently calibrated for the growing geo-economic aspects of great power competition. Second, China is spearheading a counter-order to the American-led economic system that has prevailed for decades. Beijing is using capital, resources, and dependencies to accrue power. Third, economic statecraft in the West must focus on maintaining the supremacy of currencies and raw material stocks while also safeguarding against privately-controlled cryptocurrencies and revitalizing its economic diplomacy with developing countries.

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Over the past three decades, the global order has been governed by the rules and institutions set down by the United States (US) and the wider West. Undoubtedly, globalization has led to increased trade, and this has contributed to a reduction in poverty and higher standards of living across the globe. China has been one of the main beneficiaries of this trend. Yet, rising incomes and integrated markets have become somewhat of a double-edged sword because

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distribution of resources means war will result in high economic costs. The idea that globalization, interdependence, and trade will bring world peace has been challenged. If anything, broader access to wealth, industry, and capital has led to the military modernization of states that want to subvert the very order that led to their development. This essay looks at how rival powers such as China use economic statecraft to enhance their relative power and subvert the Western order that has prevailed since at least 1944.

US-CHINA GEO-ECONOMIC RIVALRY

China has emerged as a major economic power, but the Chinese state is ruled by a single, authoritarian political entity called the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and modern Chinese society organizes industry according to the needs of the party-state under an integrated global strategy. In this sense, the Chinese "state-capitalist" model differs from the economic models found in the US and Europe. The CCP finds itself in a position to align its economic and geopolitical strategy. For example, the CCP has at times offered negative real interest rates to subsidize loans to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), fuelling Chinese firms' global expansion, drowning out fair competition, and supercharging the industrial development of China and its partners. While Russia sits on a vast array of resources and appears closer to the Chinese economic model today, the world is steadily bifurcating between the US and Chinese economic models.

An inconvenient truth, however, is that the US and China are still locked in an economic relationship of convenience. The wealthy consumer base in the US and Europe supports the Chinese economy by importing its goods. We have only recently seen measures to "reshore" manufacturing capacity back to the US and Europe and protect key industries such as semiconductors. Given the economic interdependencies between the economies of the West and China, and in the context of growing strategic rivalry, a greater focus on economic security is expected. However, this focus cannot be confined to lowering trade and technology dependencies. Ensuring that Chinese technologies cannot be used for espionage, surveillance, and/or sabotage (e.g., 5G) remains an important priority. However, Western countries need to consider global competition's more structural economic features, including currencies.

The US has dominated the global financial system for decades, but a question – considering the growing US-China competition – is whether China can disrupt the supremacy of the US dollar. Should the Chinese yuan effectively challenge the dollar in parts of the global financial system, capital flows could easily shift in China's favor. China and its like-minded partners have a vested interest in weakening the dollar, even if they do not want the responsibility and cost of becoming the world's reserve currency. Moreover, China has a stake in not weakening state power in global currency markets more generally (St-Pierre and Kao, 2023). Indeed, in 2021 the CCP outlawed crypto trading and mining. Such steps were taken as the rise of bitcoin led to capital outflows from China and a depreciation of the renminbi.

CREATING THE COUNTER-ORDER

The US dollar will likely maintain its dominance for the foreseeable future, but China can erode US and Western economic power in other ways – not least by deploying infrastructure and aid programs to influence the global balance of power. China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) is both infrastructure and aid development because it aims to increase interdependencies between Beijing and developing countries. China seeks to use the BRI to not only globally promote its

SOEs and norms but to ensure that the developing world sides with Beijing in geopolitical matters too. To this end, China coats its interactions with normative pleas to historical anti-colonial movements, all while pursuing its national interests.

Beyond infrastructure investments, development aid is another area where states can influence global affairs without necessarily incurring domestic political opposition. Luo (2023) finds that governments can choose, say, World Bank Trust Funds to ensure that bilateral aid payments are made consistently over time without the risk of being canceled or modified by changes in government. The theory is that governments will make payments through the Trust Funds to ensure a commitment to development aid and to direct payments to individual countries, which is harder to achieve under multilateral funds dispersed to multiple countries at any given time. Such a theory is aimed mainly at democratic states, where governments are reactive to domestic support for or opposition to development aid. A puzzle in this regard falls on non-democratic states such as China, where development aid can be part of a longer-term strategy directed by the party-state without fear of any public backlash.

Despite the BRI's challenges, the CCP holds to the idea of investing US$1 trillion until 2027 in infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and ports in over 70 countries (Wei, 2022). The challenge facing China is how to effectively leverage the potential of infrastructure projects under the BRI when recipient states do not choose to share China's normative view of the world or interests in international fora such as the United Nations. In such cases, China needs more than economic inducements, so it may choose instead to use its diplomatic and military power to coerce BRI partners. China is already opening military bases in Africa (Tanchum, 2021).

China's efforts have given rise to the US and European Union (EU) alternatives called the Build Back Better World (B3W) and Global Gateway initiatives. These initiatives offer developing countries an alternative because the major fear is that the sustainability of the BRI could be called into question – any major economic shock in China or a change in the CCP's economic strategy could choke inward investment flows to developing nations, which would be destabilizing.

Alternatively, the growing dependency of developing countries on China could play into Beijing's hands for more than just economic reasons. For example, if these countries default on debt payments, they could become even more dependent on China because these financial agreements are often collateralized with rights to critical infrastructure. This, in turn, could lead developing countries to "hand over" strategic assets to China in the form of ownership over critical industries such as electricity and power generation or favorable concessions for infrastructure such as ports. High-profile cases in Ecuador and Sri Lanka already point to some of the fears associated with the BRI.

Furthermore, evidence suggests that China will use its vast wealth in critical raw materials to control global supply chains (van Wieringen and Alvarez, 2022). China's economic relations with many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are also partly predicated on the strategy of securing further global supplies of raw materials and precious minerals (Laurance, 2017). Both the US and the EU are taking steps to ensure access to supplies of materials. Still, the major challenge facing Western countries is that resource needs will only increase with the technological demands of the digital economy. We already see how governments in the West are becoming more aware of the importance of critical minerals: in 2018, the US listed 35 minerals that were

deemed critical for the economy and national security, but this list was increased to 50 in 2022 (US Geological Survey, 2022) 2005).

THE CURRENCY OF POWER

In addition to the counter-order being pushed by China and its partners, there is a need to think about the overall health of the global financial system. Its vulnerabilities and evolution could hold major consequences for the dominance of the Western-led financial system. Again, currencies come into play. Cryptocurrencies seek to circumvent state authority by verifying transactions and maintaining records with a cryptographically based and decentralized system. Although China and other countries have sought to ban or strictly control cryptocurrencies, we are still experiencing high adoption rates in emerging markets, and bitcoin even bounced back within months of China's ban (Woelfel, 2021). While cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology still fail to substitute traditional government-backed currencies and are yet to be tested as viable alternatives on a global scale, they are an issue of concern to governments.
The regulation of cryptocurrencies might be one of the few areas where China and the US currently agree. However, China appears to be on a much more aggressive path for implementing a central bank digital currency, which could be quite disruptive. The global economy has traditionally functioned based on state-backed currencies, allowing governments to both regulate the global economy and exercise state power (e.g., central banks manage prices and inflation). For this very reason, however, advocates of cryptocurrencies tend to be ideologically opposed to the central role of the state in the global financial system, and cryptocurrencies are seen as a way of decentralizing financial transactions without a role for the state.

Questioning the role of governments clearly threatens to up-end traditional forms of global economic and financial governance. Here, crypto entrepreneurs seek – but have so far failed - to replace the state's traditional role of maintaining trust in the economic system between sellers and buyers. Indeed, the increasing uptake and use of cryptocurrencies threaten to make it harder for the West to impose sanctions on hostile individuals, firms, or states. For example, cryptocurrencies have the potential to skirt the SWIFT banking system entirely, which is problematic given that SWIFT handles more than 44 million financial messages per day (Swift, 2023).

Let us also not overlook the important public policy concerns raised by cryptocurrencies. For example, no agreed international tax system exists for goods and services traded with cryptocurrencies. Again, tax-free trading through cryptocurrencies might be an attractive proposition for some, but tax avoidance and evasion through cryptocurrencies can undermine state tax-takes and dent public budgets for critical spending areas such as defense. In this respect, we might expect the rise of cryptocurrencies to overlap with the creation of new tax havens and expanded illicit activity, which could be instrumentalized by state rivals and criminal organizations.

Relying on cryptocurrencies also implies a greater need to enhance cybersecurity protocols and the protection of the electronic information network. Again, there are questions about whether a decentralized currency has the resources or political authority to provide such security and assurances. The US and its partners have a vested interest in not seeing cryptocurrencies finance illicit economic activities. With this decentralized currency system in place, tracing and punishing

illegal activities would certainly be harder – some research already claims that 23% of all cryptocurrency transactions are associated with criminal activities (Europol, 2021).

The challenge facing the West and China in the coming years is how to benefit from digitalized banking while still being able to control the negative effects of this evolution in financial markets, including greater control of these currencies by private entities. Both the US and EU are exploring the benefits and possibilities of introducing a "digital dollar" or "digital euro," but both have taken a somewhat cautious approach to the issue. For its part, China has been more adventurous in pursuing a "digital yuan," and the government sees it as a way to boost domestic equality and economic growth. Thus, while China, the US, and Europe all want to maintain political control over innovative currencies, the full geo-economic implications of introducing digital currencies are unknown, but some features are becoming clearer. This includes how China could utilize a "digital yuan" to facilitate cross-border payments to reduce the impact of US sanctions (Greene, 2023).

Of course, having in place a "digital currency" also presupposes monetary and financial stability, and this is an ongoing challenge for relatively new currencies such as the euro. Indeed, analysis has shown that aside from designing a "digital euro," the banking sector in Europe is still vulnerable in many respects (Véron, 2023). Although the European banking supervision brought in after the last financial crisis has been critical for resolving the euro area crisis, the EU has not gone far enough on banking oversight and governance. Moreover, even if the EU did go far enough on banking governance, there would remain significant national idiosyncrasies regarding taxation, consumer protection, corporate and personal insolvency law, housing, and pension finances, and more.

THE DEMANDS OF DOMINANCE

In this essay, we have discussed some of the geo-economic undercurrents at play in the rivalry between the US and China. Clearly, strategic rivals like China are interested in challenging – while not fully replacing – the dominance of the US dollar, but we have also touched upon the interplay between finances and infrastructure, aid, and currencies. The logic that has guided this essay is a belief that state planners in Western countries are still behind the curve in developing strategies of economic statecraft. While it is true that the US, the EU, Australia, Japan, and others are rapidly developing their economic security strategies, we have tried to show how capital flows, debt, and economic dependencies form an intricate web of vulnerabilities for Western countries. It is unclear how digital currencies will develop in the future, but we see significant risks in this unconventional currency, which could give rise to decentralized financial flows and more organized crime.

The combination of US power and the primacy of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency has been the foundation for the growth of democracies around the world. Still, the risks associated with the rise of rival power centers and currencies are clear. Today, the US dollar is faced with growing competition in currency markets. China seeks to use the renminbi to lure states worldwide into its economic orbit. The major challenge for the Western world today is how China can combine its currency ambitions with other tools of economic statecraft, including infrastructure projects through the BRI, instrumentalizing debt in developing countries, and using its relative wealth in critical raw materials to control global supply chains.

The solution to these growing challenges is far from simple. As Western countries continue to use sanctions, tariffs, and technology controls to challenge rivals, states caught in the crosshairs of

such measures may be tempted to align with China in acts of self-preservation. This observation is not a call to lower the sanctions imposed on Russia, but it is an invitation for the West to think about all its other diplomatic relationships around the world in places such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. China today finds it far too easy to pull out the “colonialism” card against the West, but the world should be reminded that China is in, many respects, engaged in a form of “neo-colonialism” in many parts of the world (Kleven, 2019). So far, Western countries have not developed with a compelling narrative and strategy that can rival China. ☆

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CHAPTER 22

MONEY AND FINANCE: THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR AND ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

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ABSTRACT

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West has looked to support Kyiv and impose crushing economic measures on the Russian economy. Sanctions and divestment have punctured a hole in Russia's warfighting machine, but there are also fears that the Kremlin has been able to use a form of economic statecraft to weather the storm. If Ukraine is to succeed in defeating Russia, and if the West is serious about ensuring that Russia's ability to wage future war is severely dented, then a greater focus on Russia's economic statecraft is required. Russia has used an effective suite of tools to ensure the Russian economy is relatively protected from the West. Moreover, the growing vassalization of Russia to Chinese power will likely to alter the global order that has prevailed for decades, but it also puts pressure on Europe to invest in defense and make a more meaningful contribution to the transatlantic alliance.

* * *

This essay offers three primary observations: first, Western states have imposed stinging sanctions on Russia, and this policy should continue to dent the Kremlin's economic power base, as well as support Ukraine. Second, Russia has developed ways of weathering the economic storm through a form of economic statecraft that draws on its experiences during the Soviet era. Third, although Russia and China pose a military challenge to global order, the West should not overlook how Russia and China will collectively enhance their economic statecraft strateges.

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One of the immediate responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 200 has been the imposition of crushing sanctions on the Russian economy. The aim of these sanctions, apart from their retributive power, has been to severely damage Russia's war fighting abilities. Yet, even with these sanctions in place the Kremlin continues to use economic statecraft to cushion the blow. For example, while Europeans have drastically reduced their dependence on Russian energy sources, Moscow still exports to global markets at nearly the same pre-war scale, which helps it generate the revenue needed to support the Russian economy. We should also recall that Russia has traditionally weaponized energy dependencies, so new energy export links may provide Moscow with leverage in other parts of the world.

If Ukraine is to succeed in defeating Russia, and if the West is serious about ensuring that Russia's ability to wage future war is severely dented, then a greater focus on Russia's economic statecraft is required, in addition to Europe stepping up its game on defense investments. This note focuses on how Russia has adapted to changing economic circumstances and details important aspects of the Kremlin's approach to economic statecraft. Moreover, the note looks at the growing vassalization of Russia to Chinese power and how it is likely to alter the global economic order that has prevailed for decades.

THE RUBLE IN THE RUBBLE?

Quite understandably, the West's support for Ukraine in the wake of Russia's military invasion has minds focused mainly on the military effort. We are confronted with scenes on a daily basis of brave Ukrainian soldiers fighting in drenched trenches reminiscent of the First World War. Yet, beyond the fighting fields in Ukraine, there is a wider story of Russia's attempts to increase its power status. While it is true that territorial land grabs through military force is a key component of Russia's geopolitical strategy, we cannot overlook its wider interest in competing with the West more generally, and the United States (US), in particular. Russia is interested in diluting the power of the US and the West by supporting rival blocks and carving out "spheres of interest" for itself. Yet, its military is not the only way it seeks to compete with the West: its economy is another.

While there is rightfully confidence that the sanctions imposed on Russia will drastically constrain the Russian economy at some point, Western countries have to be wary of Russia's ability to adapt to changing economic circumstances. To this end, Russia uses a sophisticated pool of macroeconomic specialists educated and cultivated during the Cold War – a time when the Soviet economy was also undergoing economic pressures despite being one of two global powers. Individuals such as Elvira Nabiullina – the governor of the Russian central bank – are often depicted as economic modernizers, but she earned her spurs working in economic development, trade, and industry during the post-Soviet period and the rise of Putin.

Without overly mythologizing such individuals, their ability to help stabilize the Russian economy in the wake of unprecedented Western sanctions bear some reflection (Chiriac, 2023). In essence, such individuals have been able to use the peculiarities of the Russian economy to their advantage – at least for now. In Russia, market relations between firms and the government are tightly organized, giving the central government far more scope to manipulate the economy for geopolitical ends. Even though Russia cannot be likened to the centrally planned economy under the Soviet state, the so-called "market economy" in Russia is, in fact, largely concentrated in the hands of a few state-controlled oligarchs. In this sense, the strong linkages between state planners, political officials, and economic actors are more reminiscent of the Chinese system.

While Western countries should continue to impose far-reaching sanctions, Russia has been able to weather the economic storm so far by distinguishing between *real capital* and *money capital*. In practice, this means that the Russian state can protect the physical elements of production in critical economic areas such as agriculture, raw materials, and energy (Chiriac, 2023). To this end, Russia is seeking to shield itself from Western sanctions and divestment by protecting its means of production. Thus, while Russia is excluded from international finances via SWIFT, Moscow has been able to stabilize the ruble and ensure that the most basic needs of society are still met. In fact, the ruble appreciated to $/RUB50 last July, nearly six months into the war – the strongest level since late 2014 (Reuters, 2022). Itis unclear how sustainable Russia's reliance on a current account surplus – worth some $227 billion in 2022 (Reuters, 2023) – will be over the medium- to longer-term, especially as it tries to rebuild and modernize its military.

For Western countries, it is important not to fall into the trap of measuring Russia's economy through the favored metrics of liberal economists (e.g., GDP). Indeed, if Russia is able to adjust to economic pressures by protecting its critical industries, this causes a major issue for the West's future relations with Russia. The Kremlin's ability to wage war in the future is conditioned on the health of its productive capacities. True, Russia will likely lose access to critical Western-sourced technologies, but it might largely retain its ability to produce the means of war. In this sense, Russia is not just a major energy producer; it has a raw material base that makes it a continued danger to NATO and neighboring countries.

"IT'S THE GEO-ECONOMY, STUPID!"

One of the more direct lessons from the war on Ukraine is that Western countries cannot measure Russian actions through their liberal mindsets and norms. Another lesson is that Russia will surely try to compensate for its lackluster military performance in Ukraine by focusing on its geo-economic power over the longer-term. Cultivating its industry and using the power of the state to give direction to its economic relations with the world poses a particular challenge for the West. While many have become comfortable with the notion that free market societies are more resilient than state-controlled economies, this does not make authoritarian states and economies any less dangerous. This can be seen in how Russia continues to trade with countries such as China, Turkey, India, and Central Asia.

However, one of the growing issues facing the West is how Russia may seek to offset some of the economic damage it has experienced since the war on Ukraine through closer ties with China. We know that Russia and China agreed to a "no-limits" partnership in early February 2022, and since the war, countries such as China and India have replaced Germany as the world's leading importer of Russian oil and gas. We also know that Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have world views forged through their upbringing in communist systems. For both China and Russia, power is not simply about military force but mobilizing the industrial base to erode the West's economic dominance: keep in mind that for such leaders, the economy means more than just growth, for it links to ideologically informed understandings of inequality and development. As Xi Jinping stated during a speech to senior Chinese officials in February 2023, China's economy must be more efficient than Western capitalist economies, and it should seek its non-western route to economic development (Bloomberg, 2023).

We have already seen Russia and China become closer concerning capital flows, with Moscow keen to gain access to China's money markets and capital investment. Closer financial and economic ties between Russia and China could eventually undermine the role of the US dollar, and we have seen how the two countries have announced plans to create a parallel capital transfer system to SWIFT largely based on China's existing Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). True, some caution that China and Russia do not presently have the financial reach of SWIFT and that capital and payment transactions under CIPS still only represented 6% of the global total in 2020. However, it is unclear today to what extent CIPS will become the major transactions system in the Indo-Pacific in the future, with countries such as India – with huge existing and future financial stakes – reportedly interested in a rival payments system to the dollar and euro.

Of course, economic statecraft also involves the instrumentalization of technology and the fundamentals of economic life, such as energy and food. We have, therefore, seen bold steps in Western countries against the use of services offered by Chinese companies such as Huawei and TikTok. Yet, focusing on how Russia and China develop strategies to potentially up-end the West in capital markets is equally, if not more, important than the more blatant instruments of economic statecraft. One of the West's major concerns is that, at a time when the Communist Party has exerted far greater control over the Chinese economy, Western capital is still being invested in China's economy (Hellendoorn, 2022). Yet, this is beginning to change in some areas, with reports indicating a loss of confidence in the Chinese economy (AmCham China, 2023) and one figure showing a 73% decline in foreign direct investment in China from July to December 2022 (Kowate, 2023). Despite this more cautious approach, billions of dollars are still being invested in China's economy in areas such as vehicle battery technology, and this marks a core vulnerability for Western businesses that could be used by authorities in Beijing and, by extension, Moscow.

However, it would be a mistake to only view Russia's approach to economic statecraft through the prism of closer Sino-Russian ties. In fact, there is evidence to show that Russia has been using its current account surpluses to lend to capital-starved borrowers in the non-Western world. Such investments did not begin with Russia's war on Ukraine, but the crisis has lent greater credence to Russia's need to generate economic dependencies globally. Thus, research has shown how Russia has been prepared to invest in countries even China largely avoids, including Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and more (Svoboda, 2022). Russia seeks to invest in fragile countries for a multitude of reasons, including raw materials and using economic ties to undermine Western interests in international fora, all while using para-military organizations like the Wagner Group to ensure the stability of investments and the political narrative of "anti-colonialism." For example, while 143 out of 193 states voted to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly in October 2022, 35 countries from Central Asia and Africa, representing nearly half of the world's global population abstained (Serhan, 2022).

TOWARDS A WESTERN STRATEGY OF STATECRAFT?

In this essay, we have argued that Russia's economic statecraft should give Western countries even more reason to try and out-compete authoritarian states. There is no real coherent Western blueprint for economic statecraft today, even if the contours of an approach are becoming clearer. This can be seen in the steps to "reshore" critical industrial capacities back in the West and lower dependence on authoritarian states. We have also seen senior leaders in the EU, such as the President of the European Commission, call for the Union to de-risk its diplomatic and economic relations with China (Von der Leyen, 2023). In the specific case of energy, we have seen how Europe has moved quickly to cut its fossil fuel dependency on Russia and that this dependency did not lead to tacit support for Russia's actions in Ukraine in Europe (Becker and Lanoszka, 2023). Yet, the EU is only getting started understanding the scale of Russian state-backed assets held in European banks. There is still some way to go for Europe to place the maximum economic pressure on Russia. Beyond such measures, however, the challenge posed by growing ties between Russia and China requires a rethink about how Western countries protect their economic interests.

Clearly, Washington increasingly recognizes that the federal government has an important role to play in safeguarding US economic interests. This is the logic behind the Inflation Reduction Act, which seeks to support US industry and jobs through financial incentives worth $500 billion and tax incentives for clean energy. In February 2023, the EU also devised its own strategy but without committing any real or new finances, even if it is more than €750 billion "NextGenerationEU" effort is directed towards the digital and green transitions. The risk facing the US and EU is a "subsidies race" that, while helping to address climate change, may lead to missed opportunities to strengthen transatlantic supply chains and technology cooperation.

While the EU and US are discussing their mutual efforts to avoid any undue economic harm, the reality is that the EU has been historically far too cautious with investing in major strategic industries. In all of the high- and critical-technology areas where the US dominates today, successive governments and industries have been willing to take a risk on investment and have taken an active political decision to strengthen strategic industries. If the EU is the "world's trading superpower" it thinks it is, then it needs to be bolder on investments in key critical sectors.

However, the US and EU must do more than simply invest their way out of competition with China and Russia: more transatlantic unity on critical raw material supplies, technology control, and countering harmful foreign investment is required. Indeed, this essay has outlined how Russia is using economic statecraft to offset its embarrassing military performance in Ukraine. Western countries cannot be lured into a sense of comfort over Russia's military deterioration; more than likely, Russia will use economic tools to continue to menace its neighbors. ☆

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CHAPTER 23

AMERICAN ARMS AND INDUSTRY IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABSTRACT

United States support for Ukraine and preparation for a potential, likely protracted, conflict with China has drawn attention to the fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, the American defense industry has optimized for peacetime and low-attrition conflicts, prized efficiency and cost-savings over capacity and flexibility, and incentivized short-run returns over resilience and innovation. While this design may have made sense in a period of undisputed U.S. dominance, the rise of the PRC as a peer competitor and the emerging demand that the U.S. deter and, if necessary, win one or more protracted conflicts requires that Washington take a more intentional and direct role in shaping the capability, capacity, and resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base.

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The 2022 National Security and National Defense Strategies identify the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the "pacing threat" against which the Department of Defense (DoD) must align doctrine, force structure, and posture (DOD 2022). As the United States prepares for the potential for conflict with the PRC, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine provides a window into scenarios around a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan and recalls past wars between peer adversaries, which were often won by the side best able to sustain their own over the long term (Nolan 2019). Both U.S. support for Ukraine and preparation for a potential, likely protracted, conflict with China – both economically and militarily – has drawn attention to the fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, the defense industry has optimized for peacetime and low-attrition conflicts over high-consumption protracted conflicts, prized efficiency and cost-savings over capacity and flexibility, and incentivized short-run returns over

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resilience and innovation. While these features made sense in a period of undisputed U.S. dominance, the rise of the PRC as a peer competitor and the emerging demand that the DoD deter and, if necessary, win one or more protracted conflicts with peer adversaries requires that Washington take a more intentional and direct role in shaping the capability, capacity, and resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base.

The U.S. can draw many lessons from the war in Ukraine. Large-scale conflict entails high rates of consumption and attrition of equipment, munitions, and sustainment stockpiles. The defense enterprise must be able to leverage the latest technological developments and adapt to enemy battlefield innovations. DoD must also prepare to meet the needs of allies and partners, whose forces are reliant on U.S. equipment, munitions, and sustainment capacity, in theatre and elsewhere.

The lessons from the war in Ukraine suggest the U.S. must preserve the full range of military and deterrence options for the Indo-Pacific while maintaining military capacities to shore up allies around the globe. To do so requires a defense industrial base that can sustain the joint force and U.S. allies and partners in one or more protracted conflicts. The U.S. defense industry must have a) the capacity to quickly produce, in large numbers, weapons, munitions, spare parts, and associated supplies; b) the budgetary and production flexibly to meet the quickly changing demands of the strategic environment; and, c) cultivate within DoD, private defense industry, and non-defense commercial partners those critical advantages in emerging technologies such as advanced computing and cloud sharing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and hypersonics that will provide a comparative advantage in the battlespace of tomorrow (DOD 2022; DOD 2018; Work 2015).

Yet there are three barriers to a stronger defense industrial base. First, the guiding principles of the modern defense industry have swung too far toward market principles and too far away from direct government oversight. While this has encouraged the valuable influx of public and private capital, reduced acquisition costs, and sustained the industry during periods of relative decline in the defense budget, it has also led to the optimization of the defense industry for peacetime, a reliance on efficient but fragile “just-in-time” supply chains, and reduced competition through industry consolidation. Second, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system is inflexible and rewards stability and the bureaucratic know-how of established players. This inflexibility constrains quick adaption to changes in the strategic and technological environments. Third, the long-term shift of research and development from the public to private sector has left the U.S. government beholden to commercial partners focused on commercial opportunities, and therefore, reduced its ability to shape and leverage the technological advancements critical to military power.

The U.S. government must find a new equilibrium in the relationship between the private and public sectors. Reform of the PPBE system and target U.S. government investment in critical supply chains and production capacity to rebalance incentives away from strictly for-profit models and encourage resilience and redundancy. Reforms to antiquated legislative practices and investment in analytic capacity can free DoD to align resources with unforeseen changes in the strategic and technological environments. At the same time, the U.S. government must adjust to take advantage of the technology, capital, and research and development capacity of the private sector. This can be done by lowering hurdles to private sector involvement, increasing competition in specific phases of the procurement process, and leveraging mature venture capital know-how

to shape the development of core technologies. DoD cannot afford to wait for a crisis to promote innovation or build production lines but must adjust processes, incentives, and approaches to lay the foundation for crisis response now.

THE CREATION OF A RIGID INDUSTRIAL BASE

The COVID-19 pandemic and war in Ukraine have revealed the rigidity of the U.S. defense industrial base. This rigidity results from long-term trends in the relationship between the public and private sectors. The same processes that reshaped the U.S. industrial landscape starting in the 1960s and 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s also affected the defense industry. As economic growth slowed, the U.S. government and industry sought to boost growth through greater efficiency, consolidation, and private-sector investment (Payne 2023). As a result, the defense industry has been restructured away from wartime needs to ensure industry profit returns, as demonstrated by a dramatic rise in public market valuations and private equity investment in U.S. defense firms since 2000 (Mahoney, Tkach, and Rethmeyer 2023). Today, the industrial base has less capacity and is more likely to fail in times of crisis.

Three broad trends contributed to the creation of a rigid defense industrial base. First, the search for lower labor costs led to increased distribution of production chains both domestically and internationally (Payne 2023). These efforts successfully increased industry profits even as defense spending fell as a percentage of GDP after the Cold War. However, they also reduced capacity: the number of major defense firms fell from around 100 in the early 1990s to just five or six major companies by the end of the decade (Mahoney, Tkach, and Rethmeyer 2023), though understandably driven by mergers & acquisitions. Newly consolidated companies cut redundant factories and skilled labor, thereby reducing reservoirs of reserve capacity necessary in a crisis (Payne 2023). Consolidation also reduced competition and innovation: defense firms only had one customer, and for many major weapons systems like tanks, fighter aircraft, and ships, the DoD only had one supplier (Bradford and Yuengert 2023).

Second, the rise of private sector “Tech Titans” shifted power over the course and control of strategic technologies from the public to the private sector. For decades after World War II, the DoD was a net exporter of technologies to the commercial sector. Even non-defense commercial companies prioritized defense contracts and sold “spin-off” technologies in commercial markets they viewed as secondary (Salisbury 2023). Today, U.S. defense firms spend far less on research and development, in absolute and relative terms, than non-defense commercial firms, even as they return significant profits to shareholders. DoD has become an importer of technology reliant on “spin-on” processes, giving the non-defense commercial sector more power to shape the direction and maintain ultimate control over strategic technology (Salisbury 2023, 5-7). These companies and their employees are often uncomfortable engaging in the “business of war,” lost in DoD’s bureaucratic maze, or cannot afford to wait for the slow DoD acquisition processes (Bradford and Yuengert 2023; Finelli 2023; Salisbury 2023).

Finally, the U.S. budgetary system, created in the 1960s, encourages stability at the expense of flexibility and capacity. Planning is carried out in two-to-five-year time horizons. While DoD has some discretion within established reprogramming limits, changes to even annual budget allocations require Congressional review and approval. By empowering parochial Congressional interests, the PPBE system constrains quick adjustment in response to changes in the strategic or technological environments. Moreover, due to misalignment between political and budget

cycles and an underfunded analytic capacity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary rarely has time or capability to provide guidance to the Services on how to align their budget requests—which provide the foundation of annual budgets—with the administration's strategic assessments. Congress also tends to focus on requests that make more rather than fewer changes, incentivizing Services to make few changes to the previous year's budget. Finally, the PPBE system encourages inefficiency by making it impossible for DoD components to shift unused funds to future years (Bradford and Yuengert 2023). In short, DoD now relies on commercial innovation cycles, which occur a few months, compared to its funding process, which easily takes two to three years. Consequently, DoD is failing to leverage the U.S. advantage in technology development and innovation.

REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY FOR SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE

In the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Secretary Lloyd Austin states DoD "will act urgently to build enduring advantages across the defense ecosystem […] with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustment to new strategic demands" (DOD 2022). The war in Ukraine has focused attention on the ability of DoD to ensure and sustain the technological superiority of the joint force and U.S. allies and partners in the event of a major war. The U.S. defense industry must have a) the capacity to quickly produce, in large numbers, weapons, munitions, spare parts, and associated supplies; b) the budgetary and production flexibly to meet the quickly changing demands of the strategic environment; and, c) cultivate within DoD and defense and non-defense commercial partners technological advantages in emerging military technologies such as advanced computing and cloud sharing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, directed energy, and hypersonics (DOD 2022; DOD 2018; Work 2015). This section outlines our recommendations for improving the ability of the defense enterprise to deliver on these requirements.

First, competition with the PRC demands a return to a time of more direct defense industrial policy. In particular, the government should play a direct role in developing and maintaining workforce and production surge capacity. Recent investment in infrastructure and technology indicates a bipartisan appetite for industrial policy. The U.S. Government should undertake efforts to locate a new equilibrium between the private and public sectors in the defense industry, as well as take advantage of the U.S. global comparative advantage in capital markets to facilitate more agile funding. This will entail identifying the areas where government intervention is both necessary and likely to succeed, such as in rebuilding arsenal capacity shuttered in the 1990s, and those areas where the government can take a more indirect role to incentivize private sector activity, for instance, by encouraging private logistics firms to reduce the vulnerability of international logistics and supply chains to labor unrest by providing strong workplace protections and wage increases (Bradford and Yuengert 2023; Johnson 2022; Mahoney, Tkach, and Rethmeyer 2023; Payne 2023). The government should also (re)assert responsibility for mitigating these supply chain vulnerabilities (instead of leaving them to the whims of private firms) by, in part, requiring stronger workplace protections and wage increases, even if that leads to higher costs. Government intervention should be carefully targeted because costs tend to be higher in the public sector. DoD should leverage its ongoing internal audit process to determine the costs of nationalization to help appropriately target efforts. Finally, the U.S. can expand spare production capacity by enabling allies and partners to more easily produce U.S. equipment, munitions, and spare parts under license. Such efforts could focus on mid-range weapons, which tend to be cheaper, more

easily produced, and optimized for the defensive requirements of countries like Taiwan, Japan, and India (Carter, Gilmore, and Spindel 2023).

Second, Congress and DoD must commit to reforming DoD's development, acquisition, and business practices to improve relations with the commercial sector, which has become the locus of strategic technological development. As former Under Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin stated, "We can either retain our national [military] pre-eminence, or we can retain our processes, but we cannot have both" (Salisbury 2023, 14). Congress and DoD must take the findings of the Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform seriously and commit to prompt implementation of recommended reforms (Bradford and Yuengert 2023). DoD can improve collaboration with the commercial technology sector and gain access to America's vast capital markets through deeper engagement with private equity and venture capital firms and by improving alignment between appropriations and private sector business cycles (Salisbury 2023; Finelli 2023). DoD should reduce bureaucratic barriers to competition in the design of new defense systems, with the aim of opening competition in design to firms that may not have the capacity of a major defense firm to manufacture at scale (Bradford and Yuengert 2023).

CONCLUSION

The U.S. should not wait for a crisis to strengthen its defense industrial base. A strong defense industrial base will improve the capability, capacity, and technological edge of the Joint Force and enable it to sustain the fight over a protracted conflict. Therefore, investment in the defense industrial base can also strengthen deterrence, the primary aim of DoD policy toward the PRC. Our recommendations, if enacted, will strengthen the defense industrial base by reducing vulnerabilities, expanding resilience, and overcoming corrosive long-term trends. ☆

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CHAPTER 24

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: RETHINKING TRANSATLANTIC BURDEN-SHARING

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ABSTRACT

Though it is a core function of a sovereign state, governments do not navigate defense policy free from outside influences and constraints. The provision of external security requires armed forces to be adequately equipped but the distribution of material sources - defense-industrial capacity - for such equipment is not even but rather concentrated in the international system. How do alliance politics and defense-industrial policy connect? Our contribution highlights the material sources for military alliance effectiveness and emphasizes a strategic view of the relationship between these material factors and alliance burden-sharing. The sudden surge in demand for materiel resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine revealed the defense-industrial fault lines within the transatlantic alliance. We outline existing dependencies and interdependencies, identify trade-offs and connections between industrial policy and defense spending, and formulate policy recommendations based on our findings. Taking a political economy of security perspective, these recommendations are aimed at a better understanding of how industrial politics and alliance stability are intertwined. They suggest pathways to a new and more stable transatlantic defense-industrial bargain in an era of increased great power conflict.

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Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the importance of defense industrial networks, markets, and the sustainability of transatlantic armament supply. For non-combatant states, war strategy has had little to do with operations or military deployments. Instead, sustaining supply chain resilience has become the central concern. Both sides of the Atlantic seek to ramp up arms production but face structural challenges in doing so. The sudden demand for mechanized capacity has exposed defense industrial supply chains built around peacetime

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demand models and asymmetric conflicts, and not optimized to sustain high-intensity warfare. Indeed, translating resources into capabilities is not always straightforward or even strategic, but is often shaped by domestic interests and institutions (DeVore and Weiss 2014; Matthews 2019).

Additionally, while the US and European NATO states are allies, their defense industries compete in global procurement markets. Policy preferences over the value of open market competition may differ under peacetime and mechanized warfare demand, with additional needs for industrial policy, both domestic and allied, during times of supply chain pressure. To address these challenges, we propose elevating defense industrial policy to a more strategic level, in both national policy planning and within critical alliances, to reduce inefficiencies, optimize defense industrial output, and better harness arms markets as tools for shaping foreign policy. Strategic thinking on defense industrial health can range from better domestic regulation to more coordinated alliance policy to incentivize defense production.

Acknowledging transatlantic defense industrial competition and interdependence

Our starting point is a long-standing state dilemma: whether to make arms at home or buy them abroad, and whether to collaborate internationally to produce at a greater scale and with shared costs. Florian Bodamer (2023) presented a framework for understanding the trade-offs involved in the relative dependence on foreign inputs in sophisticated armaments production. The dilemma exists because states are reluctant to over-rely on external actors for their military supply. For European states, the attempt to arm Ukraine has underscored their dependence on external arms imports, particularly from the US. Several European states purchased US-made equipment, such as the F-35, in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Reliance on US platforms and subcomponents is not new. For example, a leading European fighter aircraft, the Swedish-made Gripen, primarily uses US technology for its engine (Saab 2020; Janes 2022). Collaborative European projects such as the German-led European sky shield missile defense initiative rely heavily on US subcomponents. If successful, the project will lead to greater European defense capability but rely on non-European technology. This example illustrates that short-term European defense capability projects triggered by the war may be in tension with long-term European strategic autonomy objectives, which include reducing reliance on external actors (Lanoszka and Becker 2022).

The defense industrial dimension of the war in Ukraine has accelerated US dominance and prompted European states to attempt to build collaborative, European-based projects to buy US weapons, such as Germany buying the P-8 Poseidon instead of co-developing a European maritime patrol aircraft (Sprenger 2022; Machi 2023). Short-term operational requirements needed fast decisions, and currently only the US defense industry could address this demand.

As a first-tier arms producer, the US faces fewer defense industrial constraints than its European allies, but it, too, is unable to domestically sustain production capacities (Jones 2023; Gould 2023). The US arms industry model, as currently structured, is dependent on external demand. Indeed, the US seeks out international partnerships for weapons platforms such as the F-35 in order to build alliances, but also for the dual goal of sourcing parts from lower-cost international producers and for building more markets of scale, keeping production costs down and sustaining program demand (Bodamer and Schilde 2021; Caverley, Kapstein, and Vucetic 2019; Chapman 2019).

Current transatlantic security policy is in tension between the strategic conversation about burden-sharing and domestic concerns over defense industry survival and competition (Schilde 2017). Becker (2023) identifies a correlation between the weight of a state's defense industry in its national economy and spending on defense equipment modernization. The finding highlights that states spend more on defense when such spending promises domestic economic spillovers, which attenuates the traditional macroeconomic guns versus butter dilemma. Domestic economic interests intrinsically sustain defense spending, making procurement costs a domestic investment rather than a pure cost for the state. The implications are relevant to European states facing procurement pressures due to the Ukraine War. If the European defense industrial base loses market share to the US and other global defense firms, it might further weaken the competitiveness of European defense firms. To extend Becker's finding, lower domestic procurement, and a less competitive European industrial base might reduce future European political constituencies for defense spending, undermining strategic alliance burden-sharing goals.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Defense industrial policy in a military alliance cannot be guided solely by the "low politics" of commercial comparative advantage or market forces, because domestic arms production is driven by state incentive structures (Hartley 2006). If European states can sustain their own defense industrial bases, they are more likely to spend on defense procurement and also more likely to meet alliance spending needs. Becker's finding points to a policy dilemma for the US: there is a tension between encouraging Europeans to buy American in the name of interoperability while simultaneously asking Europeans to spend more on defense in the name of burden-sharing. European states' incentives to spend more on defense depend as much (or more) on domestic economic and political constituencies as they do on 'high politics' considerations. At the NATO level, strategic planning should identify the various domestic industry interests for increasing armaments production and design capability goals and incentive structures accordingly.

The US and Europe need to negotiate a strategic defense industrial alliance policy

Cooperation can be strategically temporal (Calcara 2023): allies can both acknowledge the collective short-term need for US armaments while working towards a long-term strategy committed to maintaining European defense capacity. An alliance commitment to support the European defense industrial base would not equate to material support from the US to Europe, even though the US had done so before, such as when it "launched the postwar rise of France's leading military aircraft company, Dassault, by buying the entire series of the company's first postwar model, 225 planes, and presenting them to the French air force" (Moravcsik 1991, 33). Instead, even rhetorical, or regulatory support for the continuation of European defense industrial health can be effective, as the signaling from states about defense industrial health lowers industry risk and uncertainty (Schilde 2023).

Another implication of Becker's finding involves the distribution of defense spending constituencies within Europe. Europe has an intra-European relative gains dilemma with a lack of defense production diversification (Simón 2017). A handful of Western European countries currently dominate, but Central and Eastern European countries, for example, are highly motivated to modernize their armed forces. **To integrate the European defense industrial base and prevent further fragmentation of the market, Western**

European systems integrators should be incentivized through industrial policy to expand their supply chains and production networks to Eastern Europe. Additional component producers across Europe will further integrate European supply chains and lead to higher demand for European defense equipment.

Dilemmas and opportunities of international arms collaboration under hierarchy

International arms networks are often hierarchical (Krause 1995), and increasingly so in the post-Cold War environment (Caverley 2007; Gholz and Sapolsky 2021). As the dominant first-tier arms producer, the US is qualitatively distinct in scope and scale compared to Western implication that US dominance of global defense markets will only increase. However, this does not necessarily reinforce US strategic goals. Trade-offs exist between defense industrial hierarchy and multilateral security cooperation.

International arms network effects go beyond arms procurement. Forester (2023) finds that arms transfers are more than just exchanges of equipment: they create relationships between actors "akin to mini-alliance treaties" (Vucetic and Duarte 2015, 403) with spillover effects into other strategic domains. Networks of joint military exercises and armaments programs, coevolve, and influence one another. Both networks are hierarchical, dominated by a handful of suppliers, and highly transitive (ties spread to partners of partners), which reinforces hierarchies. While policymakers have causal heuristics linking arms and alliances, national strategies for harnessing these relationships are currently underdeveloped.

Calcara (2023) theorizes that international arms collaboration (formal agreements of international weapons co-production) ranges from projects with more equal ownership partnerships to those with unequal, hierarchical arrangements, dominated by a leading state. States collaborating to co-produce hardware projects have less hierarchical arms networks, with more equal co-partners and investors. In contrast, software-intensive weapons projects are more sensitive regarding sovereign information security and surveillance, and therefore require a single state as the hierarchical systems integrator to produce the weapons platform. Following Lake (1996), such hierarchical networks only increase governance costs for the hegemon. Calcara sees software projects dominating future international collaboration, further hindering cooperation and increasing costs for the most powerful state. Technological change, in the form of increasing network- and software-centric weapons, has distributional consequences on international power structures, the maneuver space for international weapons collaborations, and the costs borne by the hegemon.

Hierarchies exist between the US and international arms production partners and within European projects. Calcara (2023) explained a specific European dilemma: collaborative programs are mostly between large arms producers. Cooperation barriers include the dominance of large state "national champions" (e.g., Italy's decision not to join the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program), disincentivizing smaller actors, and government protections preventing market access. European states struggle with how to best structure their intra-European hierarchies (e.g., "best athlete" vs. "juste retour") and have so far followed the "juste retour" principle, undermining the comparative advantages of cooperation and increasing the costs of maintaining intra-European defense industrial hierarchy (Lake 2009).

RECOMMENDATION

States should recognize the increasingly hierarchical structures of arms collaboration projects. **Due to software integration, international projects may continue becoming increasingly hierarchical.** This is suboptimal for both collective strategic outcomes and the costs borne by the hegemon. A single state may lead a future arms project, but it should not necessarily be the same state, every time: **as an international body, NATO can provide a platform for systematic discussions of project leadership** in the context of, for example, the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), which aims to "provide a framework within which national and Alliance defense planning activities can be harmonized to enable Allies to provide the required forces and capabilities in the most effective way (NATO 2018)." Less dominant partners can be incentivized to participate via positive inducements, side-payments (Henke 2019), or non-economic security goods such as Joint Military Exercises (Forester 2023).

While hierarchical arms collaboration projects are costly, they are also an underutilized strategic asset. Project membership has been used to shape incentives, but so far only as *ad-hoc* and *ex post facto* economic statecraft, such as the 2018 ejection of Turkey from the F-35 program. If included in larger strategic planning, hierarchical arms collaboration projects have the potential use as positive inducement tools toward security goals (Wong 2019). Positive inducements could include, but are not limited to, activities such as Joint Military Exercises. If systematically governed at the strategic- or interagency- level, they could bridge the "low" politics of domestic industrial policy with the "high" politics of economic statecraft. Partner states could be *ex-ante* incentivized by clear expectations of what formal partnership entails, including clear signals of what behavior could jeopardize their access to armaments (Caverley 2023b).

BEYOND INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHIES: MULTIPLE SOURCES OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

Military capabilities and capacity are generated by states, markets, and non-state actors. While neglected in the security studies debate on strategic autonomy (Meijer and Brooks 2021), the EU is a critical market and regulatory actor generating future defense capabilities. Marcin Terlikowski (2023) outlined how future military capabilities are generated by both the EU (through Permanent Structured Cooperation or European Defense Fund) and cooperative NATO instruments (DIANA accelerator/Innovation Hub). The EU possesses market, monetary, and regulatory power that can generate resources, as it did in response to the COVID-19 crisis (Alvarez-Couceiro 2023). EU market regulation also incentivizes European defense industries to produce more defense technology, generating future defense capabilities via market mechanisms (Schilde 2023).

The EU, however, faces complex and sometimes contradictory incentive structures, including the twin goal of fostering intra-European interdependence and increasing extra-European independence. Calcara (2023) suggests that there are two levels of European defense cooperation. Multilateral programs, which answer short-term security goals, create inefficiencies and intra-European competition (e.g., Tempest vs. FCAS or Rafale vs. Eurofighter). European states also pursue "long term" cooperation, defense industrial sustainability, and European-level strategic autonomy goals. The two efforts evolve concurrently and sometimes even competitively as the EU Commission challenges national governments' authority (Håkansson 2021).

RECOMMENDATIONS

European states should reconcile national interests and redundant multilateral initiatives with integrated but under-funded regional projects (e.g., within PESCO), allowing for more efficient and coherent integration. The US should work with the EU as a critical market actor for future supply chain resilience in defense. **Collectively, transatlantic allies could capitalize on partnerships at different levels (between countries or with the EU) to improve efficiency and burden-sharing**.

Wartime supply chain pressures are also a moment for a strategic re-evaluation of defense market governance. States should be more creative with their regulatory toolkit for incentivizing defense industries and signaling future capability directions. The EU should more actively apply single market rules against state protectionism in defense industrial issues, but with regulatory carrots, such as R&D funding or tax incentives. Industries respond to states (or the EU) signaling future demand, and respond by investing in defense innovation; they just await demand signals regarding risk assurance to proceed (Schilde 2023). ☆

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Appendix

Order, Counter-Order, Disorder?

Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition

9-10 February 2023

Jefferson Hall

United States Military Academy

West Point, New York

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

WEST POINT®

Order, Counter-Order, Disorder?

Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition

9-10 February 2023

Attire for Civilians and Visiting Military Personnel: Conference Attire
Uniform for SOSH Military Staff and Faculty: ASU/AGSU-As
Uniform for Participating Cadets: Dress Grey

Day 1

8:00 am, 9 February: Bus Departs the Thayer Hotel (meet in lobby)

Breakfast, 9 February (8:30 am – 9:45 am, Haig Room, 6th Floor, Jefferson Hall Library)

Opening Remarks will begin at 8:45 am

Welcome Remarks: BG Shane Reeves, Dean of the Academic Board, United States Military Academy
Introductory Remarks: AMB Douglas Lute, former US Permanent Representative to NATO
Keynote Address: Matt Cordova, Senior Civilian Advisor, Chairman's Action Group, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Editors' Roundtable: Simon Smith (Defense Studies), Andrew Dorman (International Affairs), additional policy journals to be confirmed
In-person: *Haig Room* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Morning Panels, 9 February (10:00 am – 12:00 pm, Jefferson Hall Library)

Lunch, 9 February (12:00 pm – 1:30 pm, Haig Room, 6th Floor, Jefferson Hall Library)

Afternoon Panels, 9 February (1:30 pm – 3:30pm, Jefferson Hall Library)

Optional History Tour, 9 February (3:30 pm – 5:00 pm)

The tour will begin and end at Jefferson Hall. The bus will make two rounds to return attendees to Thayer Hotel shortly after a) completion of the afternoon panels or b) after the tour.

Day 2

8:00 am, 10 February: Bus Departs the Thayer Hotel

Breakfast, 10 February (8:30 am – 9:30 am, Haig Room, 6th Floor, Jefferson Hall Library)

Lunch, 10 February (11:30 am – 1:00 pm, Haig Room, 6th Floor, Jefferson Hall Library)

Afternoon Panels, 10 February (1:00 pm – 3:00 pm, Jefferson Hall Library)

Closing Remarks, 10 February (3:45 pm – 4:45 pm, Haig Room, 6th Floor, Jefferson Hall Library)

Closing Remarks will begin at 3:45 pm

Closing Remarks: LTG Steven Gilland, Superintendent, United States Military Academy
Bridging Alliances **Roundtable Discussion, featuring:**
General Rajmund Andrzejczak, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
Ambassador Masafumi Ishii, Former Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia
Ambassador Douglas Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO
Professor Dr. Luis Simón, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)
In-person: *Haig Room* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

5:00 pm, 10 February: Bus available to return guests to the Thayer Hotel

Thursday, 9 February – Morning panels

- Panel 3A: China & International Order – Comparative Politics Perspectives
- Panel 4A: Russia & International Order – Russian Asymmetric Strategies of Dis-ordering
- Panel 6: Order & Security in the Indo-Pacific
- Panel 7A: Emerging Technologies & Security Orders – Emerging Technologies & Strategy
- Panel 8B: Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare – Irregular Warfare and Great Power Competition
- Panel 9A: Societal Ordering & Security Ordering – Domestic and Organizational Politics
- Panel 10B: Money, Finance, & International Order – International Perspectives
- Panel 11B: Ideologies & Ordering – Ideologies' Effect on Foreign Policy

Thursday, 9 February – Afternoon panels

- Panel 1B: Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks: Managing International Order
- Panel 3B: China & International Order – International Relations Perspectives
- Panel 5B: Order & Security in Eurasia – War and Strategy in Eurasia
- Panel 8C: Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare: Irregular Warfare and Great Power Competition
- Panel 10A: Money, Finance, & International Order – Finance, Economics, Strategy and Alliance Management
- Panel 11A: Ideologies & Ordering – Ideologies of Foreign Policy
- Panel 12: Climate, Energy, and Ordering

Friday, 10 February – Morning panels

- Panel 1A: Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks: Theorizing International Order
- Panel 2A: Geostrategic Context – Bridging Alliances in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition: Allied Perspectives on Sino-American Competition
- Panel 2B: Geostrategic Context – Bridging Alliances in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition: Alliance Management and Sino-American Competition
- Panel 8A: Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare: Capabilities and International Ordering
- Panel 9C: Society Ordering & Security Ordering – Society and Security: Comparative and Behavioral Perspectives
- Panel 13B: Industry & Armament in a Changing International Order – Global Defense Industrial Policy and Order
- Panel 15: International Order, International Law, and Justice

Friday, 10 February – Afternoon panels

- Panel 1C: Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks: International Order and Strategy
- Panel 3C: China & International Order – Security Studies Perspectives
- Panel 4B: Russia & International Order – Alternate Reality: Russia's Strategic Vision for International Order and What to Do About It
- Panel 5A: Order & Security in Eurasia – Institutions and Eurasian Order and Security
- Panel 7B: Emerging Technologies & Security Orders – Ordering & Emerging Technologies
- Panel 9B: Societal Ordering & Security Ordering – Society, Policy and Alliances
- Panel 13A: Industry & Armament in a Changing International Order – The US Defense Industrial Base and International Order
- Panel 14: Terrorism & International Order

Working Group 1: *Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks*

Panel 1A: *Theorizing International Order* ***(4 In-person, 4 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH402* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Professor Bear Braumoeller, Ohio State University (In-person, braumoeller.1@polisci.osu.edu)
Discussant: Professor Beatrice Heuser, The General Staff College of the Bundeswehr (Virtual, Beatrice.heuser@glasgow.ac.uk)

Rapporteurs:

- LTC Mike Rosol, PhD, SOSH (In-person, michael.rosol@westpoint.edu)
- MAJ Patrick Kelly, PhD, SOSH (In-person, Patrick.kelly@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Andrew Goodhart, Ohio State University, (Virtual, Goodhart.19@buckeyemail.osu.edu)
- Professor Tanguy Struye, UCLOUVAIN (Virtual, tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be)
- Dr. William Norris, Texas A&M (In-person, wjnorris@tamu.edu)
- Nikolas Vander Vennet, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) (Virtual, nikolas.vander.vennet@vub.be)

Working Group 1: *Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks*

Panel 1B: *Managing International Order* ***(6 In Person, 2 Virtual, 1 Paper Submission)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH301* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: R.D. Hooker, Jr., PhD, Atlantic Council (In-person, rhooker57@gmail.com)

Discussants:

- Ali Wyne, MIT (In-person, awyne@alum.mit.edu)
- Prof. Daniel Nexon, Georgetown University (In-person, dhn2@georgetown.edu)

Rapporteur: Lieutenant Colonel Seth A. Johnson, PhD, Heidelberg University (Germany) (In-person, seth.johnston@georgetown.edu)

Panelists:

- Liliana Filip, PhD, Women in International Security (WIIS Romania) (In-person, lilianafilip1@gmail.com)
- Prof. Andrew Glencross, ESPOL, Catholic University of Lille (Paper Only, Andrew.glencross@univ-catholille.fr)
- Allen Newton, PhD, National Intelligence University (Virtual, allen.a.newton.civ@mail.mil)
- Alan Van Beek, Ohio State University (Virtual, vanbeek.3@buckeyemail.osu.edu)
- Fabio Figiaconi, VUB (In-person, Fabio.figiaconi@vub.be)

Working Group 1: *Order & Ordering – Intellectual and Policy Frameworks*

Panel 1C: *International Order and Strategy* ***(6 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH401* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Prof. Dr. Luis Simón, VUB (Virtual, luis.simon@vub.be)

Discussants:

- Dr. Richard Lacquement, US Army War College (In-person, richard.lacquement@armywarcollege.edu)
- Dr. Max Margulies, Modern War Institute at West Point (In-person, max.margulies@westpoint.edu)

Rapporteur: Dr. Jānis Bērziņš, National Defence Academy of Latvia (Virtual, janis.berzins01@mil.lv)

Panelists:

- General Rajmund Andrzejczak, Polish CHOD (In-person, ckiszkowiak@mon.gov.pl)
- Lieutenant Colonel Seth A. Johnson, PhD, Heidelberg University (Germany) (In-person, seth.johnston@georgetown.edu)
- Slawomir Debski, PISM (In-person, debski@pism.pl)
- Professor Tanguy Struye, UCLOUVAIN (Virtual, tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be)
- Prof. Daniel Nexon, Georgetown University (In-person, dhn2@georgetown.edu)

Working Group 2: *Geostrategic Context – Bridging Alliances in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition*

Panel 2A: *Allied Perspectives on Sino-American Competition* ***(7 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH401* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Jeff Reynolds (Virtual, reachjeffreynolds@gmail.com)

Discussants:

- Dr. Morena Skalamera, Leiden University (In-person, m.skalamera@hum.leidenuniv.nl)
- Dr. Linde Desmaele, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (In-person, linde.desmaele@vub.be)

Rapporteurs:

- CDT Eric Liu, USMA (In-person, eric.liu@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Christian Dionisio, USMA (In-person, christian.dionisio@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Andris Banka, University of Greifswald (Virtual, banka.andris@gmail.com)
- Mr. Lukasz Kulesa, PISM (In-person, kulesa@pism.pl)
- Hugo Meijer and Prof. Dr. Luis Simón, VUB (In-person, hugo.meijer@sciencespo.fr)
- Dr. Scott Smitson, Denison University (In-person, scott.smitson@gmail.com)

Working Group 2: *Geostrategic Context – Bridging Alliances in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition*

Panel 2B: *Alliance Management and Sino-American Competition* ***(5 In Person, 8 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH501* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Katherine Kjellstrom Elgin, PhD, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Virtual, kelgin@csbaonline.org)

Discussants:

- Dr. Benedetta Berti, NATO HQ (Virtual, benedetta.berti@hq.nato.int)
- Dr. Gorana Grgic, University of Sydney and the Hertie School (Virtual, gorana.grgic@sydney.edu.au)

Rapporteur: CDT Martayn Vandewall, SOSH (In-person, martayn.vandewall@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- 2LT Mason H. Remondelli & COL(Ret.) Kyle Remick, USUHS (Virtual, mason.remondelli@usuhs.edu)
- LTC Jon Bate, Stanford University (Virtual, jbate@stanford.edu)
- Mr. Abdirisak M. Shaqale, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Cooperation of Somaliland, INDSR Taiwan (Virtual, shaqale2025@gmail.com)
- Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, Assistant Professor, Texas A&M University, (In-person, achinchilla@tamu.edu), Dr. William Wohlforth, Dartmouth (Virtual)
- MAJ Haz Yano & MAJ Sean McKnight, SOSH (In-person, Hazumu.yano@westpoint.edu)
- Captain Victoria Henley, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (In-person, vhenley@mit.edu)
- Mr. Benjamin Walsh, Sea Power Centre - Australia (Virtual, walsh.ben34@gmail.com)

Working Group 3: *China & International Order*

Panel 3A: *China & International Order – Comparative Politics Perspective* ***(7 In Person, 1 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am-12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH401* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Haemin Jee, SOSH (In-person, haemin.jee@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Professor Edmund Malesky, Duke University (In-person, ejm5@duke.edu)

Rapporteur: CDT Eric Liu, USMA (In-person, eric.liu@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Xiaoxiao Shen, PhD Candidate, Princeton University (In-person, xiaoxiao@princeton.edu)
- Dr. Peng Peng, Yale, & Jiang Junyan, Columbia University (In-person, peng.peng@yale.edu)
- CPT Merlin Boone, SOSH (In-person, merlin.boone@westpoint.edu)
- Yucong Li, PhD Student, Brown University (In-person, Yucong_li@brown.edu)
- Jongyoon Baik, University of Chicago (Virtual, baikjongyoon@uchicago.edu)

Working Group 3: *China & International Order*

Panel 3B: *China & International Order – International Relations Perspectives* ***(4 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH302* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: CPT Merlin Boone, SOSH (In-person, merlin.boone@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Paul Poast, PhD, University of Chicago (Virtual, paulpoast@uchicago.edu)

Rapporteurs:

- CDT Megan Nkamwa, USMA (In-person, elizabethmegan.nkamwa@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Sarah Cao, USMA (In-person, sarah.cao@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Professor Tanguy Struye, UCLOUVAIN (Virtual, tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be)
- Liuya Zhang, Haoming Xiong (Virtual, zhang.11580@buckeyemail.osu.edu) and Professor Bear F. Braumoeller, Ohio State University (In-person, braumoeller.1@polisci.osu.edu)
- Dr. John Wagner Givens, Spelman College (Virtual, johngivens@spelman.edu)
- Jungman Han, PhD, University of Pittsburgh (Virtual, jungmin.han@pitt.edu)

Working Group 3: *China & International Order*

Panel 3C: *China & International Order – Security Studies Perspectives* ***(3 In Person, 6 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH402* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Haemin Jee, SOSH (In-person, haemin.jee@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Haoming Xiong, Ohio State University (Virtual, xiong.361@osu.edu)
- Len Khodorkovsky, Purdue Krach Center (Virtual, len@3points.org)

Rapporteur: CDT William Tuttle, USMA (In-person, William.tuttle@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- MAJ Sam Wilkins, SOSH (In-person, Samuel.wilkins@westpoint.edu)
- Dr. Edward Salo, Arkansas State University (Virtual, esalo@astate.edu)
- Dr. Justyna Szczudlik, PISM (Virtual, szczudlik@pism.pl)
- Mgr. Jiri Nemec, Masaryk University (Virtual, 420584@muni.cz)
- James Sundquist, Yale University (Virtual, james.sundquist@yale.edu)

Working Group 4: *Russia & International Order*

Panel 4A: *Russian Asymmetric Strategies of Dis-ordering* ***(6 In Person, 4 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH501* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Rob Person, SOSH (In-person, Robert.person@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- BG (Ret.) Peter Zwack (Virtual, zrussianet@gmail.com)
- Michael Rouland, U.S. European Command (Virtual, Michael.r.rouland.civ@mail.mil)

Rapporteurs:

- CDT John Mayle, USMA (In-person, john.mayle@westpoint.edu)
- Isak Kulalic, Boston University (In-person, isakkulalic@gmail.com)

Panelists:

- Prof. Larry Goodson, PhD, and Dr. Marzena Zakowska, US Army War College (In-Person, larry.goodson@armywarcollege.edu)
- AMB Vesko Garcevic, Boston University (In-person, veskog@bu.edu)
- Dr. Elena Pokalova, CISA, National Defense University (Virtual, elena.pokalova.civ@ndu.edu)
- Michel Wyss, M.A., ETH Zurich (In-person, m.d.wyss@gmail.com)
- Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan, Head of Research, Royal Australian Navy (Virtual, buchananek3@gmail.com)

Working Group 4: *Russia & International Order*

Panel 4B: *Alternate Reality: Russia's Strategic Vision for International Order and What to Do About It*

(6 In Person, 4 Virtual)

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH301* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Sir Graham Stacey, European Leadership Network (In-person, grahams@europeanleadershipnetwork.org)

Discussants:

- Dr. Rob Person, SOSH (In-person, Robert.person@westpoint.edu)
- Dr. Morena Skalamera, Leiden University (In-person, m.skalamera@hum.leidenuniv.nl)
- BG (Ret.) Peter Zwack (Virtual, zrussianet@gmail.com)

Rapporteur: CDT John Mayle, USMA (In-person, john.mayle@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Prof. Agnieszka Legucka, PISM (In-person, legucka@pism.pl)
- Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, CNA (In-person, gorenbur@fas.harvard.edu)
- Dr. Ondrej Ditrych & Martin Laryš, Institute of International Relations Prague (Virtual, ditrych@iir.cz)
- Dr. Olga R. Chiriac, JSOU and Center for Strategic Studies, Bucharest (Virtual, olga.r.chiriac@gmail.com)
- Dr. Ieva Berzina, National Defense Academy of Latvia (Virtual, Ieva.berzina.mil.lv)

Working Group 5: *Order & Security in Eurasia*

Panel 5A: *Institutions & Eurasian Order and Security* ***(4 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH303* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Ms. Shawanesh Underwood, Department of State (Virtual, underwoodSN@state.gov)

Discussants:

- Jason Pack, Senior Analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation (Virtual, jason@libya-analysis.com)
- Dr. Scott A. Silverstone, SOSH (In-person, scott.silverstone@westpoint.edu)
- Stanley R. Sloan, Middlebury College (Virtual, sloan.stanley@gmail.com)

Rapporteur: James Farwell, Esq., The Farwell Group (Virtual, james.farwell@gmail.com)

Panelists:

- Dr. Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, Helmut-Schmidt-University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg (In-person, nele.ewers-peters@hsu-hh.de)
- R.D. Hooker, Jr., PhD, Atlantic Council (Virtual, rhooker57@gmail.com)
- Ms. Karolina Muti, Research Fellow in Security and Defence, Instituto Affari Internazionali (Virtual, k.muti@iai.it)
- Dr. Linde Desmaele, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (In-person, linde.desmaele@vub.be)

Working Group 5: *Order & Security in Eurasia*

Panel 5B: *War & Strategy in Eurasia* ***(5 In Person, 6 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH401* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Jeff Reynolds (Virtual, reachjeffreynolds@gmail.com)

Discussants:

- General Rajmund Andrzejczak, Polish CHOD (In-person, ckiszkowiak@mon.gov.pl)
- BG Krzysztof Nolbert, Defense Attache of the Republic of Poland (In-person)
- Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, CNA (In-person, gorenbur@fas.harvard.edu)

Rapporteurs:

- CDT Zachary LeBlanc, USMA (In-person, zachary.leblanc@westpoint.edu)
- CDT John Thomas, USMA (Virtual, john.thomas@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Federico Donelli, University of Trieste (Virtual, donellifed@gmail.com)
- Professor Beatrice Heuser, The General Staff College of the Bundeswehr (Virtual, beatrice.heuser@glasgow.ac.uk)
- Professor Njord Wegge, Norwegian Military Academy (Virtual, nwegge@mil.no)
- Vytautas Kuokštis, PhD, Vilnius University (Virtual, kuokstis@gmail.com)
- Dr. Thomas Sherlock, SOSH (In-person, Thomas.sherlock@westpoint.edu)

Working Group 6: *Order & Security in the Indo Pacific* ***(3 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH402* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Captain Jane Kaufmann, Stanford University (In-person, janekauf@stanford.edu)

Discussants:

- Hugo Meijer, EISS (In-person, hugo.meijer@sciencespo.fr)
- Prof. Dr. Luis Simón, VUB (Virtual, luis.simon@vub.be)

Rapporteur: CDT Martayn Vandewall, USMA (In-person, martayn.vandewall@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Amitav Acharya, American University (Virtual, aacharya@american.edu)
- Dr. Lauren Sukin, London School of Economics & Political Sciences (Virtual, L.Sukin@lse.ac.uk)
- Dr. Gorana Grgic, University of Sydney (Virtual, gorana.grgic@sydney.edu.au)
- Dr. Ryan Weldzius, Villanova University (Virtual, ryan.weldzius@villanova.edu)

Working Group 7: *Emerging Technologies & Security Orders*

Panel 7A: *Emerging Technologies & Strategy* ***(3 In Person, 9 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH403* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock,Ph.D., SOSH (In-person, kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Dr. Dominika Kunertova, ETH Zurich (Virtual, Dominika.kunertova@sipo.gess.ethz.ch)
- Len Khodorkovsky, Purdue Krach Center (Virtual, len@3points.org)

Rapporteurs:

- CPT Teddy MacDonald, USMA (In-person, theodore.macdonald@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Trinity Stenger, USMA (In-person, trinity.stenger@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Mr. Zachary Kallenborn, University of Maryland (Virtual, zkallenborn@gmail.com); Marcel Plichta (Virtual, msp4@st-andrews.ac.uk)
- 1LT Bryce Johnston, US Army (Virtual, Bryce.johnston@alumni.ie.edu)
- Robert Haddick, Mitchell Institute (Virtual, Rhaddick@afa.org)
- Alessandra Russo, PhD Candidate, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Virtual, Alessandra.russo@unicatt.it)
- Raúl González Muñoz, PhD, Spanish Association of Aeronautical and Space Law (AEDAE),(Virtual, raul.v.gonzalez.munoz@gmail.com)
- CPT Austen Boroff, US Army (Virtual, austen.boroff.mil@army.mil)

Working Group 7: *Emerging Technologies & Security Orders*

Panel 7B: *Ordering & Emerging Technologies* ***(5 In Person, 4 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH513* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Captain Jane Kaufmann, Stanford University (In-person, janekauf@stanford.edu)

Discussants:

- MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock, PhD, SOSH (In-person, kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu)
- Cynthia Cook, CSIS (Virtual, ccook@csis.org)

Rapporteurs:

- MAJ Nate Hedgecock, USMA (In-person, nathan.hedgecock@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Olivia Raykhman, USMA (In-person, olivia.raykhman@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Dominika Kunertova, ETH Zurich (Virtual, Dominika.kunertova@sipo.gess.ethz.ch)
- Dr. Daniel Fiott, VUB (Virtual, daniel.fiott@vub.be)
- Dr. Darrell Driver, US Army War College (Virtual, Darrell.driver@armywarcollege.edu)
- William Morrissey, United States Navy (Virtual, William.morrissey@gmail.com)
- Sylvia Mishra, European Leadership Network (Virtual, Mishra.sylvia@gmail.com)
- Dr. Michael Poznansky, US Naval War College (In-person, Michael.poznansky@usnwc.edu)

Working Group 8: *Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare*

Panel 8A: *Capabilities and International Ordering* ***(3 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH403* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Sir Graham Stacey, European Leadership Network (In-person, grahams@europeanleadershipnetwork.org)

Discussant: Robert Haddick, Mitchell Institute (Virtual, Rhaddick@afa.org)

Rapporteur: CDT Michael Rooney, USMA (In-person, michael.rooney@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- MAJ Zachary Griffiths, Army Staff, US Army (In-person, Zachary.e.griffiths.mil@army.mil)
- Paul Poast, PhD, University of Chicago, & Dan Reiter, PhD, Emory University (Virtual, paulpoast@uchicago.edu)
- Dr. Jānis Bērziņš & Victoria Vdovychenko, National Defence Academy of Latvia (Virtual, Janis.berzins01@mil.lv)
- Edward Salo, PhD, Arkansas State University (Virtual, esalo@astate.edu)
- Kaitlyn Robinson, PhD, Duke University (Virtual, Kaitlyn.robinson@duke.edu)

Working Group 8: *Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare*

Panel 8B: *Irregular Warfare and Great Power Competition* ***(5 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH303* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: MAJ Kyle Atwell, SOSH (In-person, kyle.atwell@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, Texas A&M (In-person, achinchilla@tamu.edu)
- Lieutenant Colonel Katie Crombe, US Army War College (In-person, Catherine.b.crombe.mil@mail.mil)

Rapporteurs:

- CDT Alexis Bradstreet USMA (In-person, alexis.bradstreet@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Luther LeBlanc, USMA (In-person, luther.leblanc@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Allen Newton, PhD, National Intelligence University (Virtual, alln.newton@gmail.com)
- Cosimo Melella, PhD Candidate, University of Genoa / CCDCOE (Virtual, cosimo.melella92@gmail.com)
- Edward Salo, Arkansas State University (Virtual, esalo@astate.edu)
- Colonel William Harris, Georgetown University & US Army War College (Virtual, wh83@georgetown.edu)
- Mr. Doug Livermore, Department of the Navy (Virtual, dolivermore@gmail.com)

Working Group 8: *Conflict, Capabilities, & Order – Regular & Irregular Warfare*

Panel 8C: *Gray Zone Conflict* ***(4 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH303* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Andy Maher, UNSW (Virtual, Andrew.maher@irregularwarfare.org)

Discussants:

- William Reno, Northwestern University (Virtual, reno@northwestern.edu)
- Lt Col Jahara Matisek, PhD, US Naval War College (In-person, jahara.matisek@usnwc.edu)

Rapporteur: CDT Fahad Abdulrazzaq, USMA (In-person, fahad.abdulrazzaq@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Jānis Bērziņš, National Defence Academy of Latvia (Virtual, janis.berzins01@mil.lv)
- Dr. Celestino Perez, Jr., US Army War College (In-person celestino.perez@armywarcollege.edu)
- MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock, PhD, SOSH, & Dr. Lauren Sukin, London School of Economics & Political Sciences (In-person, Kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu)

Working Group 9: *Societal Ordering & Security Ordering*

Panel 9A: *Society and Security: Domestic and Organizational Politics* ***(7 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH301* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Scott Limbocker, SOSH (In-person, scott.limbocker@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Schwab, PhD, MBA, Brooke Army Medical Center (In-person, stephen_schwab@baylor.edu)

Rapporteurs:

- CPT Mike Simms, SOSH (In-person, Michael.simms@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Knox Watson, USMA (In-person, knox.watson@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- MAJ Matt Rigdon & CPT Eric Kim, SOSH (In-person, Mathew.rigdon@westpoint.edu)
- COL Todd Schmidt, PhD, Army University Press (In-person, todd.a.schmidt.mil@army.mil)
- Major Zachary Griffiths, Army Staff, United States Army (In-person, Zachary.e.griffiths.mil@army.mil)
- Dr. Simon J. Smith & Thomas Crosbie, Staffordshire University (Virtual, simon.smith@staffs.ac.uk)
- COL (Ret.) Carl Andrew Castro, USC (Virtual, cacastro@usc.edu)
- Professor Tanisha Fazal, University of Minnesota, & Logan Stundal, University of Virginia (Virtual, fazal007@umn.edu)

Working Group 9: *Societal Ordering & Security Ordering*

Panel 9B: *Society, Policy and Alliances* ***(2 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH403* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: LTC Mike Rosol, PhD, SOSH (In-person, michael.rosol@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Dr. Simon J. Smith, Staffordshire University (Virtual, simon.smith@staffs.ac.uk)
- Dr. Jason Lyall, Dartmouth College (Virtual, Jason.lyall@dartmouth.edu)

Rapporteur: CDT Rachel Radvinsky, USMA (In-person, rachel.radvinsky@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- LTC John Kendall, US Army (Virtual, john.kendall10@gmail.com)
- Prof. Olivier Schmitt, University of Southern Denmark (Virtual, Schmitt@sam.sdu.dk)
- Maryum N. Alam, PhD Candidate, Ohio State University (Virtual, alam.75@buckeyemail.osu.edu)

Working Group 9: *Societal Ordering & Security Ordering*

Panel 9C: *Society and Security: Comparative and Behavioral Perspectives* ***(6 In Person, 2 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH301* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: MAJ Patrick Kelly, PhD, SOSH (In-person, patrick.kelly@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Dr. Scott Limbocker, SOSH (In-person, scott.limbocker@westpoint.edu)

Rapporteur: CDT Isabella Sullivan, USMA (In-person, isabella.sullivan@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dan Vallone, More in Common (In-person, dan@moreincommon.com)
- Major Joseph Amoroso, PhD, SOSH (In-person, joseph.amoroso@westpoint.edu)
- Dr. Jason Lyall, Dartmouth University (Virtual, Jason.lyall@dartmouth.edu)
- Dr. Olga R. Chiriac, Center for Strategic Studies (Virtual, olga.r.chiriac@gmail.com)
- Martin Armstrong, Ohio State University (In-person, Armstrong.828@buckeyemail.osu.edu)

Working Group 10: *Money, Finance, & International Order – Domestic & International Perspectives*

Panel 10A: *Finance, Economics, Strategy and Alliance Management* ***(6 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH501* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Mickey Strasser, SOSH (In-person, mickey.strasser@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Dr. Daniel Fiott, VUB (Virtual, daniel.fiott@vub.be)
- Frank Finelli, The Carlyle Group (In-person, Frank.Finelli@carlyle.com) **Rapporteur:**

MAJ J. Alexander Thew, SOSH (In-person, alex.thew@westpoint.edu) **Panelists:**

- Dr. Ringailė Kuokštytė, General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania (Virtual, ringailekuokstyte@gmail.com)
- LCdr Mike St-Pierre, Canadian Armed Forces Joint War College (In-person, michael.st-pierre@cfc.dnd.ca) , and Mr. Michael Kao, Akanthos Capital Management, LLC (In-person, mkao@akanthoscapital.com)
- Prof. J. Paul Dunne, University of Cape Town, & LTC Jordan Becker, SOSH (Virtual, john.dunne@uct.ac.za)
- Nicolas Véron, Bruegel and Peterson Institute for International Economics (In-person, Nicolas.veron@gmail.com)

Working Group 10: *Money, Finance, & International Order – Domestic & International Perspectives*

Panel 10B: *Money and Finance: International Perspectives* ***(5 In Person, 3 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023 10:30am – 12:15pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH513* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Mickey Strasser, SOSH (In-person, mickey.strasser@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Dr. Daniel Fiott, VUB (Virtual, daniel.fiott@vub.be)
- Frank Finelli, The Carlyle Group (In-person, Frank.Finelli@carlyle.com)

Rapporteur: MAJ J. Alexander Thew, SOSH (In-person, alex.thew@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- MAJ Gabe Royal, MPA, The George Washington University (In-person, gabe_royal@email.gwu.edu)
- Dr. Olga Chiriac, Center for Strategic Studies (Virtual, olga.r.chiriac@gmail.com)
- Jing Luo, PhD, Ohio State University (In-person, luo.1405@buckeyemail.osu.edu)
- Matt Digiuseppe, Leiden University (Virtual, mdigiuseppe@gmail.com)

Working Group 11: *Ideologies & Ordering*

Panel 11A: *Ideologies of Foreign Policy* ***(6 In Person, 4 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH513* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: COL Todd Schmidt, PhD, Army University Press (In-person, todd.a.schmidt.mil@army.mil)

Discussant: LTC Mike Rosol, PhD, SOSH (In-person, michael.rosol@westpoint.edu)

Rapporteurs:

- CPT Jacob Barnes, SOSH (In-person, jacob.barnes@westpoint.edu)
- CDT Seth Benson, USMA (In-person, seth.benson@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Angelos Chryssogelos, London Metropolitan University (Virtual, a.chryssogelos@londonmet.ac.uk)
- Prof. Dr. Sandra Destradi, University of Freiburg (Virtual, Sandra.destradi@politik.uni-freiburg.de)
- Dr. Benjamin Martill & Dr. Alexander Mesarovich, University of Edinburgh (Virtual, Benjamin.martill@ed.ac.uk)
- Erin K. Jenne, Central European Institute (Virtual, jennee@ceu.edu)
- COL E. John Gregory, JD, PhD, USMA/DFL (In-person, eugene.gregory@westpoint.edu) & Dr. Lillian Ho, USMA/DFL (In-person, lihsing.ho@westpoint.edu)

Working Group 11: *Ideologies & Ordering*

Panel 11B: *Ideologies' Effects on Foreign Policy* ***(4 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 10:00am – 12:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH302* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: MAJ Pat Kelly, SOSH (In-person, Patrick.kelly@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Dr. Angelos Chryssogelos, London Metropolitan University (Virtual, a.chryssogelos@londonmet.ac.uk)
Rapporteur: CDT Elisabeth Ake, USMA (In-person, elisabeth.ake@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Andrew Goodhart, Ohio State University (Virtual, goodhart.19@buckeyemail.osu.edu)
- Leo Blanken PhD, Naval Postgraduate School (In-person, ljblanke@nps.edu)
- LTC Todd Hertling, Vanderbilt University (Virtual, todd.r.hertling@vanderbilt.edu)
- Dr. Toby Greene, Bar Ilan University (Virtual, toby.greene@biu.ac.il)
- Maryum N. Alam, PhD Candidate, Ohio State University (Virtual, alam.75@buckeyemail.osu.edu)
- LTC Jordan Becker, SOSH (In-person, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu)

Working Group 12: *Climate, Energy, and Ordering* ***(4 In Person, 5 Virtual)***

Thursday, 9 February 2023: 1:30-3:30pm | Click Here for Abstracts
In-person: *JH402* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dominik P. Jankowski, NATO HQ (Virtual, jankowski.dominik@hq.nato.int)

Discussant: Dr. Emily Holland, Naval War College (In-person, Emily.holland@usnwc.edu)

Rapporteur: Captain Jane Kaufmann, Stanford University (In-person, janekauf@stanford.edu)

Panelists:

- MAJ Joshua Woodaz, SOSH (In-person, Joshua.woodaz@westpoint.edu)
- Dr. Morena Skalamera, Leiden University (In-person, m.skalamera@hum.leidenuniv.nl)
- Zuzanna Nowak, PISM (Virtual, nowak@pism.pl)
- Dr. Jonathan M. DiCicco, PhD, Middle Tennessee State University (Virtual, Jon.DiCicco@mtsu.edu)
- Dr. Noah Zucker, Princeton (Virtual, noahzucker@princeton.edu)
- Katarina Kertysova, European Leadership Network (Virtual, KatarinaK@europeanleadershipnetwork.org)

Working Group 13: *Industry & Armament in a Changing International Order*

Panel 13A: *The US Defense Industrial Base and International Order* ***(2 In Person, 8 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | *Click Here for Abstracts*

In-person: *JH302* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Boston University (Virtual, rosella.cappella@gmail.com)

Discussants:

- Dr. Mark R. Wilson, UNC-Charlotte (Virtual, mrwilson@uncc.edu)
- Frank Finelli, The Carlyle Group (In-person, frank.finelli@carlyle.com)

Rapporteurs:

- Mr. Samuel Gerstle (Virtual, samgerstle@gmail.com)
- Isak Kulalic, Boston University (In-person, ikulalic@bu.edu)

Panelists:

- Jen Spindel, PhD, University of New Hampshire, LTC Keith L. Carter, PhD, USMA, & 2d Lt Colin Gilmore, US Air Force (Virtual, Jennifer.spindel@unh.edu)
- Emma Salisbury, University of London (Virtual, emma.salisbury@gmail.com)
- Corey R. Payne, John Hopkins (Virtual, cpayne@jhu.edu)
- Dr. Charles Mahoney, CSU – Long Beach, Benjamin Tkach, Mississippi State University (Virtual, Charles.mahoney@csulb.edu)
- Bob Bradford, Army War College (Virtual, Robert.bradford@armywarcollege.edu)

Working Group 13: *Industry & Armament in a Changing International Order*

Panel 13B: *Global Defense Industrial Policy and Order* ***(2 In Person, 10 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH302* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Professor Kaija Schilde, Boston University (Virtual, kschilde@bu.edu)

Discussants:

- Prof. J. Paul Dunne, U of Cape Town (Virtual, john.dunne@uct.ac.za)
- Frank Finelli, The Carlyle Group (In-person, frank.finelli@carlyle.com)
- Cynthia Cook, CSIS (Virtual, ccook@csis.org)

Rapporteurs:

- Jade Guiberteau, Master student and RA Defense Economics Chair, ENSAE - IP Paris and Defense Economics Chair (Virtual, jade.guiberteau@outlook.fr)
- Lucas F. Hellemeier, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany (Virtual, lucas_hellemeier@web.de)

Panelists:

- Florian Bodamer, PhD Candidate, Boston University (Virtual, fbodamer@bu.edu)
- LTC Brian Forester, UNC-Chapel Hill (Virtual, bgforester@gmail.com)
- Dr. Antonio Calcara, University of Antwerp (Virtual, Antonio.calcara@uantwerpen.be)
- Paula Alvarez-Couceiro, NAVANTIA SME (Virtual, palvarezc@navantia.es)
- Dr. Marcin Terlikowski, PISM (Virtual, terlikowski@pism.pl)
- LTC Jordan Becker, SOSH (In-person, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu)

Working Group 14: *Terrorism & International Order* ***(3 In Person, 6 Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 1:00-3:00pm | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH501* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chairs: AMB James Jeffrey (Virtual)

COL Sean Morrow, SOSH (In-person, sean.morrow@westpoint.edu)

Discussant: Dr. Nakissa Jahanbani, SOSH (In-person, nakissa.jahanbani@westpoint.edu)

Rapporteur: CDT Kenneth Gentry, USMA (In-person, kenneth.gentry@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Mr. Zachary Kallenborn, University of Maryland (Virtual, zkallenborn@gmail.com); Herbie Tinsley (Virtual, htinsley1@gmail.com); Gary Ackerman, University of Albany (Virtual; gackerman@albany.edu)
- Mr. Jacob Ware, Council on Foreign Relations (Virtual, jaw321@georgetown.edu)
- Dr. Erin McFee, London School of Economics and Political Science & Irregular Warfare Initiative (Virtual, E.McFee@lse.ac.uk)

Working Group 15: *International Order, International Law, and Justice* ***(5In Person, 4Virtual)***

Friday, 10 February 2023: 9:30-11:30am | Click Here for Abstracts

In-person: *JH513* **Virtual:** Click here to join the meeting

Chair: Dr. Hugh Liebert, SOSH (In-person, hugh.liebert@westpoint.edu)

Discussants:

- Prof. Hitoshi Nasu, USMA (In-person, hitoshi.nasu@westpoint.edu)
- Dr. Amitav Acharya, American University (Virtual, aacharya@american.edu)
- Dr. Josh King, SOSH (In-person, Joshua.king@westpoint.edu)

Rapporteurs:

- Captain Jane Kaufmann, Stanford University (In-person, janekauf@stanford.edu)
- CDT Daphne Karahalios, USMA (In-person, daphne.karahalios@westpoint.edu)

Panelists:

- Dr. Thomas Peak, Vilnius University (Virtual, william.peak@tspmi.vu.lt)
- Dr. Anatoly Levshin, Princeton University (Virtual, alevshin@princeton.edu)
- Rafal Tarnogorski, PISM (Virtual, tarnogorski@pism.pl)

International Security Seminar 2023

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